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Abstract
In the 21st century, law-enforcement, military, border patrol, and private companies all use a
wide variety of surveillance equipment that is tailored to their specific needs. This equipment is
expensive, typically requires an enormous capital investment, and often fails to live up to
expectations; there must be a better way. The primary objective of this thesis is to conceptualize
a new and more capable surveillance system, dubbed the Portable Sensor Network (PSN), which
can either augment or entirely replace existing systems. The core concept of the PSN demands
that it must affordable, portable, modular, and based on existing, commercially available
technology. To achieve this goal a four step methodology has been developed: analysis of
customer’s needs, analysis of the capabilities and features of existing systems, development of
the PSN based on that analyses, and finally, analysis of the fully developed PSN’s effectiveness
via analytical methods borrowed from the field of intelligence analysis. By the end of this thesis,
it should be clear to the reader which surveillance system(s) are most effective in a given
scenario and how the PSN can augment or replace that system(s).

ix
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Introduction
Background
Various electronic sensors have been utilized for decades in surveillance systems designed to
provide intrusion detection for everything from national borders to prison walls. Modern
surveillance systems are required to provide border intelligence for three classes of geographic
regions: geopolitical borders, localities (e.g., cities, ports, small islands, etc.) under strict military
or police observation (perhaps even quarantine), and fixed installations (e.g., power plants,
military bases, airports, etc.). While these systems have evolved significantly from their original
incarnation, they have been proven insufficient to cope with the 21st century threats facing the
United States at home and abroad. The failure of the U.S. to secure neither the U.S.-Mexico
border nor the Afghanistan-Pakistan border are two of the most egregious and well-known
failures to successfully implement an affordable system to monitor geopolitical borders.
One of the biggest problems facing those whose task it is to address the problem of insufficient
surveillance is cost. The cost of a surveillance system can be broken down into four categories:
development, procurement, operational, and maintenance. In the case of the U.S. – Mexico and
Afghanistan – Pakistan borders, the cost of border surveillance has been a topic of great debate.
Successful monitoring of the U.S.-Mexico border is an essential step in reducing the flow of
illegal narcotics and undocumented immigrants into the U.S; a task which has required enormous
capital investments. Unfortunately the border is still insecure despite the fact that the U.S. has
invested billions of dollars into new technology, technology that has been augmented by a two
fold increase in the number of border patrol agents (since 2004) and deployment of 1,200
National Guard troops along the border.12 With respect to the surveillance needs of the U.S. –
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Mexico border, the problem is both a lack of funding and the allocation of that funding. One
such example is the choice made by the DHS to fund the Secure Border Initiative (SBI)3, a multibillion dollar program that was cancelled in 2011 because it both ran over budget and failed to
live to live up to expectations.
Attempts to properly monitor the Afghanistan – Pakistan border have had failures not unlike
those encountered by DHS. Here to the problem is not a lack of funding, it is how that funding
has and continues to be appropriated. Given these facts, the question becomes: how should
current funding be allocated so that it both maximizes effectiveness and reduces cost? Secretary
Janet Napolitano addressed this question in January of 2011. The following statement was made
by the Secretary elaborating as to why DHS cancelled the SBI in favor of a less expensive
program known as the Alternative SBI4:
"There is no 'one-size-fits-all' solution to meet our border
technology needs, and this new strategy is tailored to the unique
needs of each border region, providing faster deployment of
technology, better coverage, and a more effective balance between
cost and capability."5

Farley, R. (2011). Obama Says Border Patrol Has Doubled the Number of Agents Since 2004. Politifactcheck.com,
May 2011.
2
According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, the Southwest Border remains the primary gateway for moving
illicit drugs into the United States. This is estimated to be between a $50 and $60 billion business that relies on
smuggling in two directions: immigrants and narcotics are smuggled into the U.S. while drug money, weapons, and
ammunition are smuggled out.
Molzahn, Rios, and David A. Shirk. Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2011. University of San
Diego, Trans-Border Institute: Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies.
3
SBInet Program: Program-Specific Recovery Act Plan. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and
Border Protection, May 15, 2009
4
Zuckerman, Jessica. “The 2013 Homeland Security Budget: Misplaced Priorities.” The Heritage Foundation,
March 23, 2012.
5
“Napolitano Cancels Virtual Border Fence Project, Proposes Alternative.” Fox News, January 14, 2011.
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Secretary Napolitano’s statement reflects DHS’s new approach to border security, an approach
that is the antithesis of the one embodied by the original SBI. This approach calls for the
recalculation of available funds towards programs that provide faster deployment of technology,
better coverage, and achieve a more effective balance between cost and capability. To date, this
plan has proven a more effective use of resources than was achieved under the prior initiative.
Despite this success, there is room for further optimization, optimization that challenges the
Secretary’s statement that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution. There may not be a one-sizefits-all system, but there may very well be a one-size-fits-all solution – a solution that not only
addresses the surveillance problems of DHS but those of other organizations as well.

Foundation of the Solution
The solution to the problem posed by over-budget and insufficient surveillance systems is threefold. First, the solution, or asset(s) implemented, must be budget friendly. Any economist will
tell you that, all things being equal, as the production of a given product increases the cost to
produce that product decreases. In this case, the product that is being considered is surveillance
equipment designed to monitor geopolitical borders. As the production of a single surveillance
product increases, its cost decreases. The problem with the SBI is that the technology being
produced was in the form of large and very expensive installations that contained the latest
technology available such as advanced, long-range radar.6 Development and research cost
remain the same regardless of how many assets are purchased, a cost that is shared in the per unit
price of the final asset. As the number of assets produced decreases the development and
research cost shared by each of those assets increases, driving up the final price of each (e.g., the
6
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B-2, F-22, and DDG-1000 programs)7. No matter how many of these ‘products’ DHS purchases
they will always remain relatively expensive. An alternative to this approach is investing in
smaller hardware that can be mass produced, a concept DHS has begun to adopt with the
implementation of the alternative SBI. With that in mind, the alternative SBI is based around
the acquisition of hundreds of surveillance assets as opposed to only a dozen. Though a step
forward, there is room to take this concept even further. In place of adopting assets produced by
the hundreds, DHS could invest in the acquisition of less expensive assets numbering in the
thousands, thereby reducing the per-unit (and total program) costs that much more. This
however is not the only way to reduce costs.
In an effort to further reduce the costs, any new surveillance assets employed should be
developed in such a way that they appeal to a wide variety of organizations. As the number of
organizations interested in a new asset increase the capital investment required by a single
organization to develop that asset decreases. Unfortunately, achieving this is no small task.
Doing so requires the development of an asset that is the solution to a problem shared by every
organization for which the asset, or solution, is intended to appeal. This is a difficult task given
the organizations covered in this thesis: DHS, the owners of critical infrastructure, and the
military. Nonetheless a problem has been found, the identification of items of interest (IOI).
The second part of the solution relates to the actual design of the asset(s) itself. DHS’s decision
to invest, via the implementation of the alternative SBI program, in surveillance assets that use
off the shelf technology was a step in the right direction but one that, as was the case with the
acquisition of new assets, can be taken even further. It is one thing to use off-the-shelf
technology, it is another thing entirely to use 100%, commercially available components, the
7
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type of components marketed to every day citizens. The more these types of components are
used, the greater the savings. The potential savings may be so great and the development cost so
low that private companies take it upon themselves to develop the asset without first being
contacted by customers to do so.8 Another advantage of using off-the-shelf components is that it
reduces the time required to go from concept to production. While it may take additional time to
implement these assets, doing so can be reduced if the contractor used to develop and produce
them is the same contractor responsible for the production and development of existing assets.
The third and final part of the solution proposed addresses the inability of existing surveillance
systems to identify IOIs. The three key components to surveillance are detection, identification,
and tracking of IOIs. Nearly all surveillance systems are designed to detect and track IOI’s, but
very few have the capability to identify them. Even fewer have the capability to distinguish
between objects of the same class (e.g., a pleasure craft vs. a smuggler’s go fast boat, a narcotics
smuggler vs. an illegal immigrant, etc.). If an asset can be developed that addresses this problem
it has the potential to replace or augment existing surveillance systems in service with all three
organizations. This asset is the Portable Sensor Network (PSN).
In addition to addressing the above deficits, the core concept of the PSN requires it to be
portable, modular, upgradable, and reusable. Although these requirements place additional
restrictions on the final design of the PSN, those restrictions are nowhere near as restrictive as
the final and most difficult requirement: the design of the PSN must be original. Original means
just that, a system that, to the best of anyone’s knowledge (the knowledge possessed by
individuals whose domain is surveillance equipment, not your average bystander), has never
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been designed. The PSN cannot simply imitate the design of current systems by either
improving the capabilities of those systems or reducing the cost of acquiring them.
Methodology
The PSN is a fully integrated, portable, modular, upgradable, rapidly deployable, and
inexpensive sensor system that fulfills the needs expressed in the preceding paragraph. The
primary objective of this thesis is to conceptualize a new and more capable surveillance system,
dubbed the Portable Sensor Network, which can either augment or entirely replace existing
systems. A four step process has been developed to accomplish this objective: analysis into
whether or not demand for the PSN exist (or a surveillance system similar to it), development of
a working concept off of which a tangible product can be modeled, analysis of the proposed
system’s performance against existing ones, and to provide proof of concept by actually
constructing one of the sensors the PSN would employs. This four step process is the
methodology on which this thesis is based. If successful, it should be clear to the reader which
surveillance system(s) are most effective in a given scenario and how the PSN can augment or
replace that system(s). The first step towards achieving this task is to determine to whether or
not and to what extent demand for the PSN exist. Demand, in this case, is the main discourse of
the first two chapters.
Summary Introduction to Each Chapter
Each of the chapters in this thesis is part of the four step process described in the previous
paragraph. The following is an introduction to these chapters and how each of them contribute
to the overall methodology.
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Chapter 1: Surveillance Demands in the 21st Century
In Chapter 1, surveillance demands are broken down by the three organizations analyzed in this
thesis. Each organization has its own subchapter which itself is broken down into four sections:
review, criteria/condition, summary, and mission/scenario table. The majority of the material
presented in each subchapter is done so in the review. The review section contains information
detailing the background and various missions each organization performs. This information is
broken down according to the type of surveillance, offensive or defensive, and the specific
missions performed within each surveillance type. Following the review is list of each
organization’s criteria and condition. Criteria and condition are gathered based on an analysis of
the review. Criteria determine what capabilities an organization must possess in order to fulfill
its mission. Condition is the actual ability that organization possesses. The criteria examined in
this chapter came from several sources, including: legislation, contracts, white papers, and
criteria based on a stated objective (e.g., a public affairs statement regarding the goals of an
organization). As part of this examination a gap analyses is performed. This analysis assesses
the gap, if any, that exist between an organization’s surveillance capabilities and their designated
criteria. Both this gap and the criteria from which it is derived are crucial details to consider
when determining whether or not the PSN is a viable solution for the needs of a given
organization. Immediately following the criteria and condition list is a summary. This primary
purpose of this summary is to create an abridged list of an organization’s criteria that includes
mention of what criteria on that list is not satisfied by that organization’s current surveillance
system(s). Following the summary is a scenario specific requirements table.
This table takes the information obtained in the review of an organization and translates it into a
table that quantifies that organization’s surveillance demands. These demands are quantified
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according to the different surveillance missions performed by an organization and the conditions
under which those missions are performed. At the end of the chapter, the data contained in each
organization’s table is assembled into a master one. The master table serves as a reference for
determining the needs of one organization versus the needs of another. It also highlights the
specific surveillance needs according to external variables such as terrain and climate.
Ultimately, this information is analyzed with respect to a similar table located at the end of
Chapter 2.
Chapter 2: Analysis Existing and Proposed Surveillance Systems
Once it can be determined what customers want and need in a surveillance system attention is
turned towards existing and emerging surveillance systems against which the PSN would
compete. Chapter 2 of this thesis does just that, it analyzes the features and capabilities of
existing and emerging surveillance systems. All of the major existing surveillance systems,
particularly those in wide spread use by U.S. organizations, are analyzed to determine their key
features, capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, and operators (organizations). This data is then
compiled at the end of each surveillance system’s analysis as an abridged summary. Following
each system’s summary is a table similar to those constructed in Chapter 1, and like Chapter 1, a
master table is created from them and placed at the end of the chapter. This table assists in
determining what features the PSN must possess to be competitive with existing systems and
what shortcomings those systems have that the PSN can address. It is crucial that this analysis
yield useful data that can be applied to the development of the PSN if it is ever going to be
viewed as a viable alternative or augmentation to existing, already proven hardware. Moreover,
this table helps to assess what features existing systems possess that are transferrable to clientele
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who have yet to take advantage of them. With this information in hand the development of a
better and more capable system can proceed.
Chapter 3: Conceptualizing a Better System
The major objective of Chapter 3 is to analyze the tables constructed in the first two chapters.
Analysis of these tables is performed to determine what surveillance system(s) are best suited to
fulfill the scenario specific surveillance demands of an organization on a mission by mission
basis. This analysis also highlights scenarios in which two or more organizations have
overlapping surveillance demands. Knowing this information helps to determine what
components (certain capabilities are directly related to the components installed, others are not)
of the PSN should have a modular design. Taking this approach enables the development of a
system whose variants share the maximum number of unique components, reducing overall cost
of each PSN unit. Next, analysis of the tables from Chapters 1 and 2 is conducted to reveal
which scenario-specific missions have surveillance demands that have not been satisfied by
existing surveillance systems.
Following this analysis the tactics and operational use of existing surveillance systems are
examined on a scenario by scenario basis. Understanding how an organization employs their
surveillance systems and the contribution those systems have with respect to that organization’s
broader mission is crucial to the development of the PSN. This examination makes use of the
Scenario-Specific Optimization Asset (SOSA). SOSA is used, in this chapter, to generate some
of the images used to illustrate specific scenarios and the organization-specific tactics used in
them.

10

Chapter 4: Design of the Portable Sensor Network
Chapter 4 begins with a quick review of the analysis and examination conducted in chapter 3.
This information is then applied to the requirements imposed on the design of the PSN (e.g.,
portable, modular, cheap, original, etc.). This examination and all of the research conducted
prior to it is taken and used to create a preliminary design for the PSN. This design is the
product of multiple, unsuccessful versions of the PSN that preceded it. For that reason, the
design history of the PSN is discussed prior to introducing the final design itself. Using this
approach explains how and why the final design came in to being, an excellent method of
introducing the final designs itself.
Next, the various features of the PSN are discussed. While many, but not all, of these features
are taken from the table at the beginning of the chapter, the discussion of them in this section is
in greater detail and in the context of their specific application to the PSN. There are however
some features and capabilities that require further elaboration. These features and capabilities,
due to their originality, will no doubt be scrutinized more than those which are already
considered to be proven technologies. As a result, they are explained in greater detail than those
covered earlier in the chapter. At the conclusion of this chapter the actual design of each variant
of the PSN can begin.
Chapter 5: Variants and Deployment of the PSN
The preliminary design, features, and scenario-specific use of the PSN is used in this chapter to
determine how many versions of the PSN are required and what features those versions require.
This information is then taken and used to determine the approximate cost of each version. Next,
the individual variants are deployed in mock scenarios. This is intended to show how these
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sensors are both deployed, operated, and maintained in the field.

The majority of the mock

scenarios performed in this chapter will be similar to those from chapter 3. The only exception is
that in this chapter the PSN is used in lieu of real-world systems. The purpose of this is to
determine whether or not the PSN provides any benefit over existing systems and whether or not
the capabilities of the PSN can be utilized without modifying the tactics used in those scenarios.
Any scenario that requires and/or allows for the use of different tactics when the PSN is
deployed is examined to determine the costs and/or benefits of using those tactics, a task that is
made much easier via the use of SOSA. Although SOSA is used to generate illustrations similar
to those in chapter 3, it is used to its full extent in this chapter to both compare different systems
and optimize the placement of them.
Chapter 6: Analysis of the Proposed System
Once the operation of each sensor system has been established an analysis of each variant of the
PSN is conducted. These analyses compare the PSN against existing sensor systems as well as
judge its ability to handle various scenarios which it may encounter (scenarios derived from
historical precedence and those which are entirely hypothetical).

Figure I.1: Methodology behind the development of the PSN
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It is important to acknowledge that the process outlined by the steps in the methodology above is
an active one. For example, if analysis conducted in chapter 5 reveals a weakness in the
operation of the PSN, that weakness will be addressed, if possible, by rethinking the design and
operation of a specific sensor, component, or sub-component. The overall methodology and the
active process of break analysis that supports it is summarized in Figure I.1.
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Chapter 1: Surveillance Demands in the 21st Century
Condition and Criteria
The surveillance demands of any given organization can be determined from three sources: those
that are explicitly stated by that organization or any organizations to which it is subservient; inhouse and third party audits of an organization that reveal gaps in that organization’s surveillance
capabilities; and those needs which can be derived from an organization’s mission statement,
stated objective, and/or responsibilities. These three sources of an organization’s surveillance
demands are known as the ‘criteria’. Criteria are the litmus test against which the surveillance
capabilities of an organization are judged.
On its own, criteria is nothing more than a statement of the ideal surveillance capabilities an
organization possesses. In the real world the capabilities of an organization rarely meet or
exceed those expected of it. The current state of these capabilities is called the ‘condition’, a
statement of what is. Condition refers to the total surveillance capability surveillance of an
organization, not the capability of any single component or system (some organizations have
multiple surveillance systems, each of which has components of its own). At this point it is
important to note that surveillance related condition and criteria are not always explicitly stated
as surveillance specific. Any criteria or condition which has a surveillance component or
depends implicitly upon surveillance is also a possible source of both criteria and condition.
When condition and criteria are combined they paint a picture that reveals both an organizations
surveillance demands and where those demands are not met. The difference between condition
and criteria is known as the ‘gap’.9 Most criteria are either explicitly stated by an organization or

9

Note: Condition and criteria are commonly used terms in the auditing process. The Government Accountability
Office (GAO), the preeminent auditing agency for the U.S. federal government, uses this technique as standard
procedure when conducting its own audits. The complete auditing process involves determining the condition,
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can be derived from that organization’s goals/objectives. Condition on the other hand is most
often found in reviews and/or audits of an organization’s surveillance capabilities. The
following chapter examines major organizations in the U.S. and abroad that rely on surveillance
to fulfill their mission. This examination further breaks down the mission of each organization
by defining the type of perimeter each of these organization monitors. Since no formal definition
of perimeters exist that is common to each, a three tier system has been developed: hard, soft,
and dynamic. Hard perimeters are perimeters that have a static outer edge defined by a physical
barrier (e.g., an Army fort, Air Force base, Naval port, prison, etc.). Soft perimeters are static
perimeters which have no physical barriers (i.e., a coast line or geo-political border, small,
circular forest with ‘private property, do not enter’ signs every 50 ft, etc.). A dynamic barrier on
the other hand is more ethereal than its counterparts. Any surveillance asset serving in support
of a dynamic barrier must be able to adapt according to the day to day needs of its operators.
Moreover, dynamic barriers are not really barriers at all; they are more or less regions of
surveillance that encircle a semi-permanent or newly established installation (e.g., a forward
operating base, tactical airfield, etc.)
Due to the variety of surveillance demands that exist across the whole of the whole of the
organizations covered in this chapter, each sub-chapter is organized according to both the
aforementioned perimeter but also the type of surveillance (mission type) being performed:
offensive or defensive.

criteria, cause, and effect of whatever capability is being audited (in this case surveillance). In this thesis, the final
two steps in the audit process are implicit in the analysis of the organizations themselves, not explicitly stated like
condition and criteria.
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Defensive Surveillance
Defensive surveillance applies to surveillance that is conducted for the purpose of detecting
intruders who approach and/or cross the perimeter of an asset whose perimeters may be protected
by any one of the three perimeters discussed earlier: hard, soft, and dynamic. The protection of
these assets is made all the more difficult by the vast array of assets that fall into one of these
three categories. This is especially true in the case of military assets. Consequently, the military
has a greater number of missions unique to each type of perimeter. The vast majority of
missions performed by all three of the organizations reviewed in this chapter are defensive, and
the majority of those are in the defense of hard borders.
Offensive Surveillance
For the purpose of this thesis, offensive surveillance is classified as surveillance conducted to
gather intelligence not directly linked to the security of a perimeter or installation. Offensive
surveillance is not always conducted in support of immediate, offensive military action; it may
be conducted for the sole purpose of gathering intelligence useful to individuals making key
decisions related to U.S. national security or foreign policy.
Following the detailed review of each organization there is summary which lists the major
criteria and condition(s) of that organization. Each criteria and condition are broken into two
parts which are separated by a hyphen. The first part is the official criteria/condition that more
often than not surveillance specific, the second describes specifically how that criteria/condition
relates surveillance.
In addition to the review and summary there is a surveillance table that quantifies the various
surveillance needs of an organization. Depending on the number of unique missions and the
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number of scenarios per mission, each of which has its own surveillance requirements, an
organization can have a table with multiple rows, with one mission-scenario combination per
row.10 There are however thousands of possible combinations per mission. In an effort to
reduce the number of rows in the final table (to a manageable number), a maximum of five
scenarios have been logged per organization. These five mission-scenario combinations are
modeled after a real life mission-scenario combination.11 Depending on the scenario,
surveillance assets currently in use may be declared in the scenario title. The following list
contains the name and description of the variables used in these tables to quantify the
surveillance requirements of each organization’s mission-scenario combination(s)12:
Scenario Title: The specific title of the scenario. This title is typically named based on the real world
scenario on which it was modeled.
Operator: The name of the organization represented in that row’s mission-scenario combination. This
field has two parts that are separated by a hyphen. The first part is the organization or mission itself, the
second is the parent organization and/or class of organization to which the first belongs (e.g., CBP/DHS,
Army/Military, Air Force/Military, etc.)
Surveillance Mission: Indicates whether the surveillance conducted in this row is offensive or defensive
Objective: Indicates how the surveillance assets are with respect to the broader mission. Assets
implemented can be used to deter, detain, overtly survey, or covertly survey IOIs.
Preconditions: Not used until chapter 3. This is a variable similar to scenario title but is only used in
custom scenarios, and is therefore N/A to the scenarios outlined in this chapter
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The number of rows can vary for many reasons. The first and most obvious reason there may be additional rows
is because a particular organization has multiple surveillance needs (e.g., multiple offensive and/or defensive
missions each with their own requirements, etc.). However, an organization may also have additional rows if
characteristics within that mission vary based on certain criteria, in which case there are multiple ‘scenarios’ for a
single mission. For example, an organization may have defensive requirements based on the type of a perimeter
used in a particular scenario. If that same mission has different surveillance requirements when the perimeter is
changed (e.g., soft to hard) then that scenario will be added to the matrix as a new, independent row.
11
For example: if there was a real nuclear power plant needing defensive surveillance, that piece of critical
infrastructure and the surveillance requirements demanded by it would be translated via the use this rating system
into a mission-scenario combination.
12
Some of the variables listed in this section are rated on a scale from 1 to 5 or 1 to 10. Each value of a rating has a
unique description attached to it, a description which varies from variable to variable. Appendix A has a list that
describes the meaning behind the values attached to each variable
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Type of Perimeter: Indicates the type of perimeter surrounding an installation requiring defensive
surveillance. The three types of perimeters are hard, soft, and dynamic. All scenarios with an offensive
surveillance mission are designated as having a dynamic perimeter
Perimeter Length: Perimeter length is the length, in meters, of the perimeter requiring surveillance. In
the case of a border, the perimeter length is the length of the border needing surveillance. Some scenarios
are a microcosm of larger ones. Scenarios of this type are denoted with an asterix and, if known, the
length of the actual perimeter
Required Portability Rating: The portability requirements associated with a specific scenario. These
requirements represent the maximum size and weight of surveillance assets that can be used in a
particular scenario. These requirements are rated on a scale from 1 to 10 with 10 being the most portable
Required Setup and Teardown Rating: The time and manpower requirements associated with a
specific scenario. These requirements represent the maximum time and manpower allotted to initially
setup and then later repackage a particular scenario’s surveillance assets. These requirements are rated on
a scale from 1 to 10 with 10 requiring the least time and manpower
Required Endurance: The endurance requirements associated with a specific scenario. Endurance is
rated according to the number of days (and fractions of a day) an asset must remain operational without
service of any kind. Most scenarios do not require (hence the word must) assets with specific endurance
requirements since those scenarios take place under conditions where resupply is not an issue (e.g., along
a border that is frequented by personnel on a daily basis). Scenarios with no endurance requirements are
designated N/A
Terrain Rating: Terrain rating is used to quantify the type of terrain in which a particular scenario takes
place. The terrain quantified is only that terrain which falls within the scope of that scenario (e.g., terrain
beyond a given scenario’s required distance of detection or identification is irrelevant). This rating varies
on a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 being the most uneven
Foliage Rating: Foliage rating is used to describe the type and density of vegetation in which a scenario
takes place. Both the type and density of foliage are represented by a single variable. In addition to
describing type and density, this rating defines how much the foliage present inhibits the operation of
surveillance assets. Foliage is rated on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the most surveillance inhibiting
Required Low Observability Rating: Low observability requirements rating is used to quantify how
important it is that the surveillance assets used in a particular scenario are and remain covert. Low
observability is rated on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the most covert
Required Detection Range of Vehicles13: The distance from the perimeter a vehicle must be detectable

13

All detection, identification, and tracking requirements are under nighttime conditions. Although many
surveillance missions are conducted during the day, the majority of those missions have are conducted both day
and night. The rational for choosing nighttime is three-fold. First, conditions at night are far more stringent than
during the day (including thermal since nearly all are equipped with daytime optics), any surveillance asset will
perform equally or better during the day. Second, it would be much more difficult to rate requirements for both
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Required Detection Range of Humans: The distance from the perimeter a human must be detectable
Required Class-Specific Identification Range of Vehicles (see footnote 13 below): The distance from
the perimeter at which surveillance assets are required to identify vehicles as belonging to a particular
sub-class (e.g., a car vs. a truck or an ultra-light vs. a Cessna)
Required Class-Specific Identification Range of Humans: The distance from the perimeter at which
surveillance assets are required to identify the number of individuals traveling in a single group on foot
Required Recognition Range: The distance from the perimeter at which surveillance assets are required
to recognize the intent of a vehicle or human. A single variable is chosen since it is equally as difficult to
discern the intent of individuals in a vehicle (e.g., a truck load of illegal immigrants vs. some ranchers in
their pickup) as it is individuals on foot humans (e.g., a smuggler versus a terrorist versus an illegal
immigrant)
Required Tracking Depth of Detected Vehicles: This distance from the point of detection that
surveillance assets are required to maintain constant surveillance contact with vehicles. The vector of this
distance, or depth, depends on the mission type. If the mission is defensive surveillance of any kind or
offensive surveillance of a border, the required tracking depth is oriented with respect to the
border/perimeter. If the mission is offensive surveillance of a fixed perimeter, the tracking depth oriented
with respect to the center of the installation/perimeter being surveyed. Figures 1.1 through 1.5 at the end
of this list provide a graphical depiction of these measurements, measurements which apply to all tracking
variables
Required Tracking Depth of Detected Humans: This distance from the point of detection that
surveillance assets are required to maintain constant surveillance contact with humans
Required Tracking Depth of Class-Specific Vehicles: This distance from the point of identification that
surveillance assets are required to maintain constant, class-specific contact with vehicles
Required Tracking Depth of Class-Specific Humans: This distance from the point of identification that
surveillance assets are required to maintain constant, class-specific contact with humans
Required Tracking Depth of Recognition for IOIs: This distance from the point of identification that
surveillance assets are required to maintain constant, recognition contact with IOIs
Surveillance Budget: The surveillance budget is the total, scenario specific, funding, in U.S. dollars,
allotted for the acquisition of surveillance assets. In many cases the surveillance budget will be N/A (the
scenarios in this chapter are modeled after equipment that is already in place, not equipment up for
purchase. This variable is used more extensively in chapter 3

day and night. Finally, it is unlikely that the surveillance requirements for a particular scenario change from day to
night, only the capabilities of a particular asset.
All detection and identification ranges, in meters, are positive if the range is outside the perimeter, negative if inside.
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Important notes regarding the variables above:
Later in this thesis the detection, identification, and tracking variables are all graphed. The large
number of them makes it very difficult to both first create and afterwards view a graph that large
(particularly since those variables apply to individual surveillance assets as well). To make the
graphing of data used in this and later chapters easier to handle, the required detection range of
humans and the required class-specific identification range of vehicles are given the same value.
Similarly, the class-specific identification range of humans and the recognition range of IOI have
been combine into single table as well. For the purposes of the table below, the table at the end
of this chapter, and all graphs created in this thesis, the two combination variables described
above are named ‘Required Range of Vehicle Human Detection’ and ‘Recognition Range of IOI’
respectively.14 The same logic has also been applied in similar manner to the tracking variables
which have been combine to form the variables ‘Required Tracking Depth of IOIs’ and
‘Required Tracking Depth of Recognition IOIs’
The following figures are a graphical depiction of the different tracking depths and detection
ranges described in the list above. It is important to remember that Figures 1.2 through 1.5 are
only representative of an airborne asset’s tracking depth. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 only apply to
installations with a fixed outer perimeter (does not matter the type of perimeter). First, Figure
1.1, a depiction of detection ranges with respect to a border.
Figure 1.1 depicts the all three of the detection ranges and tracking depths (vehicle, human, and
recognition). In order to make this page image less burdening to look at the entire next page has
been devoted to it.
14

It was important to list all four variables in the list above despite the fact that only two are used. The reader now
knows what variables where considered when creating each scenario and why those variables where chosen.
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Figure 1.1: Detection ranges and tracking depths
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Figure 1.2: Offensive surveillance. All offensive surveillance assets must orbit
the center of the perimeter so that their detection radius is tangent to it. As a
result, the tracking depth is oriented with respect to the center of the perimeter

Figure 1.3: Defensive surveillance around a perimeter. All airborne defensive assets
must operate such that the inner detection range is tangent to or inside the perimeter.
The required tracking depth is measured outwards from the perimeter
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Figure 1.4: An example of offensive and defensive tracking depth along a border. The tracking depth is
oriented with respect to the border

Figure 1.5: An example of purely defensive tracking depth. The tracking depth has an inner depth that
inside or on the border itself. The tracking depth is oriented with respect to the border

Figure 1.6: An example of purely offensive tracking depth along a border. The inner detection radius
extends beyond the border. The tracking depth is oriented with respect to the border
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When assembled, the variables above form a table identical to Table 1.1 below (to make this
table easier to read it was broken into two different rows. The tables following each organization
are displayed in this method while the master table at the end of this chapter is arrayed
horizontally on two pages):
Scenario

Operator

Terrain
Rating

Foliage
Rating

Surveillance
Mission

Required
Low
Observ.
Rating

Objective

Required
Detection
Range of
Vehicles

Preconditions

Required
Detection
Range of
Humans

Type of
Perim.

Recognition
Range

Perim.
Length

Required
Tracking
Depth of
Vehicles

Required
Portability
Rating

Required Setup
and Teardown
Rating

Required
Tracking
Depth of
Humans

Required
Tracking
Depth of
Recognized
IOIs

Required
Endurance

Surveillance
Budget

Table 1.1: An example of the scenario tables used in this

At the end of this chapter there is a master table that contains the surveillance requirements of all
three organizations. This table is used in chapter 3 to aid in the design and marketing15 of the
PSN.
The first agency to undergo examination is U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the organization
that has the most to benefit from the development of the PSN.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) – DHS
Defensive Surveillance of Hard and Soft Perimeters – Border Protection
CBP is one of 22 federal agencies that make up the recently formed DHS. DHS is tasked with
fulfilling five distinct missions:16
•

15

Prevent terrorism and enhancing security

Not from a sales point of view but rather from a development one. This matrix will assist in determining what
organizations might be interested in the PSN and what organizations / missions should be ignored during the
development of it. Simply put, the surveillance requirements of these organizations exceed the surveillance
capabilities of the PSN, capabilities which are limited by the underlying concept on which the PSN was founded.
16
“Our Mission.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, February 2013.
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•

Secure and manage our borders

•

Enforce and administer our immigration laws

•

Safeguard and secure cyberspace

•

Ensure resilience to disasters

Of these five missions, CBP is the primary agency responsible for both ‘securing and managing
our borders’ and the ‘enforcement and administration of our immigration laws’. It should also
come as no surprise that, while not the lead agency, CBP also plays an important role in
‘preventing terrorism and enhancing security’. These three missions place a high demand on
CBP’s limited resources, especially when considering the physical types and domain CBP is
responsible for monitoring. This mission is conducted in the defense of both hard and soft
perimeters, perimeters that are often defended by a combination of each (i.e., in some locations
the U.S. – Mexico border is fenced while in other it is undefended). Regardless of the type of
perimeter being defended, CBP’s self-described mission remains the same:
“U.S. Customs and Border Protection is responsible for guarding nearly 7,000 miles of land
border the United States shares with Canada and Mexico and 2,000 miles of coastal waters
surrounding the Florida peninsula and off the coast of Southern California. The agency also
protects 95,000 miles of maritime border in partnership with the United States Coast Guard.”17
This undertaking requires a large surveillance network, without which the 61,000 employees of
CBP would be unable to perform the task laid before them. These employees are divided
amongst the various mission teams, the largest of which is the U.S. Border Patrol. Border Patrol,

17

“Protecting Our Borders: This is CBP.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and Border Protection,
September 2012.
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founded in 1924, is an organization that has doubled since 200418 to a force of over 22,000 in
2013.19 According to the CBP, the two-part mission of Border Patrol is:
“… preventing terrorists and terrorists weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, from
entering the United States...”20
“… to detect and prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States… maintain borders that
work - facilitating the flow of legal immigration and goods while preventing the illegal
trafficking of people and contraband.”21
These missions must be accomplished across vast land and seascapes. Border Patrol’s domain,
which is nearly identical to that of CBP, is described by them as being “…nearly 6,000 miles of
Mexican and Canadian international land borders and over 2,000 miles of coastal waters
surrounding the Florida Peninsula and the island of Puerto Rico.”22
Due in large part to the size of this domain, it is the Border Patrol agents who benefit the most
from the implementation of new, more effective surveillance technology. Unfortunately, recent
attempts to implement new surveillance technology, particularly along the U.S. – Mexico border,
have met with only mild success.

18

Farley, R. (2011). Obama Says Border Patrol Has Doubled the Number of Agents Since 2004.
Politifactcheck.com, May 2011.
19
Snapshot: A Summary of CBP Facts and Figures for 2012. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and
Border Protection, January 2013. p. 1
20
Border Patrol Overview. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and Border Protection: Border Patrol,
January 2011.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
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According to DHS’ own assessments, in 2010 only half of the southern border and 2% of the
northern border were deemed acceptably secure. 23 This is despite the fact that CBP has spent
over $5 billion in new fencing and technology. The fencing alone has cost billions –
approximately $3 million per mile less the cost of maintenance for the 649 miles that have been
constructed to date.24 Several billions more have been increasing the number of border patrol
agents, expanding the force every year since 2001. There are currently 21,970 Border Patrol
agents in CBP, of which nearly 18,000 are tasked with monitoring the U.S.-Mexico border.
Although the border is only marginally more secure now than it was in 2010, DHS has recently
classified the southern border as acceptably secure. It is important to note however that prior to

Figure 1.7: GAO analysis of CBP data25

23

An acceptable level of border security is defined as possessing the capability detect, deter, and/or intercept
violators at the border or shortly thereafter. There is no mention as to how effective these capabilities must be, only
that they exist.
Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. Southwest and Northern Borders. U.S.
Government Accountability Office, March 2011. p. 2
24
Secure Border Initiative Fence Construction Cost. U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 9, 2009. p. 4
25
Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status and
Resource Needs. US Government Accountability Office, December 2012. p. 29
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the border being declared secure, DHS changed the criteria defining what is and what is not
secure.26 Nonetheless, issues remain. GAO analysis of CBP data (Figure 1.7) shows that
attempts to cross the southern border have sharply decreased over the past 5 years. This same
analysis states that the number of ‘got aways’ have declined as a percentage of total border
violators, proof that the border is more secure27. Analysis conducted in association with thesis
suggests that the actual cause behind the increase in apprehensions and got aways is more
complex. In the same GAO report that quoted the DHS as having said the southern border was
acceptably secure there was a comment from DHS acknowledging that part of their ‘success’
was a decrease in border violators, the suggested cause being the contraction of the U.S.
economy.28 The result is a scenario in which the number of detected border violators drops from
620,000 in 2006 to 193,000 in 2011 during which period the DHS increased the number of
Border Patrol agents and pumped billions of tax payer dollars into surveillance programs.
Analysis of the externalities/circumstances that contributed to a drop in the annual number of
border violators is evidence enough to question the DHS’s claim that the border is acceptably
secure. At best, the circumstances surrounding DHS’s claim make the statement itself
premature; hard proof that DHS has acceptably secured the border would be for them to do so
under the same conditions that have prompted illegal immigration to rise in the past. Once and
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Progress Made and Work Remaining after Nearly 10 Years in Operation. U.S. Government Accountability
Office, February 2013. p. 1
27
Despite the increase, less than 2/3rd of the known violators are intercepted and detained. 13% of violators
successfully evaded Border Patrol agents and gained illegal entry while 20% avoided capture by re-crossing the
border to Mexico. These figures do not take into account the unknown number of violators who were not detected
by the Border Patrol.
Progress Made and Work Remaining after Nearly 10 Years in Operation. U.S. Government Accountability Office,
February 2013. p. 1
Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource
Needs. US Government Accountability Office, December 2012. p. 29
28
Progress Made and Work Remaining after Nearly 10 Years in Operation. U.S. Government Accountability Office,
February 2013. p. 1
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only once this scenario is faced and successfully countered can CBP declare victory and the
southern border ‘acceptably’ secure.
Far from being able to declare the border secure, there is in fact ample evidence to state just the
opposite. One of the statistics often quoted by both CBP and DHS are drug seizures which, in
some cases (i.e., depending on the specific narcotic), have more than doubled. What is often
ignored is the production of narcotics, particularly in areas that commonly ship their product to
the U.S. via the southern border. The figures below highlight exactly that fact. Table 1.2 shows

Table 1.2: from DEA National Drug Assessment for 201129

heroin production and seizure from 2004 to 2010. While a first glance at production would have
one think that, since the total amount of heroin produced has not risen sharply, heroin entering
the U.S. has also not risen. This could not be further from the case. The majority of Afghani
heroin is bound for Europe or Asia. The major source of U.S. heroin is Mexico which has risen
in production from 8 metric tons in 2004 to 50 in 2010, an increase of more than six fold, while
29

National Drug Threat Assessment for 2011. U.S. Department of Justice: Drug Enforcement Agency, August 2011.
p. 27
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seizures of heroin (total, POE and border) have risen by only about 30%. Even if one just looks
at the border, seizures have only risen 250%, marginal when compared to the 650% rise in
production. Marijuana seizures are another example of how CBP and DHS have lured
themselves into developing a false confidence in their ability to interdict narcotics. Tables 1.3
and 1.4 show the production of marijuana and the seizures of various drugs from 2005 through
2010 (tables overlap from 2006-2009).

Table 1.3: Marijuana Production30

Table 1.4: Narcotics seizures, 2006-201031
30

Ibid. p. 29
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A recognizable trend appears when comparing the production and seizure of marijuana between
the years 2006 and 2009. During this period the seizure of marijuana has increased by roughly
50% while the production has increased by 300%. Both of these statistics suggest that the U.S.
southern border may not be as secure as DHS and CBP claim.
Regardless of whether DHS chooses to declare the southern border secure or not, there are still
tens of thousands of border violators who go uncaught. As long as this remains the status quo
the southern border can never truly be declared secure. There is however a much larger problem
that, in the future, could present a greater problem to CBP than that which it now faces along the
southern border.

As the percentage of border violators successfully intercepted rises, those that can afford to enter
via an alternate route will increasingly choose to do so. Unfortunately, a disproportionately large
number of those that have the financial freedom to do so are the worst of the worst – drug
smugglers and terrorists.32 The lack of surveillance along the northern border will make it
difficult to counter the problem of a shift in smuggling routes since the majority of the
technology in use today is static, requiring months to years to erect. Even worse is the fact that
the northern border is significantly more difficult to monitor than the southern. Not only is the
northern border longer than the southern, it also contains thick foliage. This foliage further
inhibits the ability of both UAVs and long range border installations (e.g., SBInet33) to detect
violators. Finally, these individuals are much more adept at smuggling than the average border
violator. Despite a noticeable drop in total border incursions, the total amount of drugs
31

Ibid. p. 50
A Line In The Sand: Countering Crime, Violence And Terror At The Southwest Border. U.S. Congress: House
Committee on Homeland Security, November 2012. p. 4
33
SBInet is the single largest and most recognizable component of the SBI. A detailed review of this system is
conducted in Chapter 2.
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smuggled across the border has risen – more so than many agencies responsible for stifling the
flow of narcotics are acknowledge These statistics are supported by U.S. citizens living along
the border who report that, although the overall number of violators has decreased, encounters
with smugglers have remained constant, if not increased. 34
Although CBP’s past attempts to secure U.S. borders have had mixed results, the organization
may be at a crossroads. With the cancellation of the SBInet program, CBP has been forced to
implement an alternative program known as the alternative or post-SBI program. This program
is marked by the introduction of six contracts for assets developed around proven technology.
These assets are:35

•

Mobile Security System (MSC)

•

Mobile Video Surveillance System (MVSS)

•

Air Support via the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)

•

Long Range Handheld Thermal Imaging System

•

Agent Portable Surveillance System (APSS)

•

Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS)

Each of these technologies, though still being tested by CBP, has so far proven effective. With
that in mind, only time will tell how effective they really are – every system has its pros and
cons.

34

“DHS Napolitano’ Touts Border Security.” CBS News, February 2013.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding.
U.S. Government Accountability Office, November 2011. pp. 37-43
35
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Offensive Surveillance – Interdiction of Maritime and Airborne Smugglers
The missions conducted by CBP that qualify as offensive surveillance are those which are in
support of enforcement assets that intercept smugglers before they enter U.S. territorial waters.
This mission also applies to surveillance assets operated by the CBP that monitor the territorial
waters (and open water around those waters) of nations cooperating with the U.S. to combat the
international narcotics trade.36 While some of the assets used in this role are dedicated to it
(surveillance), others perform both surveillance and enforcement. The organization within CBP
that is tasked with the operation of aircraft and maritime assets is the Office of Air and Marine
(OAM). As of January 2011, OAM operated 267 aircraft and 301 marine vessels in support of
their mission which is to:37

•

provide support to CBP’s anti-terrorism mission at U.S. borders including, air-to-ground
interception of people and contraband illegally crossing land borders, air-to-air
interception of aircraft, and air-to-water interception of transportation vessels.

•

provide support for CBP’s traditional work, such as border interceptions unrelated to
terrorism and other DHS missions as well.

•

conduct air operations to support other federal, state and local needs, such as disaster
relief

36

“CBP Intercepts Cocaine Smugglers in Open Water” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and
Border Protection, January 2013.
37
Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of DHS’s Air and Marine Assets. U.S.
Government Accountability Office, March 2012. p. 1
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In 2011 OAM logged 94,968 flight hours and 133,374 maritime hours, an average of 352 hours
per air asset and 476 hours of maritime asset annually. 38 This is an operation tempo that is a
credit to OAM and CBP. However, the operation of these assets comes at an annual cost in
excess of $815 million on top of the $1.3 billion spent between 2006 and 2011 to modify OAM’s
assets.39 Moreover, analysis of the capabilities provided by OAM assets revealed that, despite
being a highly a potent surveillance system, it was unable to meet its 2011 operational goals.40
More often than not, these goals were not met because of extreme environmental conditions that
prohibited OAM assets from either deploying in the first place or negated their effectiveness
after having arrived on location. Finally, although OAM is increasing its use of advanced UAVs,
these aircraft accounted for only 4,406 of the 94,968 hours flown in 2011.41

Summary Analysis

DHS has tasked the CBP with safeguarding the borders of America as well as points of entry
(POE) inside U.S. borders. Although CBP has increased its surveillance assets it still lacks the
ability to sufficiently monitor the southern border, where it spends $4 billion of its $12 billion
budget, and all but lacks the capability to effectively monitor the northern border (aside from
POE’s).42 The CBP is pursuing the GAO’s recommendation of acquiring more mobile
surveillance equipment (through the Mobile Surveillance Capabilities Program, or MSC) but that
equipment has not yet been employed en mass nor has it been in the field long enough to be
38

“2011 Air and Marine Milestones.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and Border Protection:
Office of Air and Maritime, December 2011.
39
Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of DHS’s Air and Marine Assets. U.S.
Government Accountability Office, March 2012. p. 1
40
Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of DHS’s Air and Marine Assets. U.S.
Government Accountability Office, March 2012. p. 9
41
Fact Sheet: Office of Air and Marine. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and Border Protection:
Office of Air and Marine, January 2011.
42
Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status and
Resource Needs. US Government Accountability Office, December 2012. p. 1
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considered a long term solution for CBP’s intelligence and surveillance gap. This program is a
diversion from prior trends, one that, despite not yet having been proven, is likely to be very
successful. Quotes related to CBP’s ability to seize narcotics are overstated. CBP needs to
expand its surveillance capabilities to include borders (e.g., northern and coastal) not currently
monitored (via sensors that are capable of providing real-time, actionable intelligence). It is
however important to note that CBP has established a program, the Mobile Surveillance
Capabilities Program, in an effort to utilize off the shelf, existing

Criteria

Based on audits, mission statements, and analysis of agency responsibilities, the CBP must
possess:

•

surveillance assets capable of detecting border violators immediately upon entry, yielding
actionable intelligence

•

surveillance assets capable of tracking border violators from the point of entry until the
point of interception, a distance that in some areas along the southern border stretches for
over 50 miles

•

surveillance assets capable of identifying border violators with enough detail to
determine the nature of their incursion (i.e., determine whether they are smugglers or
illegal immigrants)

•

the ability to quickly communicate the intelligence gathered via surveillance to
enforcement assets that intercept border violators and potential violators in time to deter
or detain them

•

surveillance assets that are inexpensive, mobile, and use off the shelf technology

35

•

the capability to effectively monitor both the northern and southern borders
simultaneously

•

operate across multiple Border Patrol sectors more effectively, using common
surveillance and enforcement assets

Condition

CBP possesses:

•

surveillance systems that are mobile and capable of providing surveillance via ground
radar, high-end day time and low-light optics, thermal imaging, and night vision that
utilizes various types of infrared (IR) optics

•

high-end, ground based surveillance systems that, with a single asset, are capable of
detecting items of interest (IOI) at great distances, an example of which is the now
cancelled SBInet

•

an extensive number of airborne and maritime assets including a small number of
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV’s), many of which are equipped with forward looking
infra-red (FLIR), thermal imagining, and radar

•

an increasingly large number of Border Patrol agents themselves providing mobile and
fixed surveillance (Border Patrol sectors with advanced surveillance assets use a smaller
percentage of their available agents in the classic role of mobile surveillance and border
enforcement, less equipped sectors use more (39% versus 63% or more)43

43

Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. Southwest and Northern Borders. U.S.
Government Accountability Office, March 2011. p. 15
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•

the ability to intercept border violators with varying degrees of success, success that is by
the surveillance assets deployed and the location of the incursion (e.g., in limited, high
traffic portions of the southern border that have excellent detection and enforcement
capabilities IOI can be intercepted with high degree of confidence while IOI using
tunnels constructed in urban areas are considerably more difficult to detect)

•

an annual budget of approximately $12 billion44

Scenario Table – Customs and Border Patrol

Scenario

Operator

Surveillance
Mission

Objective

Preconditions

Nogales Arizona: 8
FLIR equipped
SkyWatch towers
guarding 10 miles
of the southwest
border (16.1 km)

CBP

Defensive

Deter/Overt
Surveillance/
Active
Intercept

Defensive

Single SkyWatch
CBP
tower along the
southern border
equipped with STS
12000 radar
Three FLIR
CBP
equipped SkyWatch
towers, east of El
Paso, between
Quitman mountain
and the border
Three FLIR
CBP
equipped SkyWatch
towers west of El
Paso
Terrain
Foliage Required
Rating
Rating
Low
Observ.
Rating
1
1
5
3

1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

Perim.
Length
(m)

Required
Portability
Rating

N/A

Type
of
Perim
.
Soft

16100

Overt
Surveillance/
Active
Intercept

N/A

Soft

Defensive

Overt
Surveillance/
Active
Intercept

N/A

Defensive

Overt
Surveillance/
Active
Intercept
Required
Detection
Range of
Humans from
Border
1500 m
5000 m
1500m
1000 m

N/A

Required
Detection
Range of
Vehicles from
Border
1000 m
-200 m
500 m
500 m

Required
Recognitio
n Range
from
Border
2000 m
7000 m
2000 m
2500 m

Required
Endurance

3

Required
Setup and
Teardown
Rating
3

12000

3

3

N/A

Soft

9000

3

3

N/A

Soft

9000

3

3

N/A

Required
Tracking
Depth of
Vehicles

Required
Tracking
Depth of
Humans

3000 m
4000 m
2000 m
2000 m

300 m
2000 m
500 m
300 m

Table 1.5: CBP scenario table
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“DHS Napolitano’ Touts Border Security.” CBS News, February 2013.

N/A

Required
Tracking Depth
of Recognized
IOIs

Surveillance
Budget

10 m
10 m
10 m
10 m

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
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Protection of Critical Infrastructure – DHS
Defensive Surveillance of Hard and Soft Perimeters – Critical Infrastructure
Critical infrastructure is defined by DHS as: “…the physical and cyber systems and assets so
vital to the United States that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on
our physical or economic security or public health or safety.”45 These assets provide services in
the following public and private sectors:46

Since its founding in 2002, the protection of critical infrastructure has been one of DHS’s
primary responsibilities. This responsibility was clarified in December 2003 when President
George Bush released HSPD-7, a presidential directive outlining DHS’s mission and
responsibilities as they pertain to safeguarding America’s critical infrastructure.47 Among other
things, this directive stated that it was the responsibility of the Secretary of DHS to: “…serve as
the principal Federal official to lead, integrate, and coordinate implementation of efforts among
Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and the private sector to protect

45

“Critical Infrastructure Protection.” Department of Homeland Security, February 2013.
Ibid.
47
“December 17th 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7.” White House, December 2003.
46
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critical infrastructure and key resources.”48 This means that in some cases DHS can only assist
in the protection of certain assets through collaboration, not take unilateral action to secure them.
Nonetheless, DHS has made steps towards securing the assets in all 18 sectors outlined above
through: the institution of new regulation, the formation of public-private partnerships, riskmanagement, and the use of grants designed to assist private companies whom the DHS deemed
‘worthy’.49 These tasks have been assigned to various organizations within DHS, each of which
is responsible for various program(s) and/or grant(s). The following are just a few of the
programs and grants DHS has created since 2002:50
•

Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP)

•

Urban Security Initiative (USI)

•

State and Regional Preparedness Program (SRPP)

•

Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP)

•

Port Security Grant Program (Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA))

These programs provide many services, two of which are funding and vulnerability assessment.
The latter is a service provided by the DHS which assesses the vulnerability of an asset. Based
on that assessment the vulnerability and assessment team (VAT) makes recommendations to the
owner/operator on how to reduce their vulnerability. The owner/operator then decides whether
or not to act on the recommendations made, usually basing their decision on available funding.
In order to make sure that more recommendations made are actually implemented, DHS provides
financial assistance through one of its many grant programs. This funding is traditionally

48

Ibid.
“Critical Infrastructure Protection.” Department of Homeland Security, February 2013.
50
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and
Other Critical Infrastructure. U.S. Government Accountability Office, December 2005. p. 60
49
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allocated based on the criticality of the asset and the financial contribution the owner of the asset
is willing to make with respect to the overall cost of implementing the recommendation. One of
the most common recommendations made by VATs is the installation of additional surveillance
equipment in the form of sensors and cameras.
Providing surveillance services have never been a task explicitly assigned to DHS, it has
however been an implicit part of the services they provide. When making their
recommendations, a VAT has the liberty to recommend specific technologies (e.g., thermal, IR,
etc.) but not manufactures. Their clients however are not required to use the technologies
recommended by VATs. As a result, those owners/operators who do implement the
recommendations made use a variety of different surveillance devices, driving up the cost of
doing so. To make matters worse, there are not only different organizations providing grants and
assessments for each type of critical infrastructure, there are multiple organizations providing
grants within each class of infrastructure. An example of this chaos is the fact that there are
three different organizations providing grants to the owners/operators of ports. In this case, the
three organizations are: the Coast Guard, Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), and
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP). Making this a particularly
bad scenario is the fact that these three organizations each have their own criteria defining how
they allocate grants, leading to a situation in which the most significant security needs are not
addressed.51 Nonetheless, vulnerability assessments are performed, grants awarded, and the
surveillance capabilities of critical infrastructure assets improved.

51

In the case of the ODP, the criteria that determined how grants are awarded have changed significantly over the
past decade. In the past, a private company was awarded a security grant based on the priority of that request as it
was assigned by DHS (use of a ranking system) and the amount that company was willing to contribute. As of
2006, a company’s worth is now taken into account. The more a company is worth, the more that company is
expected to pay, which in some cases is 100%.
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Unfortunately these improvements, in addition to being costly, have yielded mixed results. In
one case a chemical plant was equipped with cameras that were linked via the internet to both the
installation’s internal security and/or local law-enforcement (LE).52 This highly sensible and
effect use of cameras is contrast by the use of insufficient thermal cameras at ports. In 2011 the
GAO reported that some organizations who have implemented thermal cameras as part of their
port’s surveillance package did not install units that were capable of detecting small watercraft,
the type of vessel most likely to be used by both terrorists and smugglers.
Summary Analysis
Various agencies and programs within DHS (e.g., FEMA, BZPP, etc.) and other, independent
agencies (e.g., Coast Guard) have been tasked with addressing the vulnerabilities of U.S. critical
infrastructure through mutual cooperation, and the provision of grants and vulnerability
assessments. A key element in the success of their mission is ensuring that the surveillance
needs of these assets are met. This task has only been met with mild success due to the massive
number of government programs involved and the inconsistent allocation of resources towards
the most critical of assets.
Criteria

Based on audits, mission statements, and analysis of the responsibilities assigned to DHS, DHS
is required to:

52

Homeland Security: DHS is Addressing at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Authority is Needed. U.S.
Government Accountability Office, June 2006. p. 9
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•

serve as the principal Federal official to lead, integrate, and coordinate implementation of
efforts among Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and the
private sector to protect critical infrastructure and key resources

•

support risk management; enhanced domain awareness; training and exercises; expansion
of recovery and resiliency capabilities; and further capabilities to prevent, detect, respond
to, and recover from attacks involving improvised explosive devices and other nonconventional weapons; and competitively award grant funding to assist critical
infrastructure in obtaining the resources required to support the National Preparedness
Goal’s associated mission areas and core capabilities53 - conduct security assessments via
VATs that assist the public and private sectors in determining their surveillance needs

•

ensure that the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure are addressed by providing both
grants and vulnerability assessments – funding to help both the public and private sectors
pay for their surveillance needs in accordance with the VAT’s recommendations

Condition
DHS:
•

is continuing to foster communication between local law-enforcement, federal agencies,
and the owners/operators of critical infrastructure assets

•

is providing vulnerability assessments that make specific recommendations on how to
decrease the vulnerability of a critical infrastructure asset via the installation or upgrade
of surveillance equipment

53

“FEMA: Port Security Grant Program.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Federal Emergency Management
Agency, June 2012.
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•

has instituted grant programs that award hundreds of millions of dollars per year in
financial assistance to the owners of critical infrastructure, assistance which used to
encourage owners to implement the recommendations made by VATs

•

is not overseeing the process of implementing recommendations as well as they could,
leading to scenarios in which some of this nation’s most critical assets are left with
considerable vulnerabilities (to include surveillance)

•

is not allocating grants based purely on the criticality of an asset but instead with respect
to the capability of an asset to provide for its own defense, leaving many of this nation’s
most critical assets highly vulnerable to attack and/or penetration (by terrorists and
smugglers respectively)

Scenario Table – Critical Infrastructure

Scenario

Operator

Surveillance
Mission

Objective

Preconditions

Type of
Perim.

Perim.
Length

Required
Portability
Rating

Civilian Port
Complex

DHS

Defensive

Deter/
Detain

N/A

Soft

16100 m

DHS

Defensive

N/A

Soft

DHS

Defensive

Deter/
Detain
Deter/
Detain

N/A

DHS

Defensive

Deter/
Detain

N/A

Required
Low
Observ.
Rating

Required
Detection
Range of
Vehicles
from Border
1000 m
-200 m
500 m
500 m

Three FLIR
equipped
SkyWatch towers,
east of El Paso,
between Quitman
mountain and the
border
Three FLIR
equipped
SkyWatch towers
west of El Paso
Terrain
Foliage
Rating
Rating

1
1
5
3

1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

Required
Detection
Range of
Humans
from Border
1500 m
5000 m
1500m
1000 m

Table 1.6: Critical Infrastructure scenario table

Required
Endurance

3

Required
Setup and
Teardown
Rating
3

12000 m

3

3

N/A

Soft

9000 m

3

3

N/A

Soft

9000 m

3

3

N/A

Required
Recognition
Range from
Border

Required
Tracking
Depth of
Vehicles

Required
Tracking
Depth of
Humans

2000 m
7000 m
2000 m
2500 m

3000 m
4000 m
2000 m
2000 m

300 m
2000 m
500 m
300 m

Required
Tracking
Depth of
Recognized
IOIs
10 m
10 m
10 m
10 m

N/A

Surveillance
Budget

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
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Military – Department of Defense (DoD)
The organizations that compose the U.S. military are referred to as “departments”, which when
combine form the DoD.54 These three departments are the Air Force, Army, and Navy. The
Marines, despite commonly thought of as a forth department, are a subdivision of the Navy. All
three of these departments have extensive surveillance demands that are an implicit part of the
mission each department is required to perform. These demands require the use of surveillance
assets capable of capable of detecting a variety of rapidly evolving threats, making the job of
countering them far more difficult, at least on paper, than those of facing DHS and CBP.
Fortunately for the military, the type and quality of surveillance assets available to them far
outpaces those in use by CBP and DHS, assets which are available (by comparison) on a
moment’s notice. While the military does perform a wide variety of missions, one of the most
common is the defense of static installations, a mission that requires the use of surveillance
assets nearly identical to the ones used in the defense of critical infrastructure. With that in
mind, the first topic discussed is the defensive surveillance of permanent installations.
Defensive Surveillance of Hard Perimeters – Permanent Installations
Permanent installations with hard perimeters are common to all three departments. In most
cases, these installations have very similar, if not nearly identical, surveillance needs. The
individuals responsible for making sure the surveillance needs of their installation are met are the
commanders of the installations themselves. These commanders face many of the same
limitations facing the owners of civilian infrastructure, the two most prominent being adequate

54

Departments are different from branches. There are five branches: Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast
Guard. The Marines report to the Department of Navy. The Coast Guard, which is not a DoD organization, reports
to DHS.
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assessment to determine the vulnerabilities of a given installation and the funding to implement
changes that adequately address those vulnerabilities.
When it comes to the DoD, the most pre-eminent organization that conducts vulnerability
assessments is the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The DTRA sends out balance
survivability assessment teams (BSAT) that provide a service similar to the one provided by
DHS’s VATs. These teams conduct what they refer to as a balance survivability assessment
(BSA): a comprehensive review of an installation’s vulnerabilities to physical and cyber-attacks.
In addition to the run of the mill assessment conducted by VATs, BSATs will typically conduct a
red team assessment – a type of assessment in which the vulnerabilities of an installation are test
by having a red team (friendly units/personnel posing as the enemy) attempt to breach or
otherwise defeat the defenses of that installation. After having conducted these assessments, the
BSAT makes recommendations to the installation’s commander on how to reduce the
installations vulnerability. More often than not, surveillance is one of the recommendations
made by BSATs. Though they are not required to act on these recommendations, most
commanders who request a BSA of their installation do the best they can to do so (George C.
Baker, personal communication, March 9, 2013) [1].55
Acquiring the funding needed to implement the recommendations made by BSATs is always an
issue. Commanders have very little control over their installations budget, leaving those
commanders who do wish to implement recommendations made by BSATs with one of two
choices: apply for DoD grants or pay for it themselves. If no financial aid is awarded, the
commander of an installation must either allocate money from their pre-existing budget or

55

All of the facts contained within this paragraph were obtained via an interview with Dr. George C. Baker that was
conducted on March 9, 2013
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choose not to implement the BSAT’s recommendations. The cost to implement these
recommendations can vary wildly depending on the specifics of the recommendation itself
(George Baker, personal communication, March 9, 2013) [2].56
Standard surveillance recommendations made by BSATs can be broken down into two broad
categories: personnel and hardware. Personnel recommendations deal with the use of manpower
to reduce an installation’s vulnerability by increasing the number, route, and outfitting of patrols
(e.g., increase the number of security guards, increase the frequency of patrols, utilize canines,
modify procedures to increase accountability for security guards, etc.). Hardware
recommendations, with respect to surveillance, deal specifically with the installation, upgrade,
re-allocation, and integration of surveillance hardware. The types of hardware recommended
ranges from increased lighting to the installation of ground based radar and thermal cameras.
This hardware can either be fixed (e.g., security camera mounted on the wall of a building) or
mobile (mobile, man-portable ground radar). The upside to using fixed hardware is that the
surveillance assets installed provide useful intelligence that mobile assets cannot. For example,
an installation’s POE (for vehicles) can be equipped with a remotely operated, under vehicle
inspection system. These systems consist of multiple cameras embedded in the pavement that
are capable of detecting smuggled and potentially dangerous devices (e.g., a bomb, weapons,
computer hacking hardware, etc.).57 Using cameras such as these allows an installation’s
security personnel to conduct an otherwise risky search from the safety of their guard house, far
from the suspect vehicle. Largely because of their cost, immobility, and the time required to
install, assets like the under vehicle inspection system are only implemented at fixed
installations.
56
57

Ibid.
“Gatekeeper – Automatic and Under Vehicle Inspection Systems.” Army-Technology.com, 2012.
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Another way of reducing an installation’s vulnerabilities is to increase the effectiveness of
surveillance assets by making those assets more intelligent. Making them more intelligent refers
to improving their identification and communication capabilities. Intelligent identification refers
to a whole class of capabilities, nearly all of which are software related, that aid in managing the
operator’s workload and identifying IOIs. For example, one of the capabilities intelligent
identification adds is the ability to identify IOIs it detects as being relevant or irrelevant to the
human operator/security personnel. If relevant, the system would alert a human operator, if
irrelevant the system would simply ignore the IOI it detected. The second capability that is an
essential component of an intelligent surveillance system is improved communication between
the different components of that system, communication which requires networking. A modern,
intelligent, and networked surveillance system is capable of:
•

motion detection

•

classifying an IOI detected (e.g., person, animal, car, etc.)

•

discerning between IOIs of interest to the operator and those which the operator would
deem ‘false alarms’

•

discerning between IOI that are within the installation’s perimeter and those outside of it
(e.g., a camera mounted on the rooftop of an embassy that points towards the outer wall
and main gate, outside of which is a sidewalk and busy street. The system needs to
ignore any IOI detected outside of the wall and gate despite the fact that people and
vehicles outside the gate are visible to the camera 24/7)

•

communicating from one sensor to another that an IOI has been detected, after which all
surveillance equipment capable of viewing that IOI automatically pan and tilt to do so
(known as smart surveillance)
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•

tracking a single IOI from one sensor to the next, ideally doing so on a 2D overlay of the
installation and surrounding area

•

linking an installation’s sensor feed in real time from the installation itself to nearby
security or LE assets

All of the features and capabilities above can be easily implemented as part of an installation’s
surveillance package so long as that installation has either a hard or soft perimeter. While some
of these features and capabilities cannot be used to monitor a dynamic perimeter, some can.
Unfortunately, doing so would require the development of a system that is much more flexible
and easy to setup than that which is required for a use in an installation that has either a hard or
soft perimeter. Further complicating matters is the fact that an intelligent surveillance system
monitoring an installation with a dynamic border must also be equipped with wireless power and
communication.
Defensive Surveillance of Soft and Dynamic Perimeters – Tactical Airfields and Forward
Operating Bases (FOB)
The Air Force operates almost exclusively from permanent installations while the Army and
Marines operate extensively from installations with hard, soft, and dynamic perimeters. There is
however one instance in which all three services perform a similar mission – the establishment of
tactical airfields and FOBs. These are temporary installations typically constructed close to the
front lines, and in some cases, behind enemy lines. Tactical airfields, like the one shown in
Figure 1.10, allow transport aircraft to insert large numbers of troops and their heavy equipment
where the enemy least expects it. They may also be used as a temporary airfield from which
short-range attack and close air support aircraft and helicopters operate. FOBs are similar to
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tactical airfields in that they sometimes have an airfield or helipad. What makes them unique is
that they perform a wider variety of missions than tactical airfields. It is common for FOBs
fulfill the role of a: command and control station, staging area for ground forces and close air
support (CAS), fire support base (artillery), and resupply depot. A good way of think about
tactical airfields vs. FOBs is that a tactical airfield can morph into a FOB. A FOB on the other
hand cannot morph, via the addition of an airfield, into a tactical airfield; it simply becomes a
FOB with an airfield. This is not a text book definition and others may disagree with it. It is
based on the author’s time in the Air Force as a loadmaster on C-5 aircraft58.

Figure 1.8: C-130 Hercules landing on a tactical airfield59

58

Several of the loadmasters the author served with have operated from tactical airfields in support of Tanker Airlift
Control Elements (TALCE). TALCE is defined as a “…composite organization tailored to support airlift missions
transiting locations where command and control, mission reporting, or support functions, as required, are
nonexistent or require augmentation”.
Global Security: Glossary I, Abbreviations and Acronyms. Global Security.org, March, 2013.
59
“Tactical airfield landing” Wyoming Air National Guard: 153rd Airlift Wing, Cheyenne, WY, March 2013.
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Both of these installations require ground forces to establish and maintain. The Army and
Marines can and do establish both without assistance whereas the Air Force requires assistance
to do so. Regardless, when either installation is initially established it will have a soft perimeter.
If the airfield or FOB in question becomes semi-permanent it may transition towards having a
hard or soft perimeter. Regardless of the scenario, tactical airfields and FOBs established using
only airborne assets (ground troops and their equipment that are inserted via helicopters and/or
aircraft) have nearly identical surveillance requirements.
FOBs and tactical airfields can and have been established in a variety of environments ranging
from deserts to thick forests, each of which challenge surveillance systems operating in them
with unique atmospheric and climatological challenges. A truly capable surveillance system
should be easily transportable and capable of functioning, day and night, in any environment.
With this in mind, any surveillance package used by airborne troops to establish the initial
perimeter of a FOB or tactical airfield should:
•

be capable of functioning day and night in all environments for a predestinated length of
time60 without (e.g., forest, desert, tundra, etc.) and atmospheric conditions (e.g., fog,
rain, sandstorms, etc.)

•

consist of individual components/assets that are lightweight and man-portable61

•

consist of sensors designed with an emphasis on the detection62 of IOIs (as opposed to
the identification of them) regardless of the environment 63

60

Those sensors that are deployed several kilometers from the airfield will need to operate without maintenance or
resupply until supplies are delivered. The time taken before these supplies are delivered could range from a single
day to more than a week (data is approximated, no published timeframe could be found)..
61
Installations established in a ‘hot zone’ are initially secured by troops who likely have limited or no supply lines,
particularly if the installation being established is done so behind enemy lines. Either way, there is a premium
placed on both the volume and weight of any gear carried by these troops.
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•

be capable of using existing military power sources and support/maintenance equipment

Although similar to FOBs without an airfield, any installation with an airfield must take into
account additional considerations. A typical airfield will have a runway that is 3,500-4,500ft
long with enough space for one or two large aircraft (if the airfield is used for transports, if not it
may be much smaller, particularly if it only operates helicopters or vertical or short takeoff and
landing (VSTOL) aircraft). When establishing an airfield, both the security of the airfield and
that of the aircraft must be taken into account. To do so requires the establishment of a very
large perimeter, particularly along the route taken by aircraft during takeoff and landing. Ideally,
the surveillance system employed should be able to detect IOIs out to a range that completely
prohibits the use of man portable air defense systems (MANPADS). This is a fairly large area
considering the fact that most MANPADS have a range of 3.2 miles.64 These conditions require
any surveillance system deployed by airborne troops in support of a newly established
installation with airfield should:
•

be capable of detecting IOIs well beyond the maximum range, relative to the airfield, of
any MANPADS believed to be deployed in the area

•

be able to be quickly deployed, ideally before the airfield itself becomes operational

The requirements for newly established airfields and FOBs not constructed by airborne troops
have nearly identical requirements to those above. The primary difference between the two is
62

Detection is more important when establishing an FOB or tactical airfield due to the rural environment in which
most of these installations are established. The potential threat posed by any IOI will require enforcement assets to
intercept all IOI detected, regardless of their intention (think of the perimeter of a tactical airfield as that of any
permanent military installation – visitors are not welcome!).
63
The sensors deployed will vary depending on the environment (e.g., a desert airfield may use ground based radar
while an airfield established in the jungle may rely on thermal cameras). Regardless of the environment and
sensors employed, every non-sensor component should be generic (e.g., interface, networking, setup and teardown,
etc.).
64
“MANPADS: Combating the Threat to Global Aviation from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems” U.S. Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs, July 27, 2011.
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the fact that ground forces are not nearly as limited by or concerned about the weight and size of
the surveillance system being deployed. Nonetheless, any surveillance system used to secure a
dynamic perimeter will need to be extremely mobile, easy to setup, and easy to tear down.
When an installation transitions from having a dynamic perimeter to a soft or hard one, the
requirements of that installation’s surveillance system change as well. As the perimeter of an
installation becomes permanent, less of an emphasis is placed on the mobility of that system.
There is however a tradeoff. The more permanent an installation is the more likely an enemy is
to know the location and vulnerabilities of it. Because of this, surveillance systems monitoring
soft and hard perimeters must be more capable than those monitoring dynamic ones. For
example, the longer an installation’s perimeter is in place the more important it is to have quality
surveillance – surveillance which can detect, identify, and classify IOIs at the same range
previous, more tactical, systems could only detect them.
Defensive Surveillance of Hard and Soft Perimeters – Geopolitical Borders
Depending on whether or not it has a physical barrier, geopolitical borders may have either a
hard or soft perimeter. The defense of geopolitical borders has always been one of the U.S.
military’s primary missions, a mission which had an early emphasis on the protection U.S.
borders. This mission has evolved over the course of the 20th and 21st centuries to such an extent
that, at present, most of the focus is now centered on the protection of foreign borders.
Regardless of the border protected, the overall mission remains the same. Unfortunately this
mission is not explicitly stated by the military; it is however a mission that can be derived based
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on historical precedence.65 Analysis of this precedence suggests that the mission of the military
is to:
•

prevent contraband, border violators, terrorists and terrorists weapons (including weapons
of mass destruction) from crossing borders

•

enhance border security

•

secure and manage borders

•

deter the enemy from taking offensive military action

•

repel attacks made by the enemy

•

defend friendly assets within the designated border from airborne attacks, whether those
attacks are made by aircraft or missiles (e.g., the use of Patriot missile systems to shoot
down Scud missiles fired at Israel during the first Persian Gulf War)66

As it was with DHS, surveillance an integral part of the broader mission of border protection.
The major difference between the two is that military forces are far more concerned than their
DHS counterparts with the detection, tracking, and identification of IOIs long before they cross
or even approach the border. While there are a few DHS assets, such as maritime patrol aircraft
and vessels, that attempt to detect, identify, and track IOIs before they enter U.S. territorial
waters and/or airspace, there are no DHS assets that do so when monitoring land borders. Like
the DHS, the military also attempts to detect, identify, and track maritime and airborne IOIs
approaching a maritime perimeter; the military however must do the same for land borders.
Unlike the DHS, military assets must also protect against the threat of rapidly approaching
65

The specific cases analyzed are the protection of: the Saudi Arabian and Israeli borders during the first Persian
Gulf War, Afghan-Pakistan border currently still under protection, the Korean Demilitarized Zone still under
protection, and U.S. air and maritime ‘space’ during the Cold War.
66
The reason for a distinction between this mission and the one above it is that this mission specifically applies to
attacks made against assets within the perimeter that can be intercepted by or with the assistance of border defenses.
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enemy aircraft and ground forces. Fortunately for the DoD, their budget is considerably larger
than that of the DHS ($553.0 vs. $43.2 billion)67
The ability of the military to secure a border depends on the border in question, the number of
friend forces deployed along that border, and the surveillance technology in use by those forces.
The sheer number of troops that are often deployed to a warzone gives them a decisive edge over
the DHS. Despite this, the military is not all that more effective in securing borders than DHS.
One way to demonstrate this fact is to examine the narcotics imported to the U.S. from Mexico
versus the narcotics exported from Afghanistan to Pakistan (in this case, smuggling is used as a
gauge from which the relative surveillance capabilities of each organization can be
approximated). Although the DHS has made progress towards securing the southwest border, it
has failed to secure other POE, including seaports and airports. By comparison, military forces
in Afghanistan have no ports and fewer airports to monitor, have access to more advanced
technology, and have many times the personnel at their disposal. Despite these advantages,
Afghanistan remains the world’s leading producer of opium, most of which is smuggled across
the border to Pakistan.68 This comparison gives rise to the question: why is the military, in
certain cases, less capable of securing land borders than the less equipped DHS?
There are many scenario specific reasons as to why the DHS is capable of doing more with less,
but only one reason that is directly related to the surveillance equipment employed by each
organization.69 The surveillance equipment used by the DHS is larger, more robust, and in many
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“Department of Defense Federal Budget: Fiscal Year 2012.” Office of Management and Budget, 2012.
“Department of Homeland Security Federal Budget: Fiscal Year 2012.” Office of Management and Budget, 2012.
68
National Drug Threat Assessment for 2011. U.S. Department of Justice: Drug Enforcement Agency, August 2011.
p. 27
69
Some of the scenario specific reasons are: DHS personnel have more knowledge and experience, particularly in
the case of CBP, than soldiers deployed to Afghanistan; DHS stationed along the southern border are monitoring
more level terrain; the region along the southern border is much easier to navigate, largely due to the roads, than the
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cases more, more capable than that used by the military. Why? Although their equipment is less
advanced, the surveillance equipment possessed by DHS is not designed for universal
deployment along a variety of borders70, nor is not limited by its size and weight. As a result, the
DHS can build permanent installations while the military is forced to use more tactical and
mobile equipment. Moreover, military objects defended by soft perimeters do not benefit from
the installation of infrastructure/defenses that have a symbiotic relationship with surveillance
assets (e.g., triple layer fencing along the southern border allows surveillance assets to focus on
the border’s more permeable segments). This (symbiotic) relationship maximizes the
capabilities of surveillance in two ways. First, it enables an installation’s surveillance assets to
provide more extensive surveillance of high threat regions via the installations of a greater
number of fixed assets in those locations. Second, these barriers slow the advance of intruders,
allowing mobile surveillance assets to cover greater ground than they otherwise would.
However, as was stated above, the relationship established by the deployment of both barriers
and surveillance assets is a symbiotic one. Regions in which surveillance assets saturate the
landscape will require the establishment of far fewer barriers. As a result, those regions of the
perimeter can be defended more extensively by them, increasing their effectiveness (i.e.,
assuming the availability of barriers remains constant, less barriers in one region allows for the
greater use of them in another). More importantly, the installation of multiple barriers in a
single location can act as a force multiplier. The imposing site of so many barriers in one
location can act as a deterrent to would be intruders, reducing the total number of threats

rural region between Afghanistan and Pakistan; soldiers are required to work with their Afghan counterparts who
have proven to be extremely corrupt; interdicting narcotics smugglers has become less of a goal given the
dependency southern Afghans have on the harvesting of it (doing so only encourages them to support the Taliban
more fervently).
70
DHS has equipment specifically developed for use along the U.S-Mexico border. Military equipment is most
often not tailored to function in specific location; rather it is designed to be flexible, allowing for its deployment in
multiple theatres.
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attempting to breach that installation over time. Finally, the establishment of a critical number or
mass of barriers may effectively neutralize any possibility of threats breaching them, enabling
the security personnel and surveillance assets defending that installation to concentrate their
efforts along other regions of the perimeter (as the adage goes “he who defends everything
defends nothing” (Fredrick II, aka Fredrick the Great)).
Defensive Surveillance of Dynamic Perimeters – Fleet Defense
The Navy has very unique surveillance demands that are tied to the mission of fleet defense.
Both while in port and when at sea, naval fleets depend on surveillance systems to provide the
intelligence necessary to take pre-emptive action against would be threats. Some of the assets
used to provide intelligence in the defense of a naval fleet include radar, sonar, manned aircraft
and helicopters, and UAVs. However, most of these assets are used in defense of the fleet while
it is underway. There are scenarios in which the ships are not underway but those scenarios are
few and far between. One such example is the use of thermal imaging equipment to monitor the
waters around ships that are either in port or in the close proximity of one. This type of
equipment can be used to detect personal watercraft and/or small boats approaching naval ships
that may be, as was the case with the USS Cole, terrorists armed with high explosives. This is
one of the few examples of video surveillance aiding in fleet defense, and in this case, an
example of surveillance that could be performed by surveillance assets stationed at the port itself
or onboard maritime security vessels (e.g., port security, Coast Guard, etc.). With this in mind, it
is clear that the mission performed by naval assets at sea fall outside the scope of this chapter
(surveillance provided when in port is more closely related that of critical infrastructure, not fleet
defense). Moreover, the surveillance equipment used by naval vessels at sea are in an entirely

56

different class than those examined so far and are designed to fulfill a mission that is very
different from that of the PSN).
Defensive and Offensive Surveillance of Dynamic Perimeters – Special Forces (SF)
SF is a very broad term that describes a whole range of groups that engage in special operations
missions. The personnel who operate within these groups under take the most covert, high risk,
and high reward missions there are. Some of examples of U.S. groups designated as SF are:
Navy Seals, Army Green Berets, and the CIA Special Operations Group.71 The surveillance
requirements demanded by SFs, in this subsection, are broken down into two familiar categories:
Offensive and Defensive.
Offensive surveillance is the type of surveillance undertaken either before an operation is
launched or during an operation that is underway. However, surveillance gathered while an
operation is underway can only be deemed offensive if that surveillance is directly related to the
completion the successful completion of that mission (i.e., surveillance gathered for the sole
purpose of gathering information and/or surveillance gathered by the SF’s team in support of
their assigned objective). An example of this would a SFs team conducting surveillance of a
compound immediately prior to the storming of that compound. This type of surveillance can be
provided via satellites, airborne assets, and personal surveillance equipment used by the SFs
personnel themselves. The second type of offensive surveillance, that which is conducted prior
to the launch of an operation, may be provided via satellite, airborne assets, and human
intelligence (HUMINT) just to name a few. This type of surveillance can only be conducted
prior to the launch of an operation but is surveillance that gathers intelligence which is critical to
71

Washington, Douglas Waller. “The CIA’s Secret Army.” Time Magazine, February, 2003.
“Special Operations.” Military.com, March 2013.
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the planning and successful completion of that operation. The intelligence gathered prior to the
launching of Operation Neptune Sphere is an excellent example. Prior to the launch of the U.S.
Navy’s SEAL Team 6, intelligence was gathered on Osama bin Laden’s compound in
Abbottabad, Afghanistan via three (known) sources: HUMINT provided by CIA operatives on
the ground, satellites, and UAVs flying overhead.72
Defensive surveillance provided to protect SFs personnel is so closely related to offensive
surveillance that the line between the two is blurred at best. For the sake of this thesis, defensive
surveillance with respect to SFs is any surveillance which sole purpose is warning SFs teams of
threats. This type of surveillance is the most dynamic of all surveillance covered in this chapter.
The type of surveillance assets and scenarios in which those assets are used can vary from one
operation to the next. With that in mind, an example would be the use of thermal cameras to
guard the coastal region where SFs using ridged inflatables made landfall. The SFs that came
ashore will want to hide their equipment, but even if they do so they it may be discovered. Even
if it is not discovered, they may have been spotted coming ashore. Either way, the enemy may
be waiting to ambush them upon return. The SFs team that came ashore could, theoretically,
counter this ambush by detecting the enemy as they approach the region they came ashore via the
use of concealed thermal cameras, cameras which are uplinked in real-time to the SFs team
itself.
Offensive Surveillance using Mobile Assets
At first sight it would appear that offensive mobile surveillance assets (e.g., aircraft, satellites,
unmanned ground vehicles (UGV), etc.) perform an entirely different mission than that of the
72
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PSN. However, as will be seen in chapter 5, there are variants of the PSN that provide a static
form of offensive mobile surveillance that is capable of competing with its static brethren.
Mobile or static, these assets fulfill a similar mission: the gathering of intelligence. Prior to the
launch of any mission it is almost certain that attempts will be made to acquire intelligence;
intelligence which can be used to assist in the successful completion of that mission. One form of
gathering this intelligence is through the use of mobile assets capable of providing offensive
surveillance. Airborne assets, both manned and unmanned, and satellites (though not technically
airborne they are assets that provide similar capabilities from a similar ‘perspective’) are the two
most common mobile assets used by the military to provide this type of surveillance (ignoring
operational HUMINT). .
Of these two, satellites have the edge in terms of vulnerability. There are very few nations and
organizations that are capable of taking out a satellite. An additional benefit of satellites is that
they are capable of surveying large areas in a short time and at fairly rapid intervals.73 This type
of surveillance has its benefits but also its drawbacks. First, the resolution of the imagery
provided by a satellite is not as high as that provided by assets closer to the ground (e.g., UAVs
and manned aircraft). Second, the interval during which a satellite passes over a given region
can be easily predicted by the enemy. This makes it much easier for the enemy to hide mobile
assets. These are all deficits which can be overcome by the use of UAVs. UAVs can loiter over
a single area for hours at a time, can take higher resolution pictures at shallower angles than
satellites, and can arrive and depart the target area according to the operator’s needs (as opposed
to satellites and their predictable orbits).
Offensive Surveillance using Static Assets
73

Depending on the type and altitude of orbit.
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There are very few static assets used to provide offensive surveillance, particularly when the
only ones examined in this chapter are assets against which the PSN can compete or augment
(e.g., the PSN is designed to fulfill the same role or augment the capabilities of ground based
radar spying on foreign aircraft as they take off and land hundreds of miles within an adversaries
border). The only two that perform a mission remotely similar are micro-unattended ground
sensors (UGS) and fixed surveillance cameras that are either operated on scene by covert
personnel or remotely operated.
UGS come in many forms, but the ones that are most likely to provide offensive surveillance
detect subtle sounds and/or movement around the sensors. Thousands of these sensors would be
spread out behind enemy lines creating a large network. These sensors communicate amongst
themselves and with friendly forces in friendly territory to determine the location of the
approximate location of each sensor. A visual representation of this network would look like a
fine mesh covering the area over which the sensors were dropped. When the data is gathered, it
forms a network that can track objects (vehicles, personnel, etc.) as they pass through that
network. This type of surveillance allows friendly forces to know the movement, location, and
quite possibly the strength of enemy forces.
Although 100% fixed, remotely operated surveillance equipment is sometimes used behind
enemy lines odds are they are micro-cameras that fulfill a different role than that of the PSN (or
rather the concept on which the PSN is based). Man portable surveillance assets that are similar
in size to the PSN do provide offensive surveillance, but the majority of those (that the author is
aware of) are operated on scene. This use of surveillance equipment could be considered mobile
or static, depending on how often it is moved. Ultimately there are only two attributes that
determines whether or not a man portable and operated surveillance asset is classified as static.
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First, the asset must be large enough to be considered as an alternative to the PSN (i.e., a mini,
indoor sensor used to spy in the room next door doesn’t count). Second, whether or not the asset
in question gathers intelligence while it is in transit. Generally speaking, an asset designed to
fulfill a role similar to the PSN is mobile if it gathers intelligence while on the move, static if it
only gathers intelligence when fixed in place.

Scenario Table – Military

Scenario

Operator

Surveillanc
e Mission

Objective

Preconditions

Type of
Perim.

Perim.
Length

Required
Portability
Rating

Generic fixed base
(Air Force base,
Army fort, Navy
base) equipped with
long-range FLIR,
Thermal Fence, and
radar

All
branches
of the
military

Defensive

Deter/Detai
n/Active
Intercept

N/A

Hard

Varies,
est. of
20000

Geopolitical border
– Afghanistan /
Pakistan
Surveillance of a
tactical airfield in
the desert via the
use of ground based
radar and shortrange FLIR
Surveillance in
Afghanistan/
Pakistan via the use
of UGS
Surveillance of SF
during infiltration
and exfiltration

Army/
Air
Force
Air
Force

Defensive

Detain/
Active
Intercept
Detain/
Active
Intercept

N/A

Soft

N/A

Army/
CIA

Offensive

Covert
Surveillanc
e

N/A

SF

Defensive

Defensive

Required
Endurance

2

Required
Setup and
Teardown
Rating
2

12000

4

5

N/A

Soft/
Dynamic

Varies,
est. of
9000

8

8

N/A

Soft

8000

10

N/A

Varies, est.
of 3650

10

Varies, est.
of 0.1

1

N/A

Covert
N/A
Dynamic
Varies,
10
Surveillanc
est. of
e/ Detain/
500
Active
Intercept
Barry M. Goldwater
Marine/
Defensive
Overt
N/A
Hard
Est.
1
Range Yuma, AZ
CBP
Surveillanc
/Soft
35000
Equipped w/ STSe/ Active
12000 radar
Intercept
Terrain
Foliage
Requir
Required
Required
Required
Required Required
Rating
Rating
ed Low
Detection Range
Detection Range
Recognition
Tracking Tracking
Observ.
of Vehicles from
of Humans from
Range from
Depth of
Depth of
Rating
Border
Border
Border
Vehicles
Humans
1
1
2
1000 m
1500 m
2000 m
3000
300
4
2
2
-200 m
5000 m
7000 m
4000
2000
1
1
2
500 m
1500m
2000 m
2000
500
4
2
5
500 m
1000 m
2500 m
2000
300
5
5
5
500 m
200 m
50 m
100
30
1
1
12000
6000
N/A
10000
8000

Table 1.7: Military scenario table

Required
Tracking Depth
of Recognized
IOI
10
10
10
10
5
N/A

N/A

Surveillanc
e Budget

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
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Figure 1.8: Chapter 2 master scenario table
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Chapter 2: Analysis of Existing and Proposed Systems
Features, Capabilities, and Market
There are a whole range of surveillance systems currently in use by each and every one of the
organizations examined in the previous chapter, most of whom operate multiple systems.
Moreover, many of these organizations have one or more surveillance systems which have either
been recently retired or are currently under development. Each of these systems typically
employs a variety of different surveillance assets, assets which in some cases are used by more
than one system. These assets are one of several components that, when combine, form a
surveillance system. Over the course of this chapter these systems and their components will be
analyzed to determine the features, capabilities, and market each of them possess. Some of the
programs reviewed in this chapter are still under development, which means the contract for
them has yet to be granted. In this case there are usually multiple manufactures submitting
surveillance systems in hopes of winning the contract associated with that program. When this is
the case, the first thing discussed is the program itself. Following this introduction, the various
surveillance systems developed for that program are reviewed. Some of the assets and
equipment reviewed in this chapter are sometimes employed both on larger assets as well as
stand-alone systems/equipment. This type of equipment will be accounted for at the end of the
assets chapter in two subsections entitled man-portable and standalone.
For reasons that are obvious, the surveillance assets and equipment reviewed in this chapter
represent only a fraction of the total number of assets and equipment that are either in service,
testing, or have been recently retired. The assets and equipment chosen for review have been
selected based on the following criteria:
•

the extent to which an asset is or has been used
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•

the impact resulting from the use of an asset

•

the historical importance of an asset

•

how the performance of an asset ranks relative like assets (e.g., the Predator and Darkstar
are both large UAVs)

•

the relationship between an asset and the condition/capability of an organization
discussed in chapter 1 – assets eluded to or mentioned explicitly in chapter 1 are more
likely to be reviewed

•

how well an asset compares with another, already chosen asset (i.e., an asset may be
selected for review primarily because it is in the same class as another, already chosen
one; allowing for comparison between the two).

The need to develop a working database of assets and equipment has placed additional
restrictions on which will be selected for inclusion and which will not. Originally, the hope was
to develop a database that models a full range of surveillance assets, from UAVs to those that are
man-portable. Recent research has numerous systems that are similar to the PSN, so numerous
that even some of those will not be included. Based on this revelation, only those assets that are
similar to the PSN (in both terms of cost and service) have been reviewed in this chapter.
However, the variables and descriptions of them remain unchanged. This means that, if time
allows, it is possible to add additional assets.
In addition to the criteria above, those assets and equipment designed by FLIR have been granted
special consideration. FLIR, one of the largest manufactures of DoD and CBP assets and
equipment, recently purchased ICx Technologies (ICx), another major manufacturer of assets
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and equipment employed by the DoD and CBP.74 The decision to give priority to FLIR and ICx
assets and equipment is even more reaffirmed given the fact that FLIR was the major supplier of
equipment used on/by ICx assets in the years preceding FLIR’s acquisition of them.
Note: for the sake of this thesis, a distinction will be made between goods manufactured by these
two companies despite the fact that ICx is a subsidiary of FLIR.
Conducting a thorough review of these systems is a necessary step in the design of the PSN.
Depending on the surveillance asset being reviewed and the information that is available, the
review of each will assist in determining:
•

what features and capabilities customers expect in their surveillance systems

•

what features can be harnessed for application onboard the PSN

•

what capabilities the PSN must possess in order to succeed where current systems have
failed

•

whether existing systems are compatible with the PSN (i.e., co-operable)

•

the ease with which an organization can transition from the use of their existing system
towards that of the PSN

•

how much organizations are willing to spend developing new surveillance systems

•

the return, in terms of surveillance capability, customers expect from their financial
investment

The review of surveillance systems in this chapter is broken down into two parts: surveillance
assets and surveillance equipment.
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Surveillance Assets
The first part of the review process involves looking at the surveillance assets themselves. This
review examines the chassis of the asset completely stripped of the actual surveillance equipment
that can be or is installed on it. The review includes a general list of potential surveillance
options, but nothing more. The review of each asset is concluded with a summary. Each
summary is a condensed restatement of the most pertinent information within each asset’s initial
review. 75 Following the summary is a table that quantifies the data/capabilities of each. The
variables quantified in this table are:
Name of Asset: The name of the surveillance asset or system being rated
Surveillance Mission: Indicates whether the surveillance conducted by an asset is offensive or defensive. If an
asset is capable of both, both are listed in the table
Portability Rating: Indicates how portable an asset is. This rating is based on the size and weight of an asset. If an
asset changes size and/or weight when it is being deployed, the size and weight of that asset in its stowed
configuration is the data that should be entered. Finally, The portability of each system is rated on a scale from 1 to
10 with 10 being the most portable
Mobility Rating: The ability of an asset to traverse rough terrain based on the published capabilities of the asset in
question and its design features (e.g., self-propelled vs. towed, wheel vs. tracked). This rating is takes into account
the terrain rating of a particular scenario, rough terrains demand assets with higher mobility ratings. Mobility is
rated on a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 being the most mobile
Note: Both mobility and terrain rating take are effected by the terrain rating from chapter 2. Moving forward, it is
important to remember that ‘required terrain rating’ and terrain rating’ are not exclusive to one another, as is the
case with other, seemingly ‘linked’ ratings
Setup and Teardown Rating: This variable represents the maximum time and manpower required to initially setup
and then later repackage an asset. Both the time and manpower to do so are rated on a single scale from 1 to 10 with
10 requiring the least time and manpower
Endurance Rating: The time, in days, that a surveillance asset can operate without resupply or maintenance
Low Observability Rating: Low observability rating is used to quantify how detectable, both when active and
passive, a surveillance asset is with respect to other assets. Low observability is rated on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5
being the least detectable
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The information contained in the summary is not the only important information gathered from that review,
merely a restatement of certain information in a different context. This information contained in the summary is not
always explicitly defined in the review and/or features and capabilities. This information may be conclusions
derived from the analysis of data contained in the review.
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Ratio of Active to Inactive Service: The ratio between the time an asset is actively performing its mission versus
total time (e.g., a UAV that can fly for 10 hours but needs 14 hours of service to redeploy has a ratio of 10/24, or
5/12. Another example is a system that can operate for 12 days but needs 2 days of service to redeploy has a ratio of
12/14, or 6/7). Assets that can operate continuously but require refueling and/or servicing to do so receive a rating
of 1.0 as long as that asset can operate continuously while being serviced and/or refueled. Irregular service (e.g.,
repairs, upgrades, etc.) are not accounted for in this ratio
Operating Cost per Month: Total cost to operate an asset (e.g., manpower, maintenance, fuel, servicing etc.). This
cost is calculated assuming the operational tempo of the asset under review is maximized. (e.g., a UAV takes off,
lands, is serviced and/or receives regular maintenance, and takes off again without delay). Operating cost per month
is rated on a scale from 1 to 10 with 10 representing the least expensive
Asset Cost: The cost of a single surveillance asset

Once all of the asset reviews are complete the review of surveillance equipment begins.
Surveillance Equipment
Whereas surveillance assets only looked at the chassis of assets, surveillance equipment only
looks at the actual hardware that can be mounted on those chassis. The review of this equipment
is broken down into sub-sections according to the type of equipment under review (e.g., thermal
imaging vs. Radar). The reviews that follow are labeled according to their name and
manufacturer. The reviews themselves are very brief. These reviews only contain information
describing the strength, weaknesses and deployment for each piece of equipment. At the end of
each review is a table that quantifies that equipment’s capabilities. The variables quantified in
this table are:
Terrain Rating: Terrain rating is used to quantify the effect terrain has on the capabilities of surveillance
equipment. The main requirement that determines what terrain rating is required of a piece of equipment is
‘required terrain rating’ from chapter 2. This rating does not take into account how an asset’s surveillance
capabilities are inhibited on a terrain by terrain basis, only the general effect terrain has on an asset’s surveillance
capability relative to other assets. This rating varies on a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 representing the most capable of
assets, those which are the least affected by terrain
Foliage Rating: Foliage rating is used to quantify the effect foliage has on the surveillance capabilities of
surveillance equipment. As with terrain, the specific type and density of vegetation is not taken into account.
Instead, this rating represents the extent to which any foliage inhibits the surveillance capability of an asset relative
to other assets. Foliage is rated on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 representing an asset whose surveillance capabilities
are least affected by foliage
Detection Range of Vehicles: The range a surveillance asset can detect vehicles
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Detection Range of Humans: The range a surveillance asset can detect humans
Identification Range of Vehicles: The range a surveillance asset can detect vehicles
Identification Range of Humans: The range a surveillance asset can detect humans
Identification of Recognized IOIs: The range a surveillance asset can identify vehicles or humans in enough detail
to determine their intent (e.g., a smuggler vs. a farmer).by terrain
Equipment Cost: The cost for a single piece of surveillance equipment

Master Table – Surveillance Assets and Equipment in Harmony
At the end of this chapter there is a master table that contains a listing of the most common assetequipment combinations. These combinations are labeled in this table under a column titled
“Equipment Specific Asset” (e.g., a SkyWatch with STS-3000 radar and long-range FLIR would
be titled “SkyWatch Equipped with STS-3000 and long-range FLIR”. The capabilities recorded
in the master table for each asset-equipment combination is based on the maximum capability of
each piece of equipment used by that asset (e.g., if the STS 3000 radar has a detection range of 3
km and the FLIR only 2 km, the detection range recorded for that particular asset-equipment
combination is 3 km. That said, since the radar has no ability to identify IOI, the value recorded
in that row for identification is that of the FLIR). The unique surveillance qualities (e.g., the
height of one asset vs. another) are accounted for in other asset-specific variables such as terrain
rating. This table contains three additional variables that can only be quantified once an
equipment specific asset has been chosen. The headings for these variables are:
Surveillable Area of Detection: The total area, in meters, an asset can provide full time surveillance capable of
detecting and tracking of IOI. Area does not account for terrain (e.g., mountains limiting the coverage of ground
radar). This variable applies almost exclusively to airborne assets76, the surveillable area is calculated in one of two
ways. Depending on the type of surveillance being performed, airborne assets will either fly a circular or linear
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Surveillable area of detection can also apply to other mobile surveillance assets but doing so would have much
less of an effect. The reason behind having this object is to take into account the total area an asset can survey
‘nearly uninterrupted’. The speed of airborne assets is substantially greater than that of ground or maritime assets,
thereby allowing them to cover more ground in a short period of time (hence the ‘nearly uninterrupted’).
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path. If an asset is providing either defensive or offensive surveillance around an installation or objective with a
perimeter then the type of flight path flown is circular (i.e., orbital).
The surveillable area of detection is based on that assets detection range and the size of the perimeter being
surveyed. If the mission performed is defensive surveillance, the surveillance asset flies a circular orbit that has a
radius (from the center of the perimeter) that is equal to the radius of that perimeter plus that asset’s detection range.
The total surveillable area flown on a defensive mission is equal to:  =   −   where r is the orbital radius
and a is the radius of the perimeter (see Figure 2.1 for a visual). If the mission is offensive surveillance, the total
surveillable area flown on a defensive mission is equal to:  =   + where r is the orbital radius and b is the
radius of the surveillance asset (see Figure 2.2 for a visual).
If the asset is providing either offensive or defensive surveillance of a border, the total area that asset can survey is
based on the asset’s airspeed and detection range. The length of an assets detection range is based on the distance
that asset, while flying a straight flight path that is parallel to the border, can fly before turning around and tracking
along its path in such time that an IOI traveling at 50 km/h would only have travelled from the fringe of the assets
detection range to a half way across the total width of the detection area (i.e., from the very border to just under the
airborne asset). This calculation can be summarized as:     / 50 /ℎ / 2 ∗  of
the asset in km/h. For defensive surveillance, the asset flies so that its detection range just makes contact with the
border (see Figure 2.3 for a visual). For offensive surveillance, the asset flies along the border itself. (see the
Figure 2.4 for visual).

Figure 2.1: Defensive perimeter surveillance
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Figure 2.2: Offensive perimeter surveillance

Figure 2.3: Defensive border surveillance

Figure 2.4: Offensive border surveillance
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Terrain Rating: Terrain rating is used to quantify the effect terrain has on the capabilities of surveillance assets.
The main requirement that determines what terrain rating is required of an asset is ‘required terrain rating’ from
chapter 2. This rating does not take into account how an asset’s surveillance capabilities are inhibited on a terrain by
terrain basis, only the general effect terrain has on an asset’s surveillance capability relative to other assets. This
rating varies on a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 representing the most capable of assets, those which are the least affected
by terrain
Equipment Specific Asset Cost: The per unit cost of a single surveillance asset. Any systems that require more
than one asset to operate must record the cost of each asset in its own row77

When assembled, the variables above form a table identical to the one below:
Equipment
Specific
Asset
Terrain
Rating

Mission
Type

Foliage
Rating

Port.
Rating

Low
Observ
Rating

Setup and
Teardown
Rating

Endurance
Rating

Ratio of Active
to Inactive
Service

Resiliency
Rating

Detection
Range of
Vehicles
Personnel
Cost Per
Month

Detection
Range of
Humans

Recognition
Range

Estimated Maintenance
and Resupply Cost Per
Month

Surveillable
Area of
Detection

Total Operating
Cost Per Month

Mobility
Rating

Acquisition
Cost Per
Asset

Table 2.1: Sample performance table for surveillance assets
This table is the same one used to rate the capabilities of individual assets and equipment. Depending
which is being reviewed, the unused columns are marked N/A.

Surveillance Assets
The reviews conducted in this chapter are limited to the generic platform of the asset itself. The
features and surveillance equipment that can be or is installed are listed, but nothing more.
Following the review of these assets is a table containing the data/capabilities of this equipment.
The master table at the end of this chapter contains a listing of the most common assetequipment combinations. These combinations are labeled in the scenario title (e.g., a SkyWatch
with STS-3000 radar and long-range FLIR would be titled “SkyWatch Equipped with STS-3000
and long-range FLIR”. The capabilities recorded in the final table for each asset-equipment
combination is based on the maximum capability of each piece of equipment used by that asset
77

This is referring systems that cannot operate without multiple components, but components that do not always
share a set ratio between the two (or greater). For example, a system may require sensors an a communications
uplink. If, in scenario one, the system uses 5 sensors per uplink the cost will be different than in scenario two which
uses 15 sensors per uplink. To counter this problem, both the sensor and uplink must be logged as different
surveillance assets. The uplink does not need to have all attributes filled out, only those which pertain to the
complete system itself (in this case the range it can communicate with sensors and its per unit cost).
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(e.g., if the STS 3000 radar has a range of 3 km and the FLIR only a detection range of 2 km, the
detection range recorded for that particular asset-equipment combination is 3 km. That said,
since the radar has no ability to identify IOI, the value recorded in that row for identification is
that of the FLIR). The unique surveillance qualities (e.g., the height of one asset vs. another) is
accounted for in other asset-specific variables such as terrain rating.
Mobile Surveillance Capabilities Program (MSC)
recently awarded contract: U.S. CBP
The MSC program is the first of two large contracts handed out by CBP after the cancellation of
SBI. This contract, which was initially valued at $45 million, has risen in value of $102
million. 78 According to CBP, the goal of the MSC program is to develop and deploy assets that
can:
“…provide area surveillance in rural, remote areas over a range of 8 to 12 kilometers.
Capabilities are detection, identification, and tracking IOI until successfully ending in a law
enforcement conclusion. Sensory equipment may include electro-optical/infrared cameras;
ground surveillance radars; laser range finders; laser illuminators; global positioning systems;
and command, control, and communication systems. The mobile nature of MSC allows Border
Patrol to relocate surveillance assets based on changes in threat patterns and provides area
coverage.”79

`

This system employs the use of vehicles to rapidly deploy and redeploy advanced sensor
equipment, equipment which is either towed behind or mounted on the delivery vehicle. This
setup makes the MSC the most mobile, high-end surveillance asset CBP possesses – discounting
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Hock, Jessica. “FLIR Purchases ICx Technologies for $274 million.” Oregon Business, August 16, 2010.
IT Program Assessment: Customs and Border Protection Mobile Surveillance System. U.S. Department of
Homeland Security: Office of the Chief Information Officer, March 2012. p. 1
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their air and marine assets. A key distinction between the MSC and other surveillance assets
deployed by CBP is the manned nature of the system. All but one of the potential contractors
examined in this thesis put forward concepts which were manned, including the contractor who
eventually won – FLIR. FLIR’s entry, codenamed SkyWatch, is a derivative of the SkyWatch
tower which has been manufactured by ICx for over a decade now.80
SkyWatch Manned Mobile Security System
developed by ICx
According to FLIR, there are currently 100 SkyWatch towers is service along the northern and
southern borders, with additional towers in use with LE.81 Unlike some of its competitors,
SkyWatch is not a self-propelled system. It is towed to an area and then setup. Despite this
shortcoming, SkyWatch is a proven, modular, upgradable, and mobile surveillance system. The
only down sides to this system is that it is expensive, manned82, limited in its ability to see over
rough terrain, and difficult if not impossible to deploy on rough terrain. The core component of
the SkyWatch system is the tower, one version of which can been Figure 2.5 on the next page.
These towers come in three models: generic, Sentinel and Frontier. The only major differences
between the two final assets are that the Frontier is designed for longer deployments, can carry a
wider variety of sensors, and is better equipped to function as command and control center (than
the Sentinel).
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ICx is a recently purchased and now wholly owned subsidiary of FLIR, one of the world’s premier manufacturer
of military grade surveillance equipment.
81
White Paper: The Secure Border Solution. ICx Technologies, February 2013. p. 4
82
Some SkyWatch towers are manned, some are not. Based on research conducted into their use by CBP, I have
come to the conclusion that the majority of the towers operated by CBP are manned.
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Figure 2.5: SkyWatch towers in use by CBP. Note the second tower on the right, and what is
likely a third even further down the road83

The generic SkyWatch towers have been in production for over 10 years. These towers are not
equipped with the high-end sensors available on the other two nor were these the models that
won the MSC contract. With that in mind, the Sentinel and Frontier did compete for it. These
two towers are the same height (25ft), can be ordered with either a one or two person cab, and
can be equipped according to the needs of the operator.84 Some of the features typically found
on the Sentinel and Frontier towers are:85
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•

short and medium range radar

•

thermal cameras

•

public address systems

•

ability to record data from all monitoring devices

•

ballistic resistant plating

White Paper: The Secure Border Solution. ICx Technologies, February 2013. p. 1
SkyWatch data sheet and brochure. FLIR, February 2013. p. 2
85
Ibid. p. 2
84
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•

solar and diesel power

•

command and control suite

•

communications technology (e.g., Wi-Fi, cellular, satellite, etc.)

When equipped with the right combination of these features, the SkyWatch Frontier, the model
that has been purchased by CBP, is an exceptionally effective system that should be capable of
fulfilling the goals expected of it as winner of the MSC contract. Unfortunately, if Figure 2.5 is
any indicator, it appears that some of these towers have either not been equipped with the
necessary features or the installed features are not being fully utilized.86
Figure 2.5 depicts several SkyWatch towers arrayed side by side along a rural road. The MSC
program stated that a single MSC asset should have rural area surveillance capabilities that
enable it to detect and identify IOI at a range of 8 to 12 km. This is clearly not the case with the
CBP towers depicted in Figure 2.5. If this image is any sign of how these towers will be
deployed in the future then their deployment is and will continue to be a misappropriation of
resources. Finally, these towers are not cheap. It was reported that a LE version, which lacked
both radar and FLIR cameras, was purchased for $119,000 by the San Diego Police Department
using funds provided to them via a miscellaneous DHS grant.87 Considering the type of sensor
systems (e.g., radar, FLIR, etc.), armor, and communications employed on the CBP versions of
SkyWatch Frontiers, it would not be surprising if the generic legacy towers cost $250,000 or
more. One this is certain: the fixed price of each ‘stripped’ tower purchased by the U.S.
government.
86

It is not clear what type of tower is depicted in Figure 2.5. If these are the generic, legacy towers that have been
around for over a decade, the deployed with which they have been deployed would make more sense. However, it
does appear that these towers have been upgraded with high-end imaging equipment. It is important to acknowledge
that this picture was taken from a 2013 ICx white paper on border surveillance, something that suggests these are the
newer models.
87
Davis, Katrina. “Police to buy mobile observation tower.” U-T San Diego, March 2, 2009.
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In 2005 ICx signed a contract with the General Services Administration (GSA). This contract
fixed the acquisition cost of various ICx assets purchased by the government from 2006-2012.
In this document there are several assets reviewed in this chapter, seven of which are different
versions of SkyWatch towers:88
•

SW ‐ 1002 PLATFORMS SkyWatch Sentinel $73,171.28

•

SW ‐ 1003 PLATFORMS SkyWatch Frontier $87,770.78

•

SW ‐ 1005 PLATFORMS SkyWatch Frontier ‐ Level National Instituted of Justice (NIJ)
III Antiballistic Cab $139,806.17

•

SW ‐ 1006 PLATFORMS SkyWatch Frontier ‐ Level NIJ IV Antiballistic Cab
$165,149.50

•

SW ‐ 2003 PLATFORMS SkyWatch Frontier (two man cab) $110,402.78

•

SW ‐ 2005 PLATFORMS SkyWatch Frontier 2 Man ‐ Level NIJ III $165,013.24

Examination of pictures taken clearly show that the type of towers purchased by CBP are the
$165,013 2 man Frontiers with NIJ level III ballistic protection.89 However, many of these could
be legacy towers that have been upgraded with a new cab containing , which when outfit with
various types of equipment, could run well over half a million dollars. The seventh and final
‘version’ of interest described in the previous paragraph is product MSS‐MSP‐LR PLATFORMS
Mobile Sensor Platform $737,546.39. There is very little information surrounding this system
which, since it is included in this document, predates the MSC contract. Nonetheless, the

88

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION FEDERAL SUPPLY SERVICE AUTHORIZED FEDERAL SUPPLY
SCHEDULE PRICE LIST, CONTRACT NUMBER:GS-07F-0117U, U.S. General Services Administration,

2005. p. 111
89

Figure 2.5 highlights the use of this ballistic protection. The standard Frontier cab is flush with the windows;
cabs outfitted with ballistic plating are not flush and noticeably protrude from the cab.
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additional info in this document confirms that a 2013 MSC equipped SkyWatch would cost at
least $750,000, if not more.90
Summary
The SkyWatch has the potential to meet the criteria expected of it as the winner of the MSC
contract, only time will tell. The cost of an individual SkyWatch tower is a major deficit.
However, the fact that these towers are based on platforms already possessed by CBP should
make their integration with other assets easier than it otherwise would be. In the long-term, the
decade-old SkyWatch towers could be outfit to MSC standards for less than the cost of a new
Frontier or Sentinel. When it comes to mobility, SkyWatch is the most mobile high-end
surveillance system possessed by CBP. Unfortunately, its mobility and ability to provide
surveillance over large areas has limitations, limitations which may inhibit or completely
prohibit its use in mountainous terrain. Perhaps the most appealing feature of SkyWatch is its
ability to act as a mobile command and control center, a capability that CBP did not possess
before institution of the MSC program.
Features and Capabilities:

90

•

mobile

•

1 to 3 person crew

•

8-12 km detection and identification radius (on relatively level terrain)

•

2-3 km detailed identification radius (est., on relatively level terrain)

•

capable of operating for 300 hours without resupply91

The cost estimate of $750,000 is based on an in depth review of the ICx/GSA contract. This contract includes all
options, including sensors and communications equipment that would be used on an MSC equipped SkyWatch.
91
The actual endurance of all assets reviewed in this chapter depend on what sensors are equipped.

77

•

short-range radar (capable of detecting both individuals, ground vehicles, and
ultra-lights)

•

thermal, IR, and conventional cameras

•

public address systems

•

ability to record data from all monitoring devices

•

ballistic resistant plating

•

solar and diesel power

•

command and control suite

•

communications technology (e.g., Wi-Fi, cellular, satellite, etc.)

•

per unit cost: $80,000 to $750,000

Performance Matrix:
Asset or
System

Mission
Type

SkyWatch
Terrain
Rating

Def.
Foliage
Rating

Port.
Rating

Low
Observ
Rating

Setup and
Teardown
Rating

Ratio of Active
to Inactive
Service

Endurance
Rating

Resiliency
Rating

Detection
Range of
Vehicles

Detection
Range of
Humans

Recognition
Range

Surveillable
Area of
Detection

N/A
Personnel
Cost Per
Month

N/A
N/A
N/A
Estimated
Total Operating
Maintenance and
Cost Per Month
Resupply Cost Per
Month

Mobility
Rating

Acquisition
Cost Per Asset

N/A

Table 2.2: Performance matrix for SkyWatch

ThreatSTALKER Surveillance System (TSS)
developed by Telephonics
The TSS, see Figure 2.6 below, is an evolved version of the system developed by Telephonics
Corp. in its bid to win the MSC contract. The first noticeable difference between this system and
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Figure 2.6: ThreatSTALKER with partially retracted sensor suite92

SkyWatch is that TSS is self- propelled. This system has the capability to be outfit with all of
the same sensors used by the SkyWatch.93 It does however lack some of the command and
control capability94 and cannot remain on sight as long without resupply (diesel tank is not as
large). The entire system, which weighs 3,800lbs, sits on a two axle, flatbed truck that itself
weighs 6,500lbs. Although Telephonics lost the MSC contract, the TSS’s comparatively low
weight and extreme mobility make it an excellent choice for operators who work in a more
dynamic environment, such as the U.S. military. 95
The second major difference between the TSS and SkyWatch is that TSS is only designed to
accommodate two operators. These operators are required to work from a 15” display that can
92

Telephonics: Ground Surveillance Radar and Long Range Systems. Armed Forces International, 2012. Accessed
March 3, 2012 from: http://www.armedforces-int.com/suppliers/air-traffic-control-systems.html
93
Mobile Surveillance Capability. Telephonics Corporation, 2012. p. 2
94
ThreatSTALKER still has the ability to act as a command and control vehicle, one that could be equipped to
mirror the capabilities of SkyWatch. However, SkyWatch’s superior ergonomics and its ability to sustain long-term
deployments make it a better choice for use as a command and control asset
95
Oddly enough, different variants of the SkyWatch towers are already in service with the military while no
information exist that suggest the military has purchased a single TSS. One possible explanation of this phenomena
is that the military already has multiple contracts with both FLIR and ICx.
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be used from inside or outside the vehicle. 96 By comparison, the SkyWatch system can carry up
to three operators in a much larger space, all of whom interface with a display much larger than
that equipped on TSS. Moreover, these operators are able to use their own eyes to survey the
terrain, a feature not found on the TSS.
Summary
TSS is a system that fulfills the gap between semi-mobile assets like SkyWatch and completely
mobile, less equipped assets. Although not the ideal asset for sustained surveillance, it is ideal
for scenarios in which a more mobile, yet still very capable, surveillance asset is required.
Features and Capabilities

96

•

highly mobile

•

2 person crew

•

8-12 km detection and identification radius (on relatively level terrain)

•

2-3 km detailed identification radius (est., on relatively level terrain)

•

short-range ground radar

•

thermal cameras

•

electro-optical cameras

•

ability to record data from all monitoring devices

•

ballistic resistant plating

•

solar and diesel power

•

150 hour endurance without resupply

•

command and control suite

“Telephonics: Ground Surveillance Radar and Long Range Systems.” Armed Forces International, 2012.
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•

communications technology (e.g., Wi-Fi, cellular, satellite, etc.)

•

per unit cost: not available, likely $200,000 or more

Performance Matrix:
Asset
or
System
TSS
Terrain
Rating

Mission
Type
Def.
Foliage
Rating

Port.
Rating

Low
Observ
Rating

Setup and
Teardown
Rating
Ratio of
Active to
Inactive
Service

Enduranc
e Rating

Detection
Detection
Recognition
Surveillable
Range of
Range of
Range
Area of
Vehicles
Humans
Detection
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Resiliency
Personnel Cost
Estimated
Total Operating
Rating
Per Month
Maintenance and
Cost Per Month
Resupply Cost Per
Month

Mobility
Rating

Acquisiti
on Cost
Per
Asset
N/A

Table 2.3: Performance matrix for the TSS

Cam-V Mobile Security System
developed by Advanced Security Products (ASP)
The Cam-V, developed in Texas by ASP, stands out from its competitors, SkyWatch and TSS, in that it is
entirely unmanned. Indications are that the Cam-V was ruled out as a potential candidate for the MSC
contract early on, but this in no way diminishes the worth of the system. It is however considerably less
capable than both the SkyWatch and TSS. Moreover, there is the possibility that the Cam-V will win or
at least be considered for another one of CBP’s outstanding contracts, the Integrated Fixed Tower
program (IFT).
The Cam-V can be outfit with an array of sensors from static, long distance IR cameras to FLIR cameras.
These cameras are mounted on a 23ft mast (see Figure 2.6 below), not far off the 25ft mark set by
TSS and SkyWatch. 97 Unfortunately, the Cam-V cannot be equipped with either radar or high-end FLIR.
This limits its nighttime detection of IOI to roughly 2,000ft and identification to only 500ft. 98 It also lacks
the command and control capabilities of the other two systems. Despite these drawbacks, the Cam-V

97
98

Cam-V Mobile Security System Spec-Sheet. Cameras Onsite, 2013 p. 2
Ibid. p.2
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does have two distinct advantages over both

both the TSS and SkyWatch. 102

the TSS and SkyWatch: endurance and
cost.While TSS and SkyWatch measure their
endurance by the hour (30 to 150), the Cam-V
can operate a full month without support.99 This
makes the Cam-V an ideal choice in regions that
require considerable effort to setup, maintain,
and take down a surveillance system.
Unfortunately, being unmanned the Cam- V may
be a more tempting target for vandals than its
competitors. The system is equipped with an
automated alarm and motion detection that,
when triggered, audibly warns those who
approach with either a siren, pre-recorded
message, or a live message sent from an off-site
operator. However, if vandals/threats ignore this
warning it may only give them further cause to
take out the system (particularly at night when it
may otherwise be hard to see). 100 With this in
mind, the Cam-V cost between $39,000 and

Figure 2.7: Cam-V fully deployed103

$70,000101, considerably less expensive than

99

Gunter, Ford. “Local Firms Mobile Surveillance
System Could be Border Solution. Houston Business
Journal, 2012.
100
Ibid. p. 2
101
When considering cost it is more reasonable to
presume that CBP would purchase the highest trim
Cam-V possible since it is the only one that has

capabilities remotely approaching those of either the
TSS or SkyWatch.
102
Gunter, Ford. “Local Firms Mobile Surveillance
System Could be Border Solution. Houston Business
Journal, 2012.
103
The Cam-V in the picture is equipped with
defensive dome security cameras, low-equality
thermal imaging equipment, and standard (highquality) long-range day time optics.
Cam-V Mobile Security System Spec-Sheet. Cameras
Onsite, 2013 p. 1

82

Summary
The Cam-V is an excellent choice for mobile surveillance in almost any terrain. Its most
defining and appealing feature is also the one that is the most inhibiting: like the SkyWatch, it is
not a self-propelled. The advantage the Cam-V has over the SkyWatch is that it is smaller, a
quality that makes it less expensive, easier to transport, and easier to deploy. The size of the
Cam-V means that nearly any vehicle operated by the military, public, or private sectors is
capable of transporting it from location to location.
Performance Matrix:
Asset or
System
Cam-V
Terrain
Rating

Mission
Type
Def.
Foliage
Rating

Port.
Ratin
g
Low
Observ
Rating

Setup and
Teardown
Rating
Ratio of Active
to Inactive
Service

Endurance
Rating

Resiliency
Rating

Detection
Range of
Vehicles
N/A
Personnel
Cost Per
Month

Detection
Recognition
Surveillable Mobility
Range of
Range
Area of
Rating
Humans
Detection
N/A
N/A
N/A
Estimated Maintenance
Total Operating
Acquisition
and Resupply Cost Per
Cost Per Month
Cost Per
Month
Asset

Table 2.4: Performance matrix for the Cam-V

Important Information Regarding the Reviews of the Remaining Assets
The task of rating surveillance assets required far more time than initially expected. As a result,
the only assets that have undergone intense review are those above. The following assets and
programs are brief descriptions that, at most, include a picture of the system. In most cases
however there is only a sentence or two for each.
Integrated Fixed Tower Program (IFT)
outstanding contract: CBP
IFT is the second of two large, outstanding contracts up for award by CBP as part of the postSBI initiative. The driving force behind the acquisition of these towers as described by DHS is:
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“…to provide commercial-off-the-shelf/government-off-the-shelf
solutions for deployment at fixed, elevated sites, hereafter referred
to as integrated fixed towers that would provide automated,
persistent, wide area surveillance, the detection, tracking,
identification, and classification of illegal entries.”104
The concept behind the IFT is the use of unmanned towers, towers which are almost exclusively equipped
with radar, and in most cases radars manufactured by ICx. The exact range and cost of an individual IFT
system depends on the asset’s manufacturer and equipment installed (e.g., STS-350, STS-1400, STS12000, etc.) on it, but the current contract is for $98.1 million105. The following are a few of the entries
submitted for consideration by CBP (Cam-V is not included in this review but is a possible contender):

Integrated Fixed Tower Border Surveillance System (IFTBSS)
developed by Telephonics

Figure 2.8: Telephonics IFTBSS network demonstration106
104

“Integrated Fixed Towers.” Federal Business Opportunities Office, January 2011.
Ibid.
106
“Ground Surveillance Systems IFT” Telephonics, March 2013.
105
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Cerberus Unmanned Surveillance Tower System
developed by ICx

Figure 2.9: Cerberus IFT in the deployed position107

Summary
The IFT contract is similar to the MSC but may be an even more valuable and effective
surveillance asset, particularly when the scenario requires a rapidly deployable system that can
be delivered via a medium sized transport aircraft (e.g., C-130).
107

“ICx Technologies Inc.” Security Technology News, April 2013.
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Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) and Agent/Man Portable Security System (APSS)
Both the RVSS and APSS are contracts that CBP funded as part of the alternative SBI program.
The primary difference between the two is that one is man portable while the other is remotely
operated. Both assets are intended to provide surveillance via the use of electro-optical cameras
(e.g., thermal, image intensifying, simple low-light digital).

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
The use of UAVs by both CBP and the military has risen considerably over the past decade.
Current use of UAVs in places like Afghanistan outpaces the manufactures ability build them, a
fact which has taken what was once a low production asset and turned it into a virtual assembly
line of relatively inexpensive surveillance assets.108

Not only are UAVs less expensive to

purchase, they are also far less expensive to operate than manned aircraft. The cost of acquiring
and operating them has dropped low enough to allow for their use by organizations, like CBP,
that have been traditionally unable to acquire the same expensive, high-end surveillance assets
used by the military. The surveillance capability of UAVs varies widely depending on the type
of asset and the equipment installed on it. The UAVs presented in the next few pages are from
more than one ‘class’ of asset; some of them cost less than a million dollars while others that are
far more capable and survivable cost tens of millions of dollars and are capable of both detecting,
tracking, and engaging IOIs. The first of these unmanned aircraft to be introduced is that which
has become the most recognizable in the world, the Predator.
108

Cost is relative to that of a manned aircraft capable of delivering a similar level of surveillance.
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General Atomics RQ-1 (AKA MQ-1A) Predator

Figure 2.10: RQ-1 taking off in Afghanistan109

General Atomics MQ-9 (AKA the MQ-1B) Predator

Figure 2.11: MQ-9 armed with laser guided bombs110
109

“Factsheet: MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.” U.S. Air Force, November 5, 2008.
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Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel

Figure 2.12: RQ-170 rendering based on images of a RQ-170 shot down over Iran111

Manned Surveillance Aircraft and Helicopters
Similar to UAVs, many models of manned aircraft have been developed by multiple
manufactures and are in service with multiple organizations. The aircraft and helicopter
presented on the next page represent only a small fraction of those currently in service.

110
111

“Factsheet: MQ-9 Reaper.” U.S. Air Force, January 5, 2012.
“Iran Shows Film of Captured US Drone.” BBC World News, December 8, 2011.
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Lockheed Martin P-3 Orion

Figure 2.12: P-3 at Lockheed Martin’s Greenville facility112

UH-60 Blackhawk

Figure 2.13: CBP UH-60 at Dover Air Force Base Dover, DE113
112

“Greenville Operations.” Lockheed Martin, April 2013.
“Customs Blackhawk from Tucson Air Branch at Dover A.F.B. to provide air security.” Customs and Border
Protection, April 2013.
113
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Additional Surveillance Assets
The surveillance assets below are either platforms that do not fall within one of the prescribed

categories or they are assets which augment other assets in an indirect manner.
Micro-UGS
FLIR Thermal Fence
ICx Deployment Rapid Deployment Software
Micro-UAVs
Reviews of Surveillance Equipment
Preliminary Introduction to Surveillance Technologies
The surveillance equipment reviewed in this chapter are organized into sections based on the
type of technology each them uses. Prior to a review of the individual pieces of surveillance
equipment is a brief introduction to the parent class to which that equipment belongs. First
however is an introduction to some broader technologies that apply across the board to two or
more of these sections.
Generic Technologies:
Optical Zoom: This is the type of magnification used by most of the daytime optics sold to
consumers. It functions by adjusting the focal length. The quality/resolution of the image
generated by this type of camera is the same regardless of whether it is zoomed or not. The only
things that reduce the quality of a camera using optical zoom is the size of the lens, the quality of
the lens, and atmospheric conditions.114

114

There are other limitations that could be taken into account if using optical zoom in a place like space. These
however are the variables that most affect optical zoom under standard atmospheric conditions (on or close to the
Earth’s surface).
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Digital Zoom: This is the type of zoom used on commercial cell-phones. The image being
magnified has a preset resolution that is defined by the number pixels in that image. Digital
zoom does not sharpen the overall image itself, it only magnifies the individual pixels that make
up the larger image. As the digital zoom of an image increases the quality/resolution of that
image decreases.

Surveillance Equipment
Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR)
This technology is used in surveillance components to generate an image day or night. FLIR is
synonymous with thermal imaging. Cameras that employ this technology create an image based
on the subtle differences in temperature of the objects in that cameras field of view (FOV).115
This technology is excellent at detecting and identifying objects at night or in cooler regions.
The closer the temperature of the surrounding terrain is to that of the IOI the more difficult it is
to detect and identify that IOI.116 FLIR cameras range in price from several thousand to over a
hundred thousand dollars, depending in large part on the resolution of the camera (which is
directly related to the number of thermal reflectors, the truly expensive part of thermal cameras).
Since FLIR cameras create an image without needing to generate their IR light they are
extremely energy efficient.117
Some examples of FLIR equipment and their cost are:
FLIR 432-0010-01-00 MD-324 Static Thermal Night Vision Camera - $3,036

115

“What’s The Difference between Thermal Imaging and Night Vision?” FLIR Systems, Inc., 2013.
Email correspondence with PTZ systems.
117
“What’s The Difference between Thermal Imaging and Night Vision?” FLIR Systems, Inc., 2013.
116
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PTZ M-1D - $4,000-$15,000
Pelco / Schneider Electric - ESTI335-5N - Ip/analog P/t Thermal Camera 384x288 Res,
120/230vac, 35mm Lens, Pedestal Mount - $16,327
Samsung Techwin - SCB-9051 - Analog Thermal Imaging Camera, 20x240 - $8,721
Samsung SCB-9080 50mm Lens 1.2Km Range Weatherproof - $7,479
US Night Vision ATAC 360º Wireless Pan/Tilt 000615 - $6,995
Unfortunately there wasn’t enough time to gather and present data on all this equipment. The
important thing to take away from this section is that the FLIR/thermal equipment shown here is
expensive, very expensive. Most of the equipment above, despite being expensive, is only
capable of detecting humans inside of 800m and recognizing them inside of 200m.

Infrared LED Imaging (IR LED)
IR LED cameras (aka Near-Infrared Illumination cameras) are day time cameras that, when used
at night, transition from seeing in color to only black and white. 118 These cameras rely on IR
light generated by the camera itself. This light is generated by several LEDs that surround the
camera. Typical IR LED cameras can only see between 50 and150ft at night. Moreover, the
image generated is low quality and the power required to run them is high (because they generate
their own IR light).119 The advantage to using IR LED cameras is that they are extremely cheap
compared to other night vision cameras, ranging in price from $35 to $500.

118
119

“How Night Vision Works.” Sofradir EC Night Vision Systems, 2013.
“What’s The Difference between Thermal Imaging and Night Vision?” FLIR Systems, Inc., 2013.
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Image Intensifying
Cameras that employ image intensifying technology are nothing more than extremely sensitive
daytime cameras. These cameras are usually referred to as Night Vision Goggles (NVG).120 An
NVG camera works by magnifying the miniscule amount of visible light present at night to such
an extent that it produces an image.121 The image produced by NVG cameras is the classic green
and black usually used by military forces on the ground or in the air (e.g. the large binocular
goggles used by helicopter pilots to see at night). The short coming of these cameras is that they
do not work well in environments almost completely void of ambient light (e.g., in the desert that
is hundreds of miles from the nearest city on a moonless night).122 The picture quality generated
and viewable distance NVG cameras can see varies depending the generation of NVG used.
High-end NVG cameras are Gen-3 with illuminators, also known unofficially as Gen-4. One of
the major benefits of using NVG technology is that it can be combine with traditional devices to
generate clear, optically zoomed, images, the type of technology perfect for use as either a
spotting or rifle scope. This technology is less expensive than thermal but substantially more
than IR LED (several hundred to several thousand dollars). Finally, these cameras/optics are
typically only used by military and law enforcement personnel.
There wasn’t enough time to catalogue even a few of image-intensifying cameras on the market,
but they are a serious technology to consider when creating a new breed of surveillance systems.
However, after a careful review of the surveillance equipment on the market it was found that
not a single one of them that uses image-intensifying technology are designed for use as a fixed,
defensive surveillance system. This fact suggests that there may be some downside to using
120

Ibid.
“How Night Vision Works.” Sofradir EC Night Vision Systems, 2013.
122
Ibid.
121
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them in this manner, a downside that the research performed in the writing of this thesis has
failed to uncover.

Ground Based Radar
There are many varieties of ground based radar, each of which has its limitations. Some of these
radars are over 30 m tall and have a range of 80 km, others are man portable and have a range of
only a few hundred meters. Similarly, some radars are capable of detecting a man slowly
crawling while others can detect objects moving through dense foliage several km away. All of
these radars have one thing in common: they are all only capable of detecting and tracking IOIs.
The following is a list of radars made by ICx, each of which is named according to the maximum
range of that particular system (e.g., a STS-350 has a range of 350m). Unfortunately, the STS350 is the only system for which procurement and operational cost could be found.
STS-350

Figure 2.14: STS-350 ground based radar123
123

White Paper: The Secure Border Solution. ICx Technologies, February 2013. p. 6
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The prices below only reflect the cost of the radar itself, not the additional equipment that is
required to make it operational. Also, these prices have been taken from the company webpage
which was advertising a buyback and upgrade program which means they may or may not be the
standard price or the price that ICx has negotiated with some of its larger customers.
Trade in value per STS-350 radar (regardless of condition) - $13,450.
New STS-350 EP model radar with trade - $15,990.
New STS-350 ER (700m) model radar with trade - $18,990.
All new STS-350 & STS-350ER radars include the latest hardware and software and a full 12month limited warranty
STS-1400

Figure 2.15: STS-1400 ground based radar124
124

White Paper: The Secure Border Solution. ICx Technologies, February 2013. p. 6
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STS-12000

Figure 2.16: STS-12000 ground based radar125

Summary Analysis and Matrix
As was the case with many of the assets and equipment that were slated for review in this
chapter, there was not enough time to build a chapter matrix. However, the information logged
for the first three assets and the research performed into the IFT program and various types of
equipment provide enough information to continue on to the next chapter. Instead of filling out a
performance table for every piece of asset and equipment examined in this section, that
information will be estimated when it is required for either comparison between chapters 1 and 2
or when input (with respect to the performance of a surveillance system) into a surveillance tool
is required.

125

White Paper: The Secure Border Solution. ICx Technologies, February 2013. p. 7
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Chapter 3: Analysis
So far the only research performed has been on existing systems and organizations that use those
systems. This chapter takes that information and uses it to synthesize a surveillance asset
capable of replacing or augmenting existing systems; systems that are capable of filling the gap
that exist between an organization’s needs (criteria) and the capability of the surveillance asset
(s) currently employed by them (condition). The first step in this process is to analyze the data
gathered in chapters 1 and 2.
Analysis of Chapters 1 and 2
The reviews conducted in the first two chapters have revealed the requirements of organizations
that use surveillance systems, the assets in use by them, and the capabilities of those assets.
These reviews contain a large amount of information, most of which is used later in this thesis.
For now, the relevant information contained in these chapters is found in the master tables at the
end of each. Analysis of these two tables paints a picture of how surveillance systems are
currently used, the weaknesses that result from the way in which they are deployed, and what
existing surveillance assets are ideal for each scenario (with respect to those that are currently in
use).
Tooling up the Analytical Process
An analytical tool has been developed to make this analysis faster and easier than it would
otherwise be. This tool is the Scenario Specific Optimization of Surveillance Assets (SOSA,
SSOSA just doesn’t sound right). SOSA provides the user with ability to perform three
functions. First, it generates a topographic map for each of the scenarios in chapter 1, a map that
includes the detection ranges and tracking depths of the assets used. This map is useful in
determining how effective the current assets are and how resilient that system is. These
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scenarios are preprogramed with the actual surveillance assets used in the real world. Simply
select the scenario in sheet 2 and view the map in sheet 4. The second function provided by
SOSA is the ability to customize the surveillance assets used in each scenario. If the user would
like to choose a different set of assets to perform the same scenario -specific surveillance he or
she can do so. There is a button above the scenario selection column that, when pressed, clears
the current assets but leaves both the scenario itself. The third and final function provided by
SOSA is the ability to automatically optimize the placement and type of surveillance assets for a
specific scenario – either a preloaded scenario or one that is created by the user. Despite being a
useful and robust tool, SOSA is virtually useless if the user in not aware of the operational
knowledge specific to each scenario.
So what is operational knowledge and where does it come from? Operational knowledge is
defined as the knowledge of the role played by surveillance assets in each scenario with respect
to the broader mission. Furthermore, it is important to know the tactics used to accomplish that
mission so long as those tactics are influenced by the surveillance provided by the assets used in
each scenario. Some of this information is contained in the first chapter, the rest will be
provided in the pages to come. Each of the scenarios outlined in chapter 1 are depicted in this
chapter using SOSA. Following this depiction is the scenario specific requirements from chapter
1 and the capabilities of the assets, from chapter 2, employed in those scenarios.
Note: Due to the large number of scenarios and the variety of those scenarios (in terms of both
the type of assets employed and the type of perimeters they are deployed along), the scenarios
depicted in this chapter have been limited to those that employ only ground based, fixed assets.
Moreover, the types of perimeters depicted have been limited to geopolitical borders and
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exfiltration/infiltration points of SF personnel. Several of the other scenarios will be discussed,
just not in the same detail as those that are depicted using SOSA.126
Each of the scenarios that modeled by SOSA are done so in one of two ‘formats’. The first is the
most basic. These are scenarios whose titles include the surveillance assets AND equipment
installed on them in their heading (e.g. SkyWatch w/ STS-3000 radar and short-range FLIR).
When these scenarios are selected from the interactive sheet, SOSA automatically selects those
assets and their placement on the map. The second type of scenario by SOSA is more complex.
These are scenarios which have no asset or equipment associated with them. When these
scenarios are modeled the surveillance assets and equipment used will either be selected by the
author or selected by SOSA (via its built in optimization function). The following page is a
screen capture of SOSA’s main interactive sheet, Table 3.1. (not the final tool, only a betadesign). Immediately following the interactive sheet is Figure 3.1, an example of the map
generated by SOSA using its sensor-optimization function.
Findings
Ideally, a surveillance network is composed of systems that provide all three capabilities:
detection, tracking, and recognition. Unfortunately, most networks are far from ideal. In cases
where incomplete surveillance networks (those that are lack one of the three capabilities) are
deployed the overall mission of the organization operating those assets is jeopardized /
threatened.127 In some scenarios this is an acceptable and wise decision128. Then there are

126

SOSA is in the process of being modified so that both enclosed perimeters and mobile assets can be modeled.
Doing so will allow the user to perform all three functions of SOSA in the same manner those functions are used
with the current scenarios.
127
In the context used, jeopardized / threatened does not refer to absolutes. For example, an organization is
conducting a mission that has a 99.9% probability of complete success with all three capabilities. The lack of any
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Table 3.1: Interactive page of SOSA. This is the page where the user inputs the variables required to
generate either a custom scenario or one that is sensor-optimized
one of the three may reduce the probability of complete success by anywhere from 0.1% (or some number
impossibly close to 0) to 99.9%.
128
An example of this would be expanding a manned radar network from 350m to 1400m. At 350m it is borderline
possible to recognize an IOI with handheld optics, increasing the recognition capability would make no sense.
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Figure 3.1: Existing sensor network using legacy SkyWatch towers, STS-1400ER FST, and augmented
by a choice of STS-1400ER / Cam-V
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instances in which one or two of these capabilities are unavailable. There is however one
capability that modern surveillance systems lack more than any other.
Analysis of the master tables from chapters 1 and 2 has revealed that the single greatest
capability that modern surveillance networks lack is recognition. Figures 3.1 highlights an
example of scenarios in which this capability is not provided. The surveillance network modeled
in this figure resembles that which is currently deployed along a 10 mile stretch of the U.S.’s
southern border. The overlap in the detection coverage (both human and vehicular) provided by
surveillance systems in this scenario is proof that the systems that makeup this network are
capable of detection IOIs day or night. However, observation of the recognition range (labeled
human specific ident. range in this figure) highlights the fact that there are huge gaps in this
networks capability to recognize IOIs, particularly along the border itself (as opposed to further
inland from it). This figure is representative of many scenarios in which the surveillance
network deployed lacks the ideal capability to recognize IOIs. What this figure fails to illustrate
is the degree to which recognition assists in the completion of an organization’s primary mission
from one scenario to the next. The exact consequences of deploying a surveillance network
with insufficient recognition capabilities varies according to the scenario, but the cost can of
doing so is always measured in terms of resources (funds, personnel / hardware) and the success
of the mission. The loss of resources is easily quantified; the success of a mission is not.
Success however is dependent on two other variables: resources and time. The following
example illustrates this dynamic.
If recognition is lacking, the enforcement assets responsible for enforcing the region under
surveillance will be unaware of the intent or number of IOIs detected. Since the operators of
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surveillance networks often send enforcement assets that are capable of overwhelming the IOI
encountered, the number and capability of those assets may be inappropriate for the given
scenario. Doing so costs the operators time and resources (in this case it is funds, personnel, and
hardware). The loss of time and resources leads to (i.e., indicative of) the tying down of
enforcement assets that could otherwise be used to intercept additional IOI, IOI which may have
been discovered only after detection of the first. The inability to engage fewer IOIs is the most
direct impact that the loss of time and resources has on the successful completion of the overall
mission. In addition to the – the ability to discern whether or not an IOI is a false positive.
Scenarios in which an IOI is inaccurately classified as a threat is an event commonly referred to
as a false positive. It is one thing to send too many enforcement assets in response to the
detection of an IOI; it is something else entirely to dispatch those assets when the IOI detected is
of no consequence whatsoever. Doing so not only waste time and money, it leaves the operators
extremely vulnerable to the use of decoys. With this in mind, the capability to provide rangespecific recognition is the only way to determine with absolute certainty whether or not an IOI is
a false positive.
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Chapter 4: Design and Features of the PSN
Design History of the PSN
Introduction
The final design of the PSN put forward later in this chapter is far from what was originally
envisioned. Research into the variety and capability of surveillance assets and equipment (and
the organizations that use them) has been the primary motivation behind the dynamic design of
the PSN. Nonetheless, the original concept and the requirements that are the foundation of hit
have never changes, save one. The original requirements are:
•

portable

•

modular

•

upgradable

•

rapidly deployable

•

inexpensive

•

reusable

•

original

History
The requirements above have all been challenging to integrate into the final design. However,
one has been far more difficult to integrate than the others – originality. The originality of the
PSN was consistently challenged at every turn. The design the PSN changed every time research
revealed that it was not original – every time it was revealed that the then current design had
already been or was under development. This first part of this section is a record of how the
design of the PSN changed from its original incarnation to what it is now. The history described
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in this section does not account for minor revisions, only those which led to a redesign of the
then current system, versions which, at the time, were thought to have been the final design.
The Original Concept – MSC Version 1.0
Originally the PSN was called the Mobile Sensor Network (MSN). The founding requirements
were the same, but the name was different. This system was designed around the idea that a
single thermal sensor was capable of detecting and tracking multiple IOI, and that this sensor
could be developed and implemented for considerable less than those already on the market. A
key component of this concept was that the multitude of relatively cheap thermal sensors used
would be capable of talking to one another after deployment, tracking an IOI as it progressed
through the area of detection. These sensors had to be capable of being deployed by vehicles,
naval vessels, aircraft, and personnel within a short period of time in any terrain (e.g., tropical
forest, mountains, deserts, etc.) The air dropped sensors had to be capable of being dropped and
guided to specific points on the ground using GPS or triangulation (3G). In an effort to make the
design even more original and effective, the design of the sensors had to deployable with as a
bundled package. This package was to include a mobile command center and a large number of
sensors that were all contained in a 20ft cargo container, the type of container that could be
deployed via cargo aircraft or on board a naval frigate (in particular the U.S. Navy’s new Littoral
Combat Ship, or LCS) similar to the one shown in Figure 4.1 on the next page.
MSC Version 2.0
It was discovered during initial research that the function of integrating multiple, low-end
thermal cameras had already been developed by companies like FLIR. FLIR developed software
that takes their sensors and integrates them into a vast network capable of tracking an IOI from
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once sensor to the next. At this point the original design of the MSN, though challenged, was
still original – it was still highly portable, air deployable, and included a mobile command center.

Figure 4.1: U.S. Navy LCS-1 Freedom and LCS-2 Independence129

Moreover, the requirement that the sensors themselves be inexpensive was given a higher
priority than during than originally planned. Research had shown that it would be too expensive
to airdrop guided sensors. The only alternative would be to airdrop unguided ones. To make an
unguided sensor network effective aircraft would need to deploy a large number of sensors. As
the required number of sensors increased the price of them was required to decrease.
Unfortunately, further research revealed that even this design lacked enough originally to
proceed. There were already systems that were air deployable that, despite not being thermal,
129

LCS-1 and LCS-2 are the first ships in their own separate sub-class of LCS (hence two very different ships being
referred to as LCS)
Littoral Combat Ships, United States of America. Naval-Technology.com, April 2013. Accessed April 20, 2013
from: http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/littoral/littoral1.html
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enabled the tracking of IOI across a region of interest. At this point it was thought that these
sensors were different enough that the MSN’s ability to identify an IOI as belonging to a
particular class (e.g., car vs. person vs. deer). What killed this version of the MSN was research
into small, unmanned UAVs equipped with thermal sensors. Some of these UAVs, though more
expensive than the MSN, are capable of seeing through fairly thick foliage to the extent that they
are capable of identifying IOI as belonging to a particular class. In an unrelated case, it was long
after discovering the capability of UAVs that the MSN was renamed PSN. Research revealed
that CBP had just finished awarding the MSC contract to ICx. It was decided that the acronyms
and requirements of these two systems were too similar to proceed. The decision to rename the
MSN was reaffirmed when it became clear that a large portion of this thesis would be presented
at a conference attended by a large number of CBP personnel, personnel who may associate the
MSN with the MSC.
PSN Version 1.0
The first incarnation of the PSN was a derivation of the MSN. This version of the PSN was the
first version with the additional conceptual requirement that the PSN be capable of recognition.
The PSN still used thermal cameras, but this time they were used in a different way. First, the
thermal cameras used by the PSN did not need to be high-end, they need only be capable of
detecting and tracking IOI at a distance of equal to or greater than fifteen hundred feet. These
low end thermal sensors, called parent sensors (P-sensors), were to be connected via Wi-Fi to a
network of traditional cameras, or child sensors, (C-sensors) capable of optical zoom. The
thermal sensors would detect IOIs and then send a signal to the optical camera that tells them the
correct pan, tilt, and zoom to take a picture of the IOI. Using this system would allow the cheap
acquisition of both tracking (via the thermal sensors) and identification (optical sensors). This
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design put life back into the originally envisioned capability of being deployed via aircraft or
helicopters. Whereas small UAVs and thermal sensors were both capable of detection and
tracking, only this version of the PSN was capable of recognition. Unfortunately, they would
only be capable of doing so if the P-sensors dropped by aircraft were a smaller and less capable
version of their man portable counterparts.

Figure 4.3: C-Sensor option 1 – IR and solar

Figure 4.2: P-Sensor deployed (note the size of
the arms and panels, which attach to the top of
the second tier of cylinders, not the first as in
other options) – thermal, solar, and 8ft
telescoping mount

Figure 4.4: C-Sensor option 2 – camera, flash,
and solar
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The demise of this version of the PSN began with the discovery of networks in which thermal
and radar were used to detect IOIs and long-range cameras, equipped with large spot lights built
in to them, were used to identify them day or night. Radar proved to be far better at detecting
IOIs than thermal, at least on flat, devoid of foliage. Still, hope for this version (the 3rd, possibly
4th version depending on how you count it) remained despite the unavoidable use of radar and
thermal for detection. One of two actions could be taken: embrace radar and integrate it into the
design of the PSN or exploit the advantages thermal sensors have over radar.

Figure 4.5: FLIR EnforcIR130

PSN Version 2.0: Radar or Thermal
Radar and thermal each have their advantages. Radar can cover a larger area than low end
thermal sensors but it cannot see through thick foliage nor can it work in rough terrain as well as
thermal sensors. The decision was made to embrace the advantages of thermal sensors. A plan
was developed that highlighted the use of thermal sensors on mountainous, uneven terrain as

130

Ranger MS-UC EnforcIR Brochure, FLIR Systems, 2013. p. 1
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Figure 4.6: FLIR Ranger III131

well as terrain that was covered by thick foliage. The cost and tracking ability of IOI through
this terrain was mapped and proven to have its advantage over radar – at least until more
research was performed into the capabilities of ground radar.
Ground radar capable of detecting humans through thick foliage has been around since the late
1960’s. It was deployed by the U.S. in Vietnam as a way of detecting Vietcong attacking FOBs.
This technology has evolved over the decades to such an extent that nearly all mid and long
range ground radars are capable of doing so. To make the design PSN 2.0 even less original was
discovery of sensor networks that use radar to detect IOIs and high end cameras equipped with
spotlight s for identification. This deployment of radar and sensors was the second blow to what
is a design that’s foundation was three fold: the ability to see through foliage; the use of long
rage sensors to detect and track IOIs complimented by flash cameras for identification; and the
use of thermal sensors and flash sensors on mountainous terrain. Version 2.0 was not dead yet,
only limping along.

131

Ranger MS Illuminator, FLIR Systems, 2013. p. 1
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Version 2.0 was officially killed when research uncovered software developed by FLIR that
coordinates the use of radar, thermal cameras, and flash cameras to provide full coverage in any
terrain. 132 At this point it seemed like the time to throw in the towel. All the good ideas had
already been thought of, nothing else remained. That is when research was performed into the
price, resilience, and long term deployment of the surveillance assets examined thus far.
During this stage of development it was projected that the PSN P-sensors would cost $8,000 to
$12,000 while the C-sensors would cost $700 to $1,000. It was thought that the cost of the
proposed system would be similar to that of current equipment (e.g., radar, long-range thermal),
the advantage of the PSN being that it is capable of both identification and detection whereas
existing systems could only detect IOIs. The estimated cost of these systems was based on the
advertised price of similar, commercially available, systems. It turned out that these systems
were incredibly more expensive than originally thought. This meant that once again the entire
design of the PSN was a viable option. Despite the fact that it shares similar capabilities with
existing systems it can do so for a fraction of the price.
PSN Version 3.0: Cost
The debate was finally settled, the final version of the PSN would be: thermal sensors for
detection, flash for illumination, traditional daytime optics for recognition, and communication
between the P-sensors and C-sensors accomplished via the use of narrowband Wi-Fi.
The only thing left to do was conduct assessments to determine the exact cost of each component
and to conduct mock deployments. During the course of conducting these assessments two

111

things became obvious: each component, particularly the C-sensors, would cost much more than
expected and the PSN itself would take too long to deploy. Each of the C-sensors required a
laser range finder and an auto focus camera. Furthermore, the telemetry and focus required by
each C-sensor to take a viable picture of an IOI meant that C-sensors and P-sensors need to work
in unison (an expensive proposition). Although not impossible, the cost to implement these
changes negates any advantage the PSN once had over existing systems.
Despite having already been proven impractical, further analysis of the PSN 3.0 was conducted
in an effort to determine if the current version had any other flaws. This analysis revealed that
the PSN took too long to deploy. The most laborious aspect of deployment was aligning the
narrowband Wi-Fi installed on each of the sensors, a design flaw that plagued this and nearly
every other previous version of the PSN – rendering them all defunct.
PSN 4.0
The only way to make the PSN viable was to address the flaws inherent to the prior version and
all those that preceded it. The only problem was that there seemed to be no one way to address
even one of the problems at hand (the need for cheap auto focusing camera, a faster way to align
the narrowband Wi-Fi and coordinate the operation of the C-sensors with the P-sensors). There
seemed to be only one solution: get rid of the C-sensors entirely. The decision to do so was the
last major step that culminated in the PSN’s final design.
The Design of PSN 4.0
The PSN 4.0 is designed to function as an all-inclusive system, as opposed to the PSN 3.0 which
had both C-sensors and P-sensors. The same equipment installed on the two sensors that makeup
PSN 3.0 has been combined in the design of the PSN 4.0 to form a single system. Doing so
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removed the extremely expensive hardware and software required to integrate the operation of
multiple sensors. When fully assembled, the specifications of the PSN are (all dimensions are
visible in Figures 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9):
•

50.0cm (19.7”) tall (dimension 1)

•

12.7cm (5”) diameter (dimension 2)

•

13.5cm (5.3”) tall (dimension 3)

•

19cm (7.5”) wide (dimension 4)

•

27.9cm (11”) long/depth (dimension 5) (length does not include stakes which are
removable)

Dimension 2

Figure 4.8
Dimension 4

Figure 4.7: Mount

Figure 4.10: Complete system
Figure 4.9

The drawback of creating a combining all of the sensory equipment into a single system is that
the cost of acquiring the number of systems needed to construct a viable network has risen
dramatically. The single greatest reason costs have risen is that each PSN 4.0 system must have
a thermal camera installed on it, whereas the PSN 3.0 only required one thermal camera for
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every three or four systems (one P-sensor for every three or four C-sensors). More information
on this topic, the deployment and operation of the PSN, is discussed in chapter 5.
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Chapter 5: Deployment of the PSN
Variations and Outfitting
The PSN has been designed in such a way that it enables those who deploy it to gain maximum
flexibility with minimal effort, a necessity in a world where surveillance requirements can vary
greatly from mission to mission. This flexibility (i.e., feature) is all the more important when
looking back at one of the original goals outlined in the introduction: the development of a
system that can be used by multiple organizations (in an effort to reduce costs). In the case of
the PSN, the flexibility it provides its operators comes from its modular design. Though
modular, the current design is limited to a few configurations, or variations, which are defined
according to how each is outfit with an array of different components.
All variations of the PSN share a similar set of core components: lower mount and associated
hardware (e.g., battery), digital camera, rangefinder, and infrared camera. The only thing that
changes from one variation to the next is the number of flashlights installed on the sensor and the
decision of whether or not to equip it with certain, key options. It is also important to note that
every PSN sensor is intended to run using the same software. This enables every PSN built to be
capable of being modified so as to take full advantage of all options, deployment scenarios, and
flashlight variations. Figures 5.1 through 5.7 illustrate the four different ways a PSN can be
outfit with flashlights. Figure 5.1 shows the variation of the PSN that has been presented thus
far. Since the lower mount used in this figure is identical to that used by every PSN
manufactured (independent of the variation), the rest of the variations presented in this section
(and the figures of them) only illustrate the upper assembly.
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Figure 5.1: 4 flashlights

Figure 5.2: 6 flashlights

Figure 5.3: 6 flashlights
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Figure 5.4: 2 flashlights

Figure 5.5: 2 flashlights

Figure 5.6: no flashlights

Figure 5.7: no flashlights

Each of the four variations above can be equipped with one of four options: one or more
narrowband Wi-Fi transmitters, solar panels, compact telescoping upper mount, and extra-long
telescoping upper mount (e.g., the pole on which the upper assembly rests). The narrowband
Wi-Fi transmitters enable the PSN to communicate with deployed flashlights over a longer
distance (without the need for Wi-Fi in the flashlights); solar panels dramatically increase the
time a PSN sensor can remain in the field without needing to be recharged / have its battery(s)
replaced; and the use of a telescoping upper mount allows the PSN to operate from a higher
vantage point. Other than cost, the use of the compact or extra-long telescoping upper mounts is
the only options that have potentially negative side effects.

117

When the compact telescoping upper mount
is equipped it reduces the size of battery that
can be carried in the lower mount (the center
of the lower mount is hollowed out to
provide room for the pole to retract into).
The extra-long telescoping upper mount is
both easier to detect and is more
cumbersome to transport and deploy - the
actual pole is several feet long and must be
carried separately from the sensor itself.
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 illustrate how PSN
sensors look when equipped with solar
panels and an extra-long upper mount.133

Figure 5.8: 2 flashlights and solar

Figure 5.9: 2 flashlights and extra-long upper
mount134

133

No figure was generated to show the use of a
compact telescoping pole since the use of that pole
would look similar to that of a regular PSN (taller by
approximately 6” but with the added ability to
collapse completely into the lower assembly). There
would be a figure illustrating the use of directional
Wi-Fi but difficulties arose when attempting to
generate the model.

134

Total elevation between the ground and the sensor
when using the extra-long upper mount is 2.5m vs.
the standard 0.5m
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The final component that determines a specific systems unique variation is the type of flashlight
used. All PSN are equipped with a flash light that is capable of being staked into the ground or
used on the sensor itself. All of these flashlights have rotating heads, identical battery supplies,
and bulbs (LEDs). Options that can be installed on these flashlights include solar panels, Wi-Fi
transmitters (as opposed to just a Wi-Fi receiver), and sirens (audible alarm). Figures 5.10, 5.11,
and 5.12 illustrate what these options look like when installed on a standard PSN flashlight.

Figure 5.10: Solar stored

Figure 5.11: Solar deployed

Figure 5.12: Wi-Fi transmitter

Deployment and Operation
Each variant of the PSN can be deployed and operated in a multitude of different ways. The way
in which a specific system or network of systems is deployed and operated depends on the
mission, the type of systems being deployed, and the number of systems on hand. Off the two,
deployment is least complex.
Deployment
Deployment of the PSN can be done in two different configurations, both of which depend on
the location of the flashlights used to illuminate IOIs at night. The first way is deploy each PSN
system as a single unit. This configuration places all of the flashlights on the system itself. A
single PSN system deployed in this manner is capable of detecting, tracking, and recognizing
IOIs during the day according to the maximum effective range (usually between 200m and
400m) of each piece of equipment installed (i.e., digital camera, rangefinder, and thermal
camera). At night, the maximum detection and tracking range depends solely on the thermal
camera. Night time recognition depends on the type of digital camera and number of flashlights
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mounted on the upper assembly. A standard digital camera, effective when used with a moderate
amount of ambient light (early dawn, late dusk), is estimated to be capable of taking high-quality
night time images of IOIs at the following, flashlight dependent, ranges:
•
•
•
•

0 flashlights: 0m
2 flashlights: 115m
4 flashlights: 145m
6 flashlights: 160m

Although these distances are only rough estimates, they are estimates derived from the testing of
a flashlight similar in capability to ones intended for use on PSN systems (1200 lumens).135 The
testing of this flashlight was done in near total darkness at ranges up to 150m. A single
flashlight was more than capable of completely illuminating IOI at over 100m, in some cases
130m. The estimates for the effective ranges of night time recognition of IOIs presented in this
section are highly conservative; estimates that take into account the effect various atmospheric
phenomena have on a flashlight’s ability to effectively illuminate an IOI at night. These ranges
(yellow = 115m, blue = 145m, red = 160m) are illustrated in Figure 5.13 below, a mock
deployment of the PSN around a military installation with a hard perimeter.

Figure 5.13: Mock deployment of the PSN around a military base with a hard perimeter
135

See the appendix for a detailed description of this flashlight.
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The second type of deployment may or may not have flashlights installed on the upper
assemblies. What makes this deployment unique is that there are two or more flashlights
deployed on the ground at a distance from the primary system. These flashlights can be
deployed in a variety of configurations at ranges between 35m to 250m from the nearest (PSN)
system. The primary disadvantage of doing so is that, regardless of the distance between the
flashlights and the primary system, it requires far more flashlights than a standalone system. The
exact number of flashlights required depends on the orientation of them and how far the
operators want to extend the range at which a PSN can recognize IOIs. A rough approximation
of the number of flashlights needed to extend this range is illustrated in Figure 5.14. Even when
deployed at extremely short ranges (<20m), this configuration has its advantages - it removes the
flash from the primary system, making it harder to detect. Figure 5.13 illustrates the mock
deployment of flashlights, depicted by the small yellow circles, around a network of PSN
systems.

Figure 5.14: Flashlights required for extended range recognition vs. the detection range
of a STS-350 radar
Figure 5.13 goes even further; it compares the deployment of four STS-350 radars against that
of a PSN network with four systems. The shaded region represents the detection range and
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tracking area of a single STS-350 radar. In this scenario the PSN is capable of detecting and
tracking IOIs at 300-400m, approximately the same range as the STS-350. The final aspect of
deployment is the orientation those flashlights deployed in the field, which, after study, suggest
that many more flashlights are required than the number indicated in Figure 5.13 (to illuminate
IOIs at the ranges in that figure in such a way that any IOI that falls inside that range is
recognizable).
Flashlights must be oriented so that they illuminate the front side of all IOIs that close within the
rangefinders specified range. If the front side is not illuminated the camera onboard each
primary system will be unable to see the IOI at night. There are several ways of accomplishing
this, none of which is the ‘perfect solution’. The number and orientation of flashlights depends
on the area needing illumination. However, the fact of the matter is this: the numerous unique
paths from which IOIs can approach a camera’s activation range (as set by the rangefinder) make
it difficult to illuminate the front of them (IOIs) unless many flashlights are used (see Figure
5.14). With that in mind, the most effective way of using deployed flashlights is when the region
being monitored is less than 30◦ wide. The use of flashlights in this type of scenario makes it
much easier to properly illuminate approaching IOIs. Figure 5.15 illustrates an example of the
PSN deployed under these conditions.
Deployment and Operation
The operation of a PSN system begins with the engagement process. The generic process by
which the PSN engages (detect, track, and recognize) IOIs, regardless how that network is
deployed, is as follows:
1) The thermal camera detects the heat signature indicative of an IOI
2) The thermal camera tracks the IOI, using the pan and tilt mechanist to keep the IOI in the
very center of the thermal cameras display
3) As soon as the thermal camera begins to track the IOI, the laser rangefinder starts
measuring the distance between the IOI and the PSS (the rangefinder is fixed to the upper
assembly, directly below the thermal camera)
4) The focus of the camera, which is located directly below the rangefinder, is adjusted so
that it is constantly in focus. This is accomplished by linking the focus of the camera to
the distance measured by the range finder
Steps 5 and 6 when the PSS is operating during the day:
5) At a predetermined, user defined distance the camera takes a series of digital photographs
(still frames, not video)
6) These photographs are relayed to a local or regional command and control center (the
type of communication equipment used depends on the needs of the operator)
Steps 5 through 7 when the PSS is operating at night:
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5) At a predetermined, user defined distance the upper assembly broadcast a signal via
narrowband Wi-Fi (or via different methods discuss later in this section) to all flashlights
(both those on the PSS itself and those in the field) connected to that specific system
telling them to turn on for a short period of time (usually between 1/5th and 1 second).
6) The camera takes a series of digital photos a fraction of a second after the upper assembly
tells the flashlights to turn on
7) These photographs are relayed to a local or regional command and control center
The operation of a PSN system and the overall network to which it belongs depends on the
deployment of those systems and the options installed. The actual operation of each system is
identical to that which is described in steps 1 through 4 on the previous page. Following step 4,
the operation of each system is unique. The following are descriptions are examples of how
various PSN networks operate according the deployment of the systems that make up each
network and the options installed on them (the individual systems).
Example 1: Operation of a standalone PSN system or standard, Wi-Fi equipped, PSN with
flashlights installed in the field
The operation of this example is identical to the steps outlined above. The only exception to this
operation is when the flashlights used are equipped with sirens. If they are, the sirens will sound
as soon as the flashlights are triggered. These sirens will continue to emit sound until the preset
time has elapsed (time varies based on user input, but would most likely vary from a few seconds
to several minutes).
The only limitation of this system is that the W-Fi installed on it has a very short range (max of
35-40m, but usually less). This means that if flashlights are deployed in the field they are only
capable of extending the night time recognition range of a PSN system by exactly that distance, a
distance which is trivial given the recognition range of a standalone system (max of 160m).
However, there is an operational advantage to deploying flashlights in the field using Wi-Fi - it is
by far the easiest and least expensive method of doing so.
Example 2: Operation of a narrowband Wi-Fi equipped PSN with flashlights in the field
Example 3: Operation of a standard, Wi-Fi equipped PSN with Wi-Fi transmitter equipped
flashlights in the field
Estimating the Cost of a Single PSN System
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
The type of equipment intended for deployment on PSN assets was and has always been off the
shelf and commercially available. Knowing this information made it possible to predict, within
reason136, what the price of each variant of the PSN would be. Research into the cost of various
models of ground based radar, thermal sensors, and even high end flash optics opened another
door for the PSN. Regardless of whether it is competing against high-end radar suites that cost
$150,000 and up or against thermal cameras costing between $50,000 and $100,000, the PSN is
capable of providing superior recognition for a fraction of the cost. The PSN is also more
capable at detecting, tracking, and recognizing IOIs than low-radars that cost $75,000 and up
(radars may cost only $20,000, but the supporting equipment needed to make them operational
increases the price a minimum of two times over).137 Even more surprising was the cost of highend cameras equipped with spotlights. Many of these systems (in use with CBP and the military)
cost $50,000 or despite the fact that they’re use is augmented with other assets, usually radar.
When standing on their own these cameras can see 2-3 km during the day, their ability to
recognize IOIs at night via the use of their spotlights is limited to 1.5 kilometers (usually less, ½
to 1 kilometer). The financial advantage of using the PSN is clear; when compared against
existing systems, the PSN can perform equally as well on flat terrain, better on thickly foliated
terrain, and far better on mountainous terrain while doing so for a fraction of the cost.
The resilience of the PSN also gives it an advantage over existing systems. When a single, more
capable asset fails, all of the surveillance capability provided by that asset is lost with it. If one
or two PSN fail the PSN is still capable of performing its mission. This alone is a reason to
136

See chapter 5 for more information and details regarding the PSN’s estimated cost.
A GSA contract between the federal government and ICx listed the acquisition cost of entire STS-350 systems,
which use $15,000-$20,000 radars, at between $45,000 and $80,000.
137
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seriously consider the PSN over traditional, high end optics. Intermingled with the benefit of
resilience is that of endurance. Expensive, high-end optics require a significant amount of
power. If they are deployed in remote terrain they will require some type of local support. If
they are battery powered they will eventually need their batteries replaced. Even if they are
equipped with solar panels to provide additional endurance, it is unlikely that the operation of the
spotlight will be able to last long without some type of external charging. The PSN on the other
hand is a network that deployed over a large area. Each individual camera and the lights
associated with it is unlikely to be used more than once a night, perhaps even once every few
days. One small solar panel would be capable of sustaining power for years (panel generates
equal to or greater than the average power consumed). To make things even more plausible,
each unit would be equipped with batteries that, on a full charge, can power each asset for over a
month. This type of reserve ensures that the solar panels used by the PSN will never run out of
power, despite the degradation of the panel itself. Finally, the number of PSN systems that are
deployed within a given interval is higher than that of conventional spotlight/camera. This
means that, despite the fact that companies like FLIR can setup a network to optimize coverage,
on mountainous terrain the capability of that network to completely cover every bit of that terrain
is less than the PSN.
Considering the information above and the fact that the PSN has met or exceeded all of its
requirements, it can be declared that the objectives declared in chapter 1 have been fulfilled. The
PSN 4.0 is a marketable surveillance system that, in addition to fulfilling its stated requirements,
provides niche surveillance capabilities that not provided by existing systems: nearly 100% cover
in mountainous terrain and the use of thermal cameras purely for the detection (and never
identification) of IOI.
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Glossary
a – Acceleration
ad – Deceleration
A – Area
Ad – Area of sensor perpendicular to its velocity
Adp – Area of a parachute perpendicular to its velocity
Adpf – Total area of a parachute when lying flat
Ads – Area of a deployed sensor perpendicular to its velocity
Ap – Area of a parachute perpendicular to its velocity
APSS – Agent Portable Security System
ASP – Advanced Security Products
BSAT – Balance Survivability Assessment Team
BZSS – Border Zone Surveillance System
CAS – Close Air Support
Cd – Coefficient of Drag
Cdp – Coefficient of drag for a parachute
Cds – Coefficient of drag for a sensor
CBP – Customs and Border Protection
C-Sensor – Child Sensor
CAP – Combat Air Patrol
CAS – Close Air Support
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d – Diameter
ddp – Diameter of deployed parachute
DHS – Department of Homeland Security
DoD – Department of Defence
DTRA – Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Ek – Kinetic energy
Ep – Potential energy
EM – Electromagnetic
EO – Electro-optical
F – Force
Fg – Force of gravity
FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency
FLIR – Forward Looking Infrared
FOB – Forward Operating Base
GAO – Government Accountability Office
HC – Heavy camera
HSPD – Homeland Security Presidential Directive
IFT – Integrated Fixed Tower
IFTBSS – Integrated Fixed Tower Border Surveillance System
IOI – Item of Interest
k – Spring constant
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LAPES – Low altitude parachute extraction system
lp – Length of a single section/beam/rectangle of a cross parachute
LC – Light camera
LE – Law Enforcement
M - Mass
MSC – Mobile Surveillance Capabilities
ODP – Office of Domestic Preparedness
OAM – Office of Air and Marine
P – Momentum
POE – Point of Entry
P-Sensor – Parent Sensor
PSN – Portable Sensor Network
RRAP – Regional Resiliency Assistance Program
RF – Radio Frequency
RVSS – Remote Video Surveillance System
Sd – Stopping distance
SBI – Secure Border Initiative
SBInet – Secure Border Initiative Network
SDT – Sensor Development Tool
SRPP – State and Regional Preparedness Program
t – Time
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TALCE – Tanker Airlift Control Element
tb – Time to go from impact to zero velocity for the batteries, spikes, part 1, and part 3
tc – Time to go from impact to zero velocity for the camera, part 2, and associated electronics
TSS – Threat Stalker Surveillance System
UAS – Unmanned Aerial Surveillance System
UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UGS – Unattended Ground Sensor
UGV – Unmanned Ground Vehicle
USI – Urban Security Initiative
Vdi – Velocity of a descending sensor at impact
Vdt – Terminal velocity of a descending sensor
VAT – Vulnerability Assessment Team
VSTOL – Vertical Short Takeoff and Landing
W – Work
wp – Width of a single section/beam/rectangle of a cross parachute
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Appendix i – Matrix Definitions and Ratings
Chapter 1 – Scenario Specific Surveillance
Portability Requirements Rating: The portability requirements associated with a specific scenario. These
requirements represent the maximum size and weight of surveillance assets that can be used in a particular scenario.
These requirements are rated on a scale from 1 to 10 with 10 being the most portable. The approximate translation of
this scale into real world requirements is as follows: 138
1) No portability requirements at all. Major components can be assembled on site with no respect given
to their size and weight.
2) Every component of the surveillance asset(s) used must be transportable via cargo ship
3) Every component of the surveillance asset(s) used must be transportable via heavy transport aircraft
4) Fully assembled surveillance asset(s) must be transportable via cargo ship
5) Fully assembled surveillance asset(s) must be transportable via heavy transport aircraft
6) Every component of the surveillance asset(s) used must be transportable via large, wheeled combat truck
(e.g., deuce and a half)
7) Fully assembled surveillance asset(s) must be deliverable to the battlefield via transport aircraft (e.g.,
airdrop or low-altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES)139. This level of portability also applies to
manned surveillance aircraft and UAVs which are required to take off and land from a permanent airfield
8) Fully assembled surveillance asset(s) must be transportable via large, wheeled combat truck
9) Fully assembled surveillance assets must be transportable via light truck or in a small trailer capable of
being towed by a light truck (e.g., HMMWV (aka 129umvee or hummer) or commercial pickup).
10) Most stringent portability requirements. Every component of a surveillance asset must be manportable.
Setup and Teardown Requirements Rating: The time and manpower requirements associated with a specific
scenario. These requirements represent the maximum time and manpower allotted to initially setup and then later
repackage a particular scenario’s surveillance assets. These requirements are rated on a scale from 1 to 10 with 10
requiring the least time and manpower. The approximate translation of this scale into real world requirements is as
follows:

138

Every asset with a rating of 2 or higher must also be capable of ground transport via 20 ft or 40 ft shipping
containers. If this requirement were not imposed the surveillance assets used may be too large or heavy to be
deployed where they are needed.
139
LAPES is a system used by transport aircraft for the delivery of equipment that is too heavy for conventional
airdrop. An aircraft delivering cargo to the battlefield via LAPES will fly very low to the ground, perhaps even
touching it with its main (rear) landing gear. The cargo and a parachute attached to the rear of it are then pushed
out the rear of the aircraft (cargo is mounted on a pallet designed specifically for LAPES). The aircraft then gains
altitude and flies away while the cargo it deployed skids across the ground, eventually coming to a stop (the
parachute attached to it aids in slowing the cargo as it skids across the terrain).
“Lockheed C-130 Hercules.” The Aviation Zone, March 2013.
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1) The least stringent rating. Scenarios that receive a rating of 1 are in no rush to setup their surveillance assets.
These assets may require hundreds of workers years to construct/setup and once having done so can never be
redeployed (i.e., surveillance assets that are themselves permanent installations)
2) Scenarios that require any surveillance asset(s) deployed be capable of redeployment, but ones that were not
necessarily designed or initially deployed with the intention of doing so (redeployment). This type of asset may
require dozens of personnel months to either setup or redeploy. Redeployment may require the fabrication of new
parts and/or the laying of a new foundation. Finally, the initial setup and redployment of these assets may require
the installation of supporting infrastructure, such as power and communications lines
3) Scenarios that require the use of surveillance assets designed to be redeployable, but ones that often serve as
permanent installations. The setup and redeployment of these assets may take a dozen individual between one week
and a month to accomplish
4) Scenarios that require the deployment and redeployment of surveillance assets in less than a week. These types
of assets have command and control centers that require more time to deploy and redeploy than the sensors
themselves (approximately a week for the command and control center compared to a few hours for the sensors).
Deployment, redeployment, and the addition of sensors is more common than the redeployment of the entire asset
5) Scenarios that require the deployment and redeployment of surveillance assets in less than 24 hours
6) Scenarios that require the deployment and redeployment of surveillance assets in less than 6 hours. This rating
also applies to satellites with circular and polar orbits that, depending on their altitude and type of orbit, can provide
surveillance at intervals of between 90 minutes and 6 hours140
7) Scenarios that require the deployment and redeployment of surveillance assets in less than an hour. This rating
also applies to the use of in theatre (forward deployed) or on the scene maritime assets, UAVs and manned aircraft,
the rational being that the time required for these assets to arrive is approximately 1 hour (Depending on the
scenario, the time required to arrive on scene could take anywhere from a few minutes to several hours. An
approximation of 1 hour was chosen to simplify the rating system)
8) Scenarios that require any surveillance asset(s) used consist of sensors that are networked to a mobile command
and control center. The time required to deploy and redeploy these assets is dependent on by number of individuals
deploying the network, the number of sensors deployed, and the distance those sensors are from the command and
control center. The sensors used by these assets must be capable of linking to the mobile command and control
center within minutes of their deployment
9) Scenarios that require any surveillance asset(s) utilized be capable of deployment and redeployment in less than
15 minutes by a maximum of one or two individuals
10) The most stringent rating. Scenarios that receive a rating of 10 require the use of surveillance asset(s) capable of
being deployed and redeployed by a single person in less than one minute. The sensors used by these assets must be
linked immediately following their deployment to an interface possessed by the operators (individuals who deployed
the sensors)
Terrain Rating: Terrain rating is used to quantify the type of terrain in which a particular scenario takes place.
Another way of thinking about this rating is to interpret it as the mobility requirements for assets operating in this
scenario. The terrain quantified is only that terrain which falls within the scope of that scenario (e.g., terrain beyond
140

“What is the Orbit of a Satellite?” Space Today Online, March 2013.
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a given scenario’s required distance of detection or identification is irrelevant). This rating varies on a scale from 1
to 5 with 5 being the most uneven. An approximate translation of this scale into real world topographic
features/landscapes is as follows
Scenarios with a terrain rating of:
1) take place on completely level ground
2) take place on slightly uneven terrain with infrequent, small, rolling hills and/or depressions
3) take place on uneven terrain with a high frequency of small rolling hills, a high frequency of small, rolling
hills, and/or a high frequency of shall but steep changes in elevation
4) take place on highly uneven terrain with a high frequency of large hills
5) take place on mountainous terrain with large, frequent changes in elevation
Foliage Rating: Foliage rating is used to describe the type and density of vegetation in which a scenario takes
place. Both the type and density of foliage are represented by a single variable. In addition to describing type and
density, this rating defines how much the foliage present inhibits the operation of surveillance assets. Foliage is
rated on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the most surveillance inhibiting
Scenarios with a foliage rating of:
1) take place on a landscape with short grass or none at all, on which only the occasionally patch of thick
vegetation is present. This type of foliage does not inhibit surveillance equipment whatsoever
2) take place on a landscape with tall grass and the occasional tall trees. This type of foliage may inhibit
surveillance assets that are operating at ground level but should not inhibit those that are operating several
meters or more above the grass (the higher the asset is the further it can detect and identify IOIs)
3) take place on a landscape with short or tall grass that is surrounded by large, dense patches of trees. This
type of foliage inhibits surveillance assets in a manner identical to that of rating 2. However, in addition to
the inhibiting effects of rating 2, the foliage present on this landscape can greatly inhibit an asset’s ability to
detect and identify IOIs at long range
4) takes place on a thickly forested landscape composed of boreal or temperate vegetation. This type of
foliage can vary from location to location. It can greatly inhibit the abilities of a surveillance asset to detect
and identify IOIs at both short and long ranges. However, the right assets used in the right locations can
make the detection and identification of IOI at all ranges possible (e.g., the use of ground cameras to see
through forests with thick canopies but little to no foliage close to the ground)
5) take place on a thickly forested landscape composed of subtropical or tropical vegetation. This type of
vegetation makes it nearly impossible to detect and identify IOIs unless they either leave the forested
region or approach uncomfortably close to the surveillance asset
Note: The foliage ratings above are just a guide. In most cases the foliage present in a particular scenario will
not perfectly match one of the descriptions above. If this is the case, choose the rating from the list above that
best matches the surveillance restrictions present in the new scenario

Chapter 2 – Rating of Individual Surveillance Assets
Portability Rating: Indicates how portable an asset is. This rating is based on the size and weight of an asset. If an
asset changes size and/or weight when it is being deployed, the size and weight of that asset in its stowed
configuration is the data that should be entered. Finally, this rating takes into account the terrain type of terrain an
asset can traverse (e.g., self-propelled vs. towed, wheel vs. tracked). The portability of each system is rated on a
scale from 1 to 10 with 10 being the most portable
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1) No portability requirements at all. Major components can be assembled on site with no respect given to their size
and weight.
2) Every component of the surveillance asset(s) used must be transportable via cargo ship or larger
3) Every component of the surveillance asset(s) used must be transportable via heavy transport aircraft or larger
4) Fully assembled surveillance asset is capable of being transported via cargo ship or larger
5) Fully assembled surveillance asset is capable of being transported via heavy transport aircraft or larger
6) Every component of the surveillance asset is capable of being transported via large, wheeled combat truck (e.g.,
deuce and a half) or larger
7) Fully assembled surveillance asset capable of being delivered to the battlefield via aircraft (e.g., airdrop or lowaltitude parachute extraction system (LAPES) or larger. This level of portability also applies to manned surveillance
aircraft and UAVs which are required to take off and land from a permanent airfield
8) Fully assembled surveillance asset is capable of being transported via large, wheeled combat trucks or larger
9) The fully assembled surveillance asset is capable of being transported via light truck or a small trailer towed by a
light truck (e.g., HMMWV (aka a humvee or hummer) or commercial pickup) or larger
10) Every component the surveillance asset is man-portable
Setup and Teardown Rating: This variable represents the maximum time and manpower required to initially setup
and then later repackage an asset. Both the time and manpower to do so are rated on a single scale from 1 to 10 with
10 requiring the least time and manpower. The following is a description of that scale:
1) Impossible to redeploy this asset. The only way to relocate an asset with a rating of 1 is to scrap the existing asset
for components that can be used in the new one.
2) This type of asset requires dozens of personnel months to either setup or redeploy. Redeployment of this asset
will require the fabrication of new parts and/or the laying of a new foundation. Finally, the initial setup and
redeployment of this asset may require the installation of supporting infrastructure, such as power and
communications lines
3) This type of asset has been designed to be redeployable, but to do so requires so much effort that it is often used
as a permanent installation. The setup and redeployment of this asset may take a dozen individuals between one
week and a month to accomplish
4) The deployment and redeployment of this asset takes less than a week. This type of surveillance asset has a
command and control center that requires more time to deploy and redeploy than the sensor network it is linked to
(approximately a week for the command and control center compared to a few hours for the sensors). Deployment,
redeployment, and the addition of sensors is more common than the redeployment of the entire asset
5) This asset is capable of deployment and redeployment in less than 24 hours
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6) This asset is capable of deployment and redeployment in less than 6 hours. Satellites with circular or polar orbits
that, depending on their altitude and type of orbit, can provide surveillance at intervals of between 90 minutes and 6
hours are also receive a rating of 6141
7) This asset is capable of deployment and redeployment in less than an hour. Forward deployed or on the scene
maritime assets, UAVs and manned aircraft are rated at 7; the rational being that the time required for these assets to
arrive is approximately 1 hour (Depending on the scenario, the time required to arrive on scene could take anywhere
from a few minutes to several hours. An approximation of 1 hour was chosen to simplify the rating system)
8) This type of asset consists of sensors that are networked to a mobile command and control center. The time
required to deploy and redeploy this asset is dependent on by number of individuals deploying the network, the
number of sensors deployed, and the distance those sensors are from the command and control center. The sensors
used by this asset must be capable of linking to the mobile command and control center within minutes of their
deployment
9) This asset is capable of deployment and redeployment in less than 15 minutes by a maximum of one or two
individuals
10) This type of asset is capable of being deployed and redeployed by a single person in less than one minute. The
sensors used by these assets must be linked immediately following their deployment to an interface possessed by the
operator(s) (individuals who deployed the sensors)
Mobility Rating: The ability of an asset to traverse rough terrain based on the published capabilities of the asset in
question and its design features (e.g., self-propelled vs. towed, wheel vs. tracked). This rating is takes into account
the terrain rating of a particular scenario, rough terrains demand assets with higher mobility ratings. Mobility is
rated on a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 being the most mobile
Assets with a mobility rating of:
1) are capable of traversing slightly uneven terrain with infrequent, small, rolling hills and/or depressions
2) are capable of traversing uneven terrain with a high frequency of small rolling hills, a high frequency of
small, rolling hills, and/or a high frequency of shall but steep changes in elevation
3) are capable of traversing highly uneven terrain with a high frequency of large hills
4) are capable of traversing mountainous terrain with large, frequent changes in elevation
5) are airborne and not at all limited by terrain. These assets include manned aircraft, UAVs, and satellites
Foliage Rating: Foliage rating is used to quantify the effect foliage has on the surveillance capabilities of a
surveillance asset. As with terrain, the specific type and density of vegetation is not taken into account. Instead, this
rating represents the extent to which any foliage inhibits the surveillance capability of an asset relative to other
assets. Foliage is rated on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 representing an asset whose surveillance capabilities are least
affected by foliage
Assets with a foliage rating of:
1) can operate effectively in a landscape with short grass or none at all, on which only the occasionally patch
of thick vegetation is present
2) can operate effectively in a landscape with tall grass and the occasional tall trees

141

“What is the Orbit of a Satellite?” Space Today Online, March 2013.
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3) can operate effectively in a landscape with short or tall grass that is surrounded by large, dense patches of
trees
4) can operate effectively in a thickly forested landscape composed of boreal or temperate vegetation
5) can operate in a thickly forested landscape composed of subtropical or tropical vegetation. This asset may
have its surveillance capabilities inhibited but not the extent that it is incapable of providing effective
surveillance
Note: The foliage ratings above are just a guide. In most cases the foliage present in a particular scenario will not
perfectly match one of the descriptions above. If this is the case, choose the rating from the list above that best
matches the surveillance restrictions present in the new scenario
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Appendix ii – Off the Shelf Components Compatible for Use Onboard the PSN
Thermal Cameras
FLIR First Mate II and First Mate II MS - $1,900 - $3,000
These are thermal cameras manufactured by FLIR that are designed for use by mariners. The
resolution of the thermal images the First Mate II and First Mate II MS are 240 x 180 and
320x240 respectively. Depending on which is purchased, these cameras are capable of detecting
(and distinguishing between other IOIs detect) humans at between 1100 and 1500ft and small
vehicles at between three and four thousand feet. Both units of them are capable of running for
over 5 hours on 4 AA batteries and can be operated continuously for years without malfunction
or harming the camera in any way. 142

Figure ii.1: Handheld FLIR thermal cameras143
142

Information pertaining to the continuous operation of these units was acquired via email with FLIR customer
service, a fact which online research reaffirmed.
The rest of the information on these two units was acquired from:
“First Mate II & First Mate II MS Handheld Thermal Night Vision Cameras.” FLIR, April 2013.
143
Ibid.
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PTZ M1-D Micro Thermal Camera - $4,000 - $15,000
Despite the fact that it isn’t a standard, inexpensive, and commercially available thermal camera,
the M1-D is a product worth considering. It is a self-contained system that, in a dome only 4.5”
wide, has a thermal camera, standard daytime digital camera, and rangefinder. The hardware
cost between four and six thousand dollars, but does not include a controller. The cost of
purchasing the camera and all of the ancillary equipment needed to make it work is between
approximately twelve and fifteen thousand dollars. Despite having performed a large amount of
online research and successfully contacting the manufacturer via email, it is difficult to

Figure ii.2: PTZ M1-D thermal camera144
determine what, if any, additional equipment (that equipment which drives the price beyond the
cost of the camera itself) would be required to use the M1-D in the construction of a sample PSN
system. It is probable that the cost of using the M1-D will be prohibitive even if none of this
equipment is required; it may be more expensive and difficult to program around an already
144

“M1-D Micro Thermal FLIR PTZ Camera.” SPI Infrared, April 2013.
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developed system than it is to construct and program one from scratch. Moreover, these cameras
are manufactured by a single company which is based in China. Using a single, foreign supplier
may drive the price up and put US operators at unacceptable risk (e.g., the threat of a virus
embedded in the hardware, yes hardware, of the circuitry inside the camera).

Rangefinders
Unfortunately there wasn’t enough time to catalogue any commercially available laser
rangefinders. However, research has confirmed that there are many different makes and models
of them available on the commercial market. The majority of these rangefinders, which cost
between $150 and $500, are used for either hunting or golfing. All of them are capable of
ranging IOI the size of a person out to 300m, while some (over half) do so at distances of over
750m – far beyond the detection distance of all the thermal cameras being considered for use in
the construction of the PSN.

Flashlights
Barska
1200 Lumen High Power LED Tactical - $130-$150
Only a few flashlights were tested for use with the PSN, the most capable being the Barska High
Power LED Tactical Flashlight, or BTF (not an official acronym). The BTF was purchased at a
retail price of $130, is made from aircraft quality aluminum, has a maximum diameter of 2” and
a handle diameter of approximately 1”. The small size of both the lens and handle make this an
ideal component for inclusion in the construction of a PSN system. Perhaps the most impressive
aspect of this flashlight is that it can, on just two AA batteries, operate continuously on its
brightest setting (1200 lumens) for 45 minutes.
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Testing revealed that a single flashlight is capable of illuminating an area 10m wide at distances
approaching 150m. However, at 150m the light may not be enough to capture a good, highquality image of an IOI. At shorter distances, 90-100m, the flashlight was able to successfully
illuminate objects to such an extent that (at night when using this flashlight) an individual (using
only their mk 8 sights) is capable of seeing all the detail they would be able to see during the
day. These tests suggest that two flashlights would be able to provide this level of illumination
at distances between 115-130m, all the while illuminating a much larger area. The only problem
with estimating the performance and/or cost of using this flashlight in the construction of a PSN
system is the unknown cost of modifying it to the specifications required for use on a PSN
system.

Figure ii.3: Barska 1200 lumen flashlight145
145

“1200 Lumen High Power LED Tactical Flashlight.” Barska, April 2013.
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Appendix iii - Dimension and Mass of Each Sensor and Component
(using 6061 T6 aluminum for all “plates and tubes”)
Part 1A: 4.25” x 0.25” plate (0.164 kg), two 4.25” x 0.125” plates (0.082 kg each), twelve 3.8” x 1.5” x
0.125” sheets (0.018 kg each) = 0.462 kg

Figure iii.1: Part 1A – Top

Figure iii.2: Part 1A - Bottom

Part 1B: 4.25” x 0.25” plate (0.164 kg), three 4.25” x 0.125” plates (0.082 kg each), eighteen 3.8” x 1.5”
x 0.125” sheets (0.018 kg each) = 0.652 kg

Figure iii.3: Part 1B – Top

Figure iii.4: Part 1B – Bottom
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Part 2A: 4.5” x 1” plate (0.704 kg)

Figure iii.5: Part 2A Top

Figure iii.6: Part 2A Bottom

Part 2B: 4.5” x 1” plate (0.352 kg)

Figure iii.7: Part 2B Top

Figure iii.8: Part 2B Bottom

Part 3A: 3” x 8” x 0.25” tube (1.692 kg), 4.5” x 13.5” x 0.125” tube (1.031 kg), 4.5” x ½” plate (0.352
kg), 0.75” x 14” rod (0.606 kg) = 3.682 kg

Figure iii.9: Part 3A – Top

Figure iii.10: Part 3A - Bottom
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Part 3B: 3.5” x 8” x 0.125” tube (xxx kg), 4.5” x 13.5” x 0.125” tube (1.031 kg), 4.5” x ½” plate (0.352
kg), 0.75” x 14” rod (0.606 kg), four 1.25” x 0.5” x 8” x 0.125” U-shaped (xxx kg), four 1” x 0.5” x 8” x
0.125” (xxx kg), four 0.75” x 0.25” x 0.125” (xxx kg) = xxx kg
Part 4A: 2.5” x 8” x 0.25 tube (0.332 kg), 4.5” x ½” plate (0.352 kg), 4.5” x 7.5”, x 0.125” tube (0.573) =
1.553 kg

Figure iii.11: Part 4A Top

Figure iii.12: Part 4A Bottom

Part 5: two 4” x 0.125” plates (0.070 kg), ¾” x 2” rod (.039 kg) = 0.179 kg

Figure iii.13: Part 5 – Top

Figure iii.14: Part 5 - Bottom

Part 6A: batteries (0.284 kg each for 11,000 mah batteries), three spikes (0.068 kg each), camera and lens
(0.284 kg), three springs (0.243 kg average each) = 1.59 kg with 3 batteries, 2.442 kg with 6 batteries, and
3.294 kg with 9 batteries

142
Part 6B: batteries (0.284 kg each for 11,000 mah batteries), three spikes (0.068 kg each), camera and lens
(1.0 kg), three springs (0.243 kg average each) = 2.306 kg with 3 batteries, 3.154 kg with 6 batteries, and
4.196 kg with 9 batteries
Part 7: parachute and cord = 0.680 kg
Mass Calculations for the Entire Assembly Less Batteries, Camera, Springs
Mass of the assembly with 9 batteries and 6A = 10.885 kg
Mass of the assembly with 6 batteries and 6A = 9.843 kg
Mass of the assembly with 9 batteries and 6B = 11.021 kg
Mass of the assembly with 6 batteries and 6B = 10.559 kg
Assembled Sub-Components

Figure iii.15: Part 1A with 3 batteries installed

Figure iii.16: Part 5 with camera dome installed

Figure iii.17: Part 2B w/ Spikes

Figure iii.18: Part 2B w/ Spikes Profile
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Fully Assembled Air Drop/Tactical P-Sensors
Option 1: 100% waterproof w/ FLIR, 3G, and Wi-Fi

Figure iii.19: Deployed Air Drop Sensor

Figure iii.120: Stowed Air Drop Sensor
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Fully Assembled Ground Sensors
Option 1: 100% waterproof w/ FLIR, 3G, and Wi-Fi

Figure iii.21:Option 1
Stowed

Figure iii.22: Option 1 Deployed

Option 2: FLIR, 3G, Wi-Fi, solar and telescoping sensor array (9.5ft sensor and
communications)

Figure iii.23: Option 2 deployed (note the size of the arms and panels, which attach
to the top of the second tier of cylinders, not the first as in other options)
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Fully Assembled C-Sensors (camera sits approx. 15” above the ground, 12” for center tube, 2”
support shaft, from camera bottom to lens)

Option 1: IR, Wi-Fi, all-terrain mount, solar

Figure iii.24: Option 1 Deployed

Option 2: Optical zoom with flash, all-terrain mount, solar

Figure iii.25: Option 2 deployed – front
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Appendix iv – Equipping Air Dropped Sensors and the Sensor Development Tool
At the end of this appendix there is a printout from an Excel spreadsheet that was created to
enable the quick testing of various sensor configurations. This spreadsheet, sometimes referred
to as the Sensor Development Tool (SDT), can determine the G forces at impact and terminal
velocity of sensors based on their configuration (what components are installed) and the selected
parachutes specifications. The resulting info is compared against the known tolerances of the
equipment carried by each sensor. Based on this comparison, adjustments to the design of the
parachute are made to attain a velocity that is less than or equal to Vdt.146 In addition to assisting
in the design and selection of a parachute, this spreadsheet was designed to be a highly dynamic,
time saving tool.
The spread sheet associated with this appendix uses a variety of constants including: the mass of
various components, Cd estimates for each type of parachute, and the suspension travel allotted
by various components. The ability to alter these values without having to modify the rest of the
spreadsheet makes it much easier know how a sensor will perform if modification are made.
Without this spreadsheet any change in the design of the sensor would require recalculating
many of these values from scratch. The detail put into the development of this spreadsheet has
enabled it to serve functions beyond its intended use. For example, the process of actively
updating the specification of various components (e.g., cameras, shocks, etc.) was originally very
tedious, now all of that can be done by changing values in this one spreadsheet. Nonetheless, the
primary purpose of this spreadsheet is to assist in the design of parachutes. The following pages
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Vdt is used because there are several different velocities being calculated when deploying an air dropped sensor.
Further confusing the matter is the fact that some variables, such as terminal velocity and impact velocity, are
actually representing the exact same value. However, they need to be given distinct variables since, despite
representing the same value, they are a function of different variables. This will become clear later in the
appendix. In this case Vdt is used as the variable to represent the terminal velocity of the descending sensor.
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provide brief introductions to the various physics at work in this spreadsheet, organized by the
sub-chapter based on the value that sub-chapter sought to derive.

Calculating Average Deceleration Through Impact
(assuming constant deceleration through impact)
The deceleration through impact is quite possibly the most important value to consider when
constructing an air dropped sensor. This value is usually given in terms of ‘G’s’, nomenclature
which stands for G-forces or gravitational forces. One gravitational force is equal to 9.81 m/s2,
the acceleration of imparted on objects by the Earth when those objects are at sea-level. With
this in mind, G-forces calculated in this section will be done so using the SI unit of m/ss. After
this task has been accomplished, these values will be converted into G-forces in an effort provide
a more tangible value, one that is more easily comprehended by the average person than m/s2.
What makes the calculation of the average deceleration so important is that it provides a
reference point for the design of the sensor itself. Each component in a sensor is rated to
withstand a maximum sustained deceleration. These components are shielded against near
instantaneous deceleration by devices designed to dampen the impact of going from terminal
velocity to a complete stop in only a fraction of a second. These ‘dampeners’ work by extending
the time it takes for various components of the sensor to come to a complete stop.
Unfortunately, there is little room to increase the existing dampening of the sensor. These
limitations imposed by the compact design of the sensor and the desire use as many components
from the standard sensor as possible. As a result, the average deceleration through impact must
be controlled by altering the sensor’s impact velocity, which in this case is also the sensor’s
terminal velocity.
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Terminal velocity is the speed at which the force imparted on an object by gravity is equal to the
force of drag. When an object reaches this velocity it will cease to accelerate.

This section uses

both known and derived values to determine what the terminal velocity must be to ensure that the
sensor’s various sub-components are not subjected to deceleration that exceeds the specified
tolerance of each sub- component.

Meanwhile, the design of the sensor itself leaves little room

for modifications that reduce the
The first step in calculating the terminal velocity of a sensor based on its average deceleration
through impact is determining what the stopping distance, Sd, is for each sub-component of the
sensor itself. The following is taken directly from the spreadsheet:
Component & Unsprung Length (m)
LC Synthetic Cushion / 0.0064
HC Synthetic Cushion / 0.0128
Main Shock Absorber / 0.381
Stakes / 0.2032
High G Battery Shocks / 0.0889
LC Shocks / (0.0381)
Battery Cushion (0.0128)

Component Travel (m)
0.0032
0.0064
0.1778
0.1524
0.0445
0.0191
0.0064
Total Sensor Travel Sd (m)

LC Low G
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
0.3525

LC High G
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.3525

HC Low G
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
0.3366

Total Battery Travel Sd (m)

0.1588

0.2033

0.1588

Table iv.1: Average deceleration per component

The table above is broken down by component and sensor variant. In this case, sensors vary
based on their payload and the magnitude of deceleration (or G’s) that sensor is designed to
endure. The three variants are: Light Camera Low G, Light Camera High G, and Heavy Camera
Low G. The total Sd of each sensor is located at the bottom of the table. Using these values, a
hypothetical value for the velocity of the sensor at impact (Vdi)147 and the time (t) required to
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Velocity of the descending sensor at impact. The formula used is the same formula used to calculate Vdt. This is
based on the assumption that the sensor will reach Vdt before impacting the ground. If it does not this value will
be different, hence the use of a different variable.
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decelerate from Vdi  V0 can be calculated. Based on this calculation the acceleration (ad)
through impact can be derived using the following formula:
Sd = ½ ad * t2 – Vdi * t

Unfortunately, the objective is to determine what Vdi is required for a specific deceleration, not
the other way around. Therefore, the equation must be rewritten so that Vdi is a function of t, Sd,
and ad. This new equation is:
Vdi = (½ ad * t2 - Sd) / t

At this point the equation above is still a function of t. This equation must be rewritten as a
function of ad and Sd since t itself is not a known value. Fortunately, this is a simple equation to
derive:
Vdi = ½ ad * t2  t = ((2 * Sd) / ad)0.5
By combining the functions for Ad and t we arrive at the final equation for Vdi which is:
Vdi = (½ ad * (((2 * Sd) / ad)0.5)2 - Sd) / (((2 * Sd) / ad)0.5)

Determining the Proper Parachute Design for Air Dropped Sensors
The proper parachute is an essential component of the air dropped sensor. Too small a parachute
and the sensor will be damaged on impact. If too large a parachute is used there are a myriad of
problems that become obvious. The first of these deals with the flight of the sensor itself. A
parachute that is too large may cause the sensor to strike the earth with insufficient velocity to
plant (or stake) itself in the ground. Another problem dealing with the flight of the sensor is
drift. The larger the parachute the more likely the parachute is to either sail or oscillate while
descending. If the parachute does either then its descent has a lateral component, increasing the
chance that the sensor will not properly plant itself in the ground. Finally, a large parachute may
inhibit the sensors ability to penetrate dense foliage.
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The second set of concerns that must be addressed when deciding on a parachute deal with the
technical and operational needs of the system itself. If too large a parachute is used each sensor
will be both heavier and more expensive. Using a heavy sensor means that aircraft will be able
to carry less of them than they otherwise could. Moreover, if the sensor descends slowly, on the
back of a large parachute, it is more likely to be spotted by those whom the sensor is intended to
monitor.
A final detail to consider is what type of chute. Various chutes have their benefits and
shortcomings. Beyond that, one can choose certain ‘options’ for a parachute such as how long
the risers are or how large, if any, of a hole is in the center of the canopy. Regardless of what
issues are considered when choosing a parachute, the objective should be to use one that
provides the most stable and highest velocity flight path that is technically possible (without
damaging the sensor).
The spreadsheet at the end of this appendix uses a plethora of variables to determine a sensor’s
terminal velocity, most of which have to do with the massive variety of parachute options that
are available. Deriving the terminal velocity of a sensor based upon its aerodynamic and
Newtonian qualities may seem at first a little counter-intuitive given what the objective of this
chapter: to determine a correct parachute for a specific sensor. However, this is exactly what is
being calculated and for good reason. Unlike the previous calculations performed to derive Vdi
as a function of ad, there are many combinations of variables that can produce the same terminal
velocity (Vdt) when choosing a parachute (in the case of deceleration, there was only one value
of Vdi for a given value ad since Sd was known from the start). With parachutes it is more
important to select the type of parachute first, usually a decision that is based on the type of
sensor being deployed, the environment of deployment, and the operational needs of the mission.
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However, even after deciding on a specific type of parachute there is still more than one
independent variable left. Nonetheless, a specific parachute can be calculated based on
additional criteria such as the desired stability of a falling sensor. Unfortunately it is difficult to
determine how changes to the parachute affect these criteria without conducting real life trials
using full size sensors. Because of this limitation, those attributes which are difficult to
predict/calculate will be left out of the discussion, with the exception being that when parachute
designs are introduced any inherent qualities of those parachutes will also mentioned.
The next few paragraphs will introduce the various types of parachutes available, design
variables, and any qualities inherent to them. In addition, the equations used to derive the
terminal velocity for each parachute will be summarized, beginning with the only equation which
is inherent to every type of parachute.
Note: All of the parachutes in this section are going to serve the role of a drogue parachute. This
type of parachute typically functions at very high speeds and can typically be found on aircraft,
spacecraft, and airdropped munitions.
Equations Inherent to All Parachute Types
The following equation is used to determine the terminal velocity of an object given certain
perimeters:
∗"∗#$ *.,

Vdt = ! %∗&∗'( )

This equation depends on the coefficient of drag (Cd), mass (m) in kg, force of gravity (Fg) in
m/s2, air density (ρ) in kg/m3, and surface area (A) in m3 of the object that is perpendicular to the
velocity of that object. Some of these variables have been already been introduced, some have
not.
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Cd is a dimensionless variable that expresses the ability of a shape to resist the force of drag
imparted on it by the fluid, in this case air, through which that shape is moving. This value is
independent of the both the shape’s size, mass, and density (i.e., two objects can have the same
size, shape, and different masses but still possess the same Cd). All things constant, as Cd
increases so too does the force of drag acting on the object. There is however more to
estimating the Cd of a falling object. As Vdt can increase or decrease (depending on the
parachute) as Cd decreases, if only marginally. This variation is difficult to gauge since the flow
of air around the object itself can change radically with a change in Vdt. Because of this, the Cd
for each component will be estimated using a more simple method for all calculations performed
using the SDT.
Every component of a sensor must be accounted for when calculating the Vdt of a falling object.
In this case that usually means the drag due to the sensor and the parachute. When deciding on
the surface area to account for it had to be determined whether to account for the surface area of
the sensor (Ads) and that of the entire parachute (Ap) or the surface area of the sensor and
parachute less the area of the parachute directly above the sensor. The two facts that decided
whether to account for the drag of the sensor and the parachute above it were the shape of the
sensor and the distance between the top of the sensor and the bottom of the parachute. Since
nearly every air dropped sensor has a rounded top and is suspended a distance of between two to
three meters below the parachute it is highly probable that the vacuum created behind the path of
the falling sensor will have dissipated by the time that air contacts the parachute. Next, the
equation above must be rewritten so that it can account for drag imparted by both the sensor and
the parachute, each of which has its own Cd and Ad.
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From this point on the Cd and Ad for parachutes and sensors will be represented by the following
variables:
Cdp = Cd of a parachute
sensor

Cds = Cd of a sensor

Adpd = Ad of a deployed parachute

Ads = Ad of a

Using these variables the equation for Vdt is rewritten to account for the drag imparted on the
falling sensor by both the sensor itself and the parachute dangling above it. This new equation
is:
∗"∗#$

Vdt = !%∗&(-∗'(-

∗%∗&(.∗'(-

)

*.,

where m is the mass of the entire assembly

The final equation shared by nearly all the parachutes examined in the thesis is that which
governs the base Cdp for each parachute. This simple equation is only an estimate, but is as
follows:148
Cdp = Adpd / Adpf

In this equation Adpf is the total surface area of the parachute (i.e., if the parachute were laid out
flat) while Adpd is the previously stated variable representing the area of the parachute that is
perpendicular to the motion of the descending sensor. Bear in mind that this relationship does
not account for velocity. If it did, flat parachutes would be superior to all others, which they are
not. This is simply a reference point for how parachutes of a similar design behave when their
geometry is altered.
In addition to the formula above there are some constants worth mentioning that are used in the
coming sections and in the SDT. First, the Cds used for each all calculations of Vdt is Cds = 0.75.
This is a rough calculation based on the known Cd for long cylinders (0.82), short cylinders
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Sher, S. and Young, I. Drag Coefficients for Partially Inflated Flat Circular Parachutes. NASA, Washington DC,
September 1971. p. 2
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(1.15)149 and spheres (0.47). This estimation takes into account the general shape of the sensor
(long cylindrical), the narrow center section with partially exposed cylindrical faces on the top
and bottom (short cylinder), and the dome shaped camera lens (spherical). The last and final
constant is actually one which is programmed into the spreadsheet itself. In order to attain
realistic values of terminal velocity for each parachute, the Cdp was first determined using the
equation above, after which Vdt was calculated as normal. Next, this Vdt was used to calculate a
second Cdp that takes into account the original velocity. This new Cdp is then used to calculate a
final Vdt. The trick was to modify the second Cdp equation so that the second Cdp mirrors those
of real parachutes. Though exhaustive, this process provides an excellent estimation of how Cd
varies with velocity.
Flat Parachutes
Flat parachutes are the least efficient and capable of all commonly used parachutes. Their Cdp is
fairly high at low velocities (below 10 m/s).150 Because of this, the previous equation for
calculating a parachute’s Cdp works well so long the velocity is low. However, the Cdp of flat
parachutes decreases considerably. Because of this, these parachutes tend to collapse the faster
they travel. Making matters worse, when this parachute collapses its diameter decreases and its
height increases, resulting in lower values for both Cdp and Adpd.
Unfortunately it is difficult to determine the how much a flat parachute’s Adpd decreases as
velocity increases. To simplify the problem, this characteristic was accounted for (in SDT) when
programing the calculation of this parachutes velocity-corrected Cdp. As if the flat parachute was
not lacking in enough qualities already, it is also inherently unstable at high velocity. The only
149

Ludtke, W. Effects of Canopy Geometry on Drag Coefficients of a Cross Parachute in the Fully Open and Reefed
Conditions for a W/L ratio of 0.26. Naval Ordinance Laboratory, Silver Spring, MD, August 1971.
150
Sher, S. and Young, I. Drag Coefficients for Partially Inflated Flat Circular Parachutes. NASA, Washington DC,
September 1971. p. 8
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real advantage to using a flat parachute is that it is inexpensive and performs well at low
velocity. Considering the fact that the Vdi of PSN sensors is two to three times velocity at which
flat parachutes are designed to function, these parachutes are not a viable option for use on PSN
sensors.

Figure iv.1: A 36” flat parachute used the U.S. Army to deploy flares

Domed Parachutes
Domed parachutes are some of the most common parachutes in existence. These parachutes
perform considerably better at higher velocities than flat ones. Depending on the specific design
of the parachute and velocity, Cd can vary between 0.4 and 1.4. For the sake of this thesis, SDT
was calibrated according to NATO tests performed at high velocities on a several different

157

domed parachutes151. These parachutes tested varied considerably based on seeming innocuous
details such as the type of stitching and fabric used to construct them. With that in mind, the
variables used to determine the Vdi for these parachutes has been reduced to Cdp, hole diameter,
and canopy inflation.
The only new variable to consider is hole diameter, or dh. This variable refers to a hole that can
be cut into the very top of the parachute. This hole allows some of the air trapped in the canopy
to escape through it, increasing stability and reducing lateral drift. This value is usually between
1/6th and 1/7th the diameter of a deployed parachute (dp).

Figure iv.2: Dome type drogue parachute with hole in the top152

Cross Parachutes
The modern cross parachute is a relatively recent design compared to those which have been
discussed so far. While it is more complicated to construct than a flat parachute it is easier to
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Maydew, R.C. and Peterson, C.W. Design and Testing of High-Performance Parachutes. Advisory Group for
Aerospace Research and Development, Neuilly Sur Seine, France, 1991. p. 15
152
Ibid. p. 162
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construct than a regular dome parachute and both less expensive and considerably less complex
than high speed dome parachutes. It should come as no surprise that cross parachutes are also an
excellent design for high speed applications, in most cases serving a drogue parachute. Drogue
chutes are parachutes that are designed to slow but not necessarily stop a craft. This means that
the average cross parachute is designed to function at a higher velocity than most flat and domed
type parachutes. Just as important is the fact that these cross parachutes are fairly stable at high
speeds – they have to be when serving as a drogue parachute that is attached to an aircraft or
bomb!
Because cross parachutes are designed to function at high velocity they are the only parachute
studied in this appendix that has a Cdp that increases, however slightly, as velocity increases.
There is a slight drop between 0 and 15 m/s but it immediately climbs as velocity increases, well
beyond 90 m/s. The average Cdp for this type of parachute is 0.68 at 30 m/s, 0.70 at 60 m/s, and
0.72 at 90 m/s.153 The SDT has been calibrated using these values as a baseline. When it comes
to high velocity parachutes the cross is hard to beat. This is an important fact when considering
what parachute to equip the PSN airdropped sensors with since these sensors would be released
from aircraft traveling at velocities that are often in excess of 100 m/s. The cross parachute’s
ability to sustain a relatively high Cdp at this velocity means that the initial deceleration will be
faster than that of dome parachutes, something which is crucial if PSN sensors are deployed at a
high velocity and low altitude.
The Adp and Adf of the cross parachute are as follows:
Adp = (2 * ( (lp * wp))/(0.5 * π) – (1/3 * wp)
153

Adf = 2*(lp * wp) – (1/3 * wp)

Ludtke, W. Effects of Canopy Geometry on Drag Coefficients of a Cross Parachute in the Fully Open and
Reefed Conditions for a W/L ratio of 0.26. Naval Ordinance Laboratory, Silver Spring, MD, August 1971.
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In this equation lp is the variable representing the length of a single rectangular section and wp
the width of that same section.

Figure iv.3: F-16 using a cross type drogue parachute - Photo courtesy of Aerazur

Inverted Rigid Parachutes
ad = Deceleration, which is measured in m/s2, ft/s2, or G’s. One G = 9.81 m/s2 or 32.2 ft/s2
Sd = Stopping Distance, which is measured in m/s or ft/s

Time from impact to zero velocity = t

tb = time to go from impact to zero velocity for the batteries, spikes, and parts 1 and 3
tc = time to go from impact to zero velocity for the camera, part 2, and associated electronics
Sd = ½ Ad*t2 – Vd * t = total distance internal components have to decelerate from Vd to 0
Sd will vary based on the component and how far the sensor sticks into the ground (max of 0.667 ft)

For the purpose of this derivation Sd for the batteries and impact spikes (and all of parts 1 and 3)
will be estimated at Sb = 8” (0.203 m) and Sc1 = 16” (0.406 m) with 8” (0.406 m) of spring
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compression, SC2 = 24” (0.610 m) for a device with 16” (0.406 m) of spring compression, and Sc3
= 18” = 0.457 m and 10”

(0.254 m) of spring compression.

Determining What Spring to Use for Each Section
Stopping distance = x = 3” for under camera, 7” for center tube, and 8” for spikes = 1.416 ft = 0.508 m
Stopping distance for the batteries is 8” for the spikes and 2” for the battery springs = 0.833 ft = 0.254 m
Total mass of the assembly with 3 batteries = 9.453kg
Total mass of the assembly with 6 batteries = 10.301 kg

So, the first spring constant is that for the entire bottom assembly which will be stopping in
0.203 m (spikes). However, after this section has stopped the rest of the sensor will still be in
motion. The batteries will have a travel of 0.051” additional travel. The spring used in the
batteries should prolong the impact as much as possible but also ensure that the batteries are
stopped when the spring is fully compressed. If they are not, the batteries will experience rapid
deceleration and extremely high G forces as the remaining velocity is absorbed near
instantaneously.
The second step is to ensure that shock absorber and spring in the mid-section have the proper
spring constant. If they do, they will extend the time through impact as long as possible but also
ensure that the upper section (minus camera assembly) to a complete stop when the spring is
nearing full compression. In this section, the force imparted by the camera and its assembly are
ignored to simply the problem. The mass of the camera, though not negligible, can be accounted
for by using a slightly stiffer center spring.
The final component is to determine what the proper spring constant is for the spring below the
camera. Once again, the objective is to extend the stopping time as long as possible. However,
in this case, the time that the spring should extend time beyond is the time it takes the center
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spring to fully compress. As in the previous cases, the camera should come to a complete stop
when the spring in the upper section has reached its maximum compression.
m = meters for the equations below
F = Force = N
p = momentum = kg * (m/s) = N*s
x = spring compression/stopping distance = m
2
2
Ek = Kinetic Energy = (kg * m )/s = J
Ep = Potential Energy = J
k = spring constant = N/m
w = work = J

m = mass for the equations below = 9.453 kg vdi = velocity at impact = 14.691 m/s x = 16” = 0.406 m
Ek = ½ m * (vdi)2 and

Ep = Ek = ½ k * x2  k = (2*Ek) / x2

Ek = ½*9.453 * 14.6912 = 1020.099 J Ep = 1020.099  w = F * x = 1020.099
F = w / x = 1020.099 / .403 = 2512.559 N through impact F = k*x  k = F / x = 6188.569 N/m
m = mass for the equations below = 9.453 vdi = velocity at impact = 22.007 m/s x = 16” = 0.406 m
Ek = ½ m * (vdi)2 and

Ep = Ek = ½ k * x2  k = (2*Ek) / x2

Ek = ½*9.453 * 22.0072 = 2289.082 J Ep = 2289.082  w = F * x = 2289.082
F = w / x = 2289.082 / .403 = 5680.104 N through impact F = k*x  k = F / x = 13990.404 N/m
Note: Additional calculations required to determine the correct springs and dampeners for use in the final design.
The work provided in this section is more than enough of a starting point from which that work can be performed.
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